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TOWARD A THEORY OF COMMUNAL CONFLICT: The Case of Cyprus 
by Dav id J. Dunr1 
1. 
ABSTRACT 
·As a first step towards the construction of a theory 
(or set of theories) relating to conununal conflict, the 
present work focuses upon a study of the evolution of 
r:~lationships between Greek- and Turk1,.sh-Cypriots in Cyp-: ! l 
' 
rus, from 1571 to the present. Cyprus, representing a 
middle-range case in a typology of apparent communal con-
flict, is a prime example of the way an initial situation 
of· "difference" (in an ethnic, cultural sense) accelerates 
to become successively, geographical separation, political 
separation, and finally, absolute separation through mutual I 
violence. Through a fairly detailed, chronological account 
these changes are plotted. The case is complicated some-
what by the involvement--o-f outside parties in the pri~ary 
dispute. The implications of this involvement are tenta-
tively explored. Reference is made to the several mediation 
efforts aimed at reaching "a solution" and the stated con-
clusion is that these efforts have failed due to an inabil-
ity (or unwillingness) on the part of participants to separ-
ate the primary dispute from secondary and tertiary disputes 
concerned with the status of Cyprus. 
The concept of a violence threshold is put forward as 
a critical point in need of further analysis, together with 
refornLUlations of concepts relating to frustration, defensive 
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. group mechanisms and group Structures during conflicts. 
i 
Finally, a definition 
I 
; 
\that is substantially 
/ 
of "conununal conflict" is given, 
different from a definition of 
"civil war" by virtue of the absence of a degree of 
1 
·' 
civitas or community. 
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ABSTRACT 
,· 
.. 
' . 
As a first step towards the construction of a theory 
I 
(br ~et of theories) relating to communal conflict, the 
present work focuses upon a study of the evolution of 
~elationships between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots in Cyp-
rus, from 1571 to the present. Cyprus, representing a 
I • 
-middle-range case in a typology of apparent conununal con-
flict, is a prime example of the way an initial situation l 
o:f. "difference'' (in an ethnic, cultural sense) accelerates 
to become successively, geographical separation, political 
separation,. and finally, absolute separation through mutual 
violence. Through a fairly detailed, chronological account 
these changes are plotted. The case is complicated some-
what by the involvement of outside parties in the primary 
dispute. The implications of this involvement are tenta-
tikely explored; Reference is made to the several mediation 
ef 1forts aimed at reaching "a solution" and the stated con-
clusion is that these efforts have failed due to an inabil-
, 
I 
' 
l ity (or unwillingness) on the part of participants to separ-f I 
l ate th~ prim~ry dispute from secondary and tertiary disputes 
concer.p.ed with the status of Cyprus. I 
. ! 
T~e concept of a violence threshold is put forward as : i 
! 
' • i. • • a cr1t1cal. point in need of further analysis, together with 
reformulations of concepts relating to frustration, defensive 
'I· 
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9~otlp mechanisms and group structures during conflicts. . ' -
Finally, a definition of "communal conflict" is given, 
,,;.~ ' 
thatjis substaritially different from a definition of 
I 
I 
I 
"ci\til war" by virtue of the absence of a degree of I 
! 
I 
I 
civ~tas or community. 
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INTRODUCTION :·· 1 
...... 
I - f' 
~. ... 
·, 
The decade of the nineteen sixties saw the appearance, 
in quite overt fashion, of an apparently new class of con-
• 
flict~; the Nigeria-Biafra conflict, civil disorder in Ul-
ster, communal strife in Malaysia, language conflict in 
Belgium, separatist movements among the Frenc11 r)opulation 
' ; 
of <;anada, conflict between Tamil and Sinhalese in Ce~· lon, 
' ' 
c:onflict '·in the Horn of Africa, racial conflict in Ken:/a 
. ' . 
·an·d fin.ally, but certainly no less important, inter-conunun-.. ' 
a1. strif-~ in Cyprue, were the compnent parts of the class. 
The theme behind these conflicts, the factor which appar-
ently unites them in the same generic class, is that of 
".difference" ·._ the separation of one group from anotl1er 
either physically, psychologically, or both. In all these 
.. 
cases the parties are separated by factors of race, lang-
,uage, .colour or religion~ Generally, these factors rr1c1 \" be 
.... 
sul:>sumed under the heading "ethnic" - a generic term used ·t 
' 
to· designate groups characterised by distinctive origin. 
In a broader sense, the term may be applied to the minority 
groups of society; they are separated by factors most eas-
ily (and significantly) labelled ethnic. All the cases 
listed are character~sed by societal cleavages along ethnic 
The pervasive feature of the cases is one of differ-
. 
ence in a fundamental, visible, lasting and sociall:~l rein-
I 
I 
• 
5. f:orced manner . 
However, ethnic difference is not necessarily a : 
I 
1 cause of conflict. When issues of ethnic difference tran-
scend the level of mere differentiation of one group ,,.. rrom 
another and difference becomes a significant factor in the 
1 ~distribution of wealth, social position and political roles, I 
then ethnic difference .becomes a key variable. The point 
to be made is that difference is significant when it deter-
mines action. Here the issue of prejudice is significant. I i )rejudice is essentially an aspect of attitude; discrimina-
,.~ tion is the disadvantageous treatment of one grol1p b~:i" c1nc)th-
er. In the group of cases listed, one group in each conflict 
c,;l.a.ims to be the object of discrimination. 
~ 1 To,be sure, these conflicts did not originate in the 
sixties, but they erupted into outbreaks of violence, 
varying degrees. Indeed, it may be possible to locate these 
con~licts on a scale of "communal conflict intensity"; con-
1 s~ructed on the basis of deaths and/or damage. A tentative ; I 
' 
. 
outline of such a scale might resemble the following: 
FIGURE I: Tentative Classification of Selected Conflicts 
I I Belgium 
Kenya 
Civil 
Disturbance 
Canada 
Somalia 
Ulster 
Riot Death 
SCALE OF INTENSITY 
Malaysia 
Cyprus 
Nigeria 
Organised 
Campaign 
i 
I 
! 
6. 
Three sub~classes may be constructed, according to this 
sim~le scale. Low-level conflicts are bounded by a viol-
e_nce threshold; as yet these conflicts have not become 
¢~erly violent, despite periodic outbreaks. The middle-
ra~ge group have crossed this violence threshold, such 
that violence becomes a part of day to day life (if not , 
persistently and overtly, then intermittently, with re-
pressed hostility below the surface), yet the ·conflict is 
.. 
restrained in some way. In the higher class, conflict 
-becomes more intense, more ~ganised and more blood~~{. 
The prime example of the higher. class, that of Biafra-
Nigeria, was such that the conflict ended when one group 
-coerced the other into compliance with its demands. The 
1-ower: level conflicts are such that violence is not yet 
institutionalised and, therefore, accomodation is often 
1 pb~sible in favourable conditions. The major characteristic ' ' ' I , I l I l , I I I 
\o~ the middle range group is persistence; the conflicts I I I I I ! 
I I . 
have become persistent features of life, violence is used I 
. I 
in l~rge part and accomodation is frequently difficult if 
-not+ impossible; the prime examples are Ulster and Cyprus. I 
I The subject of the present thesis is a study of the 
conflict between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots in Cyprus, a 
conflict which has several factors to commend it as a sub-
ject of study. First, the conflict is rooted in history 
and the growth of value systems to the extent that "tradition 
~-
;._,;;;_ 
. ')).,_: ~
,.. 
7. 
.:· 
q:Ustom, ancient ambitions and resentments, and assumed 
~ Dana~ogies from the past, the history of centuries or even 
milleniums is part of the living present." 2 Political 
lea~ers have appealed to old values to muster support, i I ; 
' I 
' ' 
to rtr,e extent that "Greekness" itself is a key factor ' I I 
in need of explanation. Second, the conflict has passed 
a violence threshold so that violence becomes a sta~d3rd 
' . ' 
I "' 
• • 
·tool·of political action. An understanding of how this 
happens i-s important. Third, the conflict is persistent, 
d~spitJ the presence of a United Nations force, several 
' 
:a~tempts at mediation and periodic face to face negotiat-i 
\ 
idns between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. Moreover, the 
United Nations presence is such that it is necessary to 
evaluate rival perceptions of the conflicting parties, to 
e~tablish what the function of a peacekeeping force is or 
r 
middle range 
and,as such, it may yield insights into the nature of eth-
nic conflict in general and highlight the features that 
distingu.iSh. one conflict, or sub-class, from another. I . i 
Yet the Cyprus conflict does not exist in a purely ethnic 
form; it is the thesis to be argued here that Cyprus is 
~he subject of at least two conflicts; at the primar~~l 
levei is the dispute in Cyprus, involving issues of part-
· icipation, legitimacy and difference between 
T~r~: at the s~dary level is the conflict 
. I 
i 
., i ' . 
I , 
t 
Greek and 
over Cyprus, 
.,. 
8. i 
·\ 
··! 
:·involving the governments of Greece, Turkey and Great 
Britain. 
\: I 
\ 
The aim of the study. The aim of the present work is not 
·_I.. 
to answer a long list of difficult questions concerning I :i 
, 
'd~~putes in and over Cyprus; for one thing, the lack of ' 
! 
1a~~ilable data is such that it precludes a set of defin-1 
' \itivelanswers. The aims are more modest; to identify trends 
I 
' / :and patterns (such as they may be) -~nd to give an indication 
of th-e points which, with further study, could yield fruit-
flil results. The present work is centred on identification 
~£ a preliminary nature. ·, 
I 
On another, methodological, level the case study est-
ablishes the limits of empirical possibility and provides 
a\meeting point for historical, political and methodologi-
·Cal approach$~~ If a theory of ethnic conflict be possible, 
then salient features from one case need to be identified. 
I 
I 
1Sub~equently, these features need to be applied to other I 
. 
cases within a presumed class, to establish \vhther the 
4aotor
1
of inclusiveness is superficial or significant. 
' ·I 
I 
' 
.. ' 
; I i I \" ., I I I 
I 
I ! 
,! 
• 
,\ 
·I , 
·l 
·.1 
.;t 
I. 
CHAPTER 2 
The Factor of Ethnicity 
.. 
9. 
' ' l i 
! I v~ew of the centrality of the concept of ethnic-
i ty, i1 is necessary to elaborate on this conceot and i 
emphas~se the operational c~ponents of a definition. 
I 1 According to Naroll; and as generally understood in 
,-~nthropological literature, the culture-bearing unit 
(c-~lled by Naroll the "cul tuni t") which, for present 
. ' 
! purposes- may be made synonymous with the ethnic group, 
'has four component features; first, it is biologically 
~elf-perpetuating; second, it is characterised by shared 
I 
cultural values, realised in the overt unity of cultural 
' .. ·.• 
.. 
!fo:rms; third, it makes up a field of comrnur1ica tion ar1d 
interaction; fourth, it has a membership wl1icl1 ider1 ti-
. "';l f--ies _itself, and is identified by others as cons ti tu ting 
a qategory distinguishable from other categories of the 
i. 
same order. Despite its coherence and brevity, this def-, 
I 
inition i.s unsuitable. As the Norwegian anthropologist 
barth has put it, "it begs all the critical questions; I 
1 
i 
while purporting to give an ideal type model of a recurr-1 I 
I 
! 
.. ing.ernpirical form, ·it implies a preconceived view of i 
I 
' what are significant factors in the genesis, structure 
and function of such groups. 112 Moreover, such a definition I 
, 
I 
i 
.. 
,. 
, 
10. 
,does not necessarily explain the causal link between two 
I 
of the component parts of the definition; the acquisition 
of values and the problem of boundary maintenance. 
'~undarrtehtal cultural values are transmitted from one I 
genenation to the next through the day-to-day process I i 
I 
·of. sdcialisation; the family, the church, the school and 
the group all exert pressure to accept common values. 
What the ideal-type definition takes for granted is the 
maintenance of a group boundary. In fact the boundar\' 
... 
of any system is a crucial factor in system mainter1~nce, 
:hen:,ce the recent attention paid to the concept b:;..r an tr1.ro-
!, 
:g:ol.ogists, political scientists and others. Certain trans-. ' I 
1 
a¢tions are proscribed, others are held to be legitimate -
the crucial questions are; which transactions, when and in 
what circumstances. The logical dilenuna in the ideal-type 
definition that is unresolved is this; is the cultural-
bearing unit's distinctiveness a cause or effect of semi-
permeable boundaries? (Applied to the Cyprus case, .. aocs 
the desire of Greek-Cypriots to be Greek first and then 
Cyprio·t preclude certain types of intercourse with Turkish-
Cypr:i~Jts:? It is hoped that what follows may cast some I 
li~ht on this aspect of intergroup relations.) The social 
psychologist Muzafer Sherif had identified the nature of I 
tpe problem for he argues ( with empl1asis) that "Though I I 
not indep~ndent of the relationship within the groups in 
•• 
--------z- _-__ .. 
.. 
11. 
question, the characteristics of functional relations 
between groups cannot be deduced or extrapolated solely 
f:r::om. the properties 0f relations that prevail among 
membe.rs within the group its elf." 3 Al though not ex-
p'l,icitly stated, Sherif's concern is with the boundary 
problem; it is in some way a part of, yet separate from, 
the groups which comprise a system of interaction . 
. bmphasis on this boundary problem may yield insights ! 
, ·· ·' .ijnto the nature of in-groU:p socialisation and the gen-, 
" 
eration of attitudes. 
. 
•i 
~ 
·~ 
' t 
, __ 
•. _ 
.. 
-
,· 
. - .·~ 
. . 
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CHAPTER 3 
L 
Cyprus Before 1878 
; 
·i. 
,. 
i 
i fh~ island of Cyprus has never been a part of the 
G;r-·,eek] nation-state, yet the influence of Gree}: r1istor}' . 
' :t 
' 
· .. is:· ·st1~ficient to stir in Greek-Cypriots a feclir1c) of 
' I 
' ' i • 
I 
pat4iotic fervour whilst in Turkish-Cypriots it is suf-
ficiertt to make them want to feel and act in a charact-. ' 
eristically non-Greek fashion. To understand these re-
actio~s it is necessary to survey the history of Cyprus 
' 
and m~p the influences which have moulded modern Cyprus. ' 
~ It is generally accepted that Greek influence in 
Cyp.r~s dates from the arrival of Mycenean traders in 
-the fourteenth century B .C .• (The discover': of !"1"1.:ccnean 
- -
gr~ves in Cyprus would seem to support this vie~:. 1 ) 
-
~subsequently, Cyprus became an important trading centre 
in the Mediterranean area, with the result that r~l:{ce11ean 
~nd, later, Achean settlers moved to Cyprus. Furtl1er-
' 
more, it is believed that the disruption caused by the 
. 
T:~ojan Wars (1000 B.C.) led more Greeks to settle Cyprus. 
By the fourth century B·.c. Hellenic influences were 
e-ven more strongly felt in Cyprus when the Cypriot King 
Evagoras undertook a systematic campaign to Hellenise 
Cyprus. This movement culminated in the growtl1 of a Greek 
--:--7 .~ -----.-----------------
.. , 
, ..
I 
:t 13. 
literary tradition, based in Cyprus, that eventually 
. . 
led to the foundation of the Stoic school of philosophy 
in Athens, by the Cypriot, Zeno of Kition, in the third 
century B.C .. A more significant event was the advent 
of Christianity to Cyprus, brought by the apostles Paul 
.and Barrabas in the year 45 A.O.. The transformation 
,was such that by the fourth century the majority of 
Cypriots were Christian and the Emperor Constantine had I 
recognised Christianity. The significane of tl-:e Christ-
ian church, and the uniting both of it and Hellenism 
mark the growth of the church in Cyprus as both a religious 
and secular institution; it is by reference to the gro~th 
of Ch~istian orthodoxy in Cyprus that one can understand I 
the role of Makarios III as both President and Prelate. 
The institutionalisation of the church was further strength-
ened in the year 488 A.D. when Emperor Zeno of Byzantium 
declared the Cypriot Church autocephalous (i.e., independ-
ent.) By the sixth century, "the old order had gone" to 
the extent that, according to Alastos; 
Life began to flow in well defined grooves. The Church was supreme and untroubled by in-ternal divisions .... social life ~;as rea-
_, ulated. All-embracing laws and edicts governed every phase of life. The peasants were rivet-ed to the soil.2 
In 1191 the role of the church was circumscribed when t.he 
island fell to Richard Couer de Lion, who reportedly land-
ed in Cyprus by accident. Within several months, however, 
i 
I 
l 
·• 
• 14. 
the Frankish Lusignan dynasty assumed sovereignty, 
' 
under circumstances which are not entirely clear. I 
With the end of the Byzantine period the Church role 
dilminished to the extent that the unprecidented oppres-
sion of tli.e L'l,\signan period almost completely eliminated 
the Church of Cyprus. Yet during the Lusignan period, 
I 
Which lasted until 1489, Cyprus assumed a role that it I ' I 
has nol yet fully discarded; it became a key factor . in 
a western European movement to prevent foreign interven-
tion in the (Middle) East. " I t was a f o r,•l a rd b as c ~ ... ~ r1 i ch 
kept the western enterprises of the crusades going, des-
pite its ruinous contradictions, for years it remained 
·ah. outpost of western commerce and Roman Catholicism in 
...... h' · L' · . · t " 3 u: ·· e. ~van .. The decline of the Cypriot Church was due 
to its incorporation into the Church of Rome, which for-
bade the election of an Orthodox archbishop, authority 
being vested in a Latin Archiepiscopal See. 
The transference of control of Cyprus from the Lus-
i·gnans to the Venetians in 1489, was apparentl:/ of little 
consequence for the Cypriots since "the change . I I • • • • 
made little difference. The majority of people were 
s~rfs to the nobles and devoid of any rights whatsoever." 4 
T~wards the end of the Venetian period there appeared 
signs of a popular revolt against the absolutist government 
(1562) but its discovery by the Venetians led to a period 
15 . 
. of :e,ten more strictly repressive policies. 
The Ottoman Empire took over Cyprus in 1571; that 
it did not do so before this time, despite a threatening 
p¢sture is a tribute to the force of Venetian arms, the 
succes:s of Venetian diplomacy, or a combination of both. 
bnder the Ottoman rule, one of the most significant de-
velopments in Cyprus was the elevation of the Church of 
Cyprus~ the old system of rigid ecclesiastical control of 
secular activities was reintroduced as an administrative 
1
-~ove. The Archbishops of Cyprus were employed as tl1e 
in-strume:r1ts of social control in newly acquired terri t-
,~ry ~ Such a development strengthened the role of the 
Church since the spiritual authorities were permitted to 
control education in Cyprus; by so doing it continued the 
inc~lcation of Hellenic and Orthodox values to the Greeks, 
the;predominant section of the population. Bv 1660 the ... 
i 
Arcabishop and Bishops of Cyprus were recognised by the 
.. 
. 
>I 
Po~te (the Government of the Ottoman Empire) as represent-
atives :of the Christians in Cyprus, a move \-lhich "rcr)1~e:_~ent-
ed the first step toward recognition of the Cypriot ccc lc:s-
iastical h±erarchy, and particularly the Archbishop, as the 
off~cial guardian and representative of the Greek Cypriots, 
which w.as finally to become part of Turkish policy. 0 5 
In 1754 the Bishops of Cyprus were appointed to a new, 
. higher, status giving them direct access to the Porte, whilst 
-~ 
r;J,' 
... 
• 
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at the same time the Archbishop was recognised as Eth-
narch·, or politico-religious leader of the Greek commun-
ity in Cyprus - a position presently occupied by Makarios 
·: 
III. Despite the progressive moves at the administrative 
level, social and economic conditions under the Ottomans 
was far from satisfactory; famine, plague, economic dep-
redation, were characteristics of the early years of 
Turkish rule. By 1821 the position of the C11t1rc11 \•las 
' 
s~verely controlled, a major result of the Greek war of 
independence. According to Hill, 6 the Turk is 11 cl is co·\rc~ l~'/ 
.. 
·cyi\ ·:the enrollment of Cypriot priests in a Greek natioz~al-
" tst· movement, in 1819, led to swift and sharp reprisals; 
• 1Turkish troo·ps wer.e sent to Cyprus (from s~~lria), the pop-
. ula;tion was disarmed and, on the orders of the Turkish 
governor, sympathisers with the Greek cause \..rere executed • 
.. ' 
• 
1
, B.y June of 1821 the French Consul in C~~/prus \•.rrote that 
I 
I 
"not a day passes without people being 11anged, s trar:g led 
.or butchered in the capital." 7 The impact of tl1e c;rc:c::}~ 
war· ·of independence on Cyprus was twofold. In the s:;.ort 
r.un it undermined the authority of the Church, the organ-
isatlon most ~dentified with I 
i 
the ~onger run, it seemed to 
the Greek cause, whilst, in 
have contributed to the 
"Greekness" of Greek-Cypriots, for whom the Greek struggle 
' I 
fbr freedom was the classic symbol of liberation . 
r 
\ 
I 
! 
I 
I 
., 
Several subsequent revolts were quelled by the Turks 
.. 
.-
-·-· 
~-
-.· 
.. 
' ,. 
I 
~ 
:and the situation was relatively quiescent, at least 
until the Crimean War, when Greeks in Cyprus, half ex-
17. 
Specting a Russian victory over the Turks, began an anti-
Turk.ish campaign, especially after the defeat of the 
Turkish fleet at the battle of Sinope in 1853. The 
i.ntervention of France and Britain on the side of Turk-i / 
, -ey seems to have strictly limited the range of exped-
• I 
i~ht~ to which Turkey could resort to silence dissent. 
I 
Moreqvet, the Archbishop and Governor of Cyprus called 
upon ithe dissenting population to exercise restraint, 
the fiormer going so far as to threaten excommunication 
I 
for dissenters, a move deemed necessary in face of the 
a:pjP-arient growth of an articulate class of merchants, 
I 
teachers and educated younger groups thought to present 
~ -challenge to ecclesiastical rule. 
A most significant development in the later years 
bf the Ottoman period was the granting, to Greeks, of the 
right to open Greek schools, which was the four:dc1t.ior~ 
the Greek Cypriot educational system. According to Alastos 
"this achievement was more remarkable inasmuch as it was 
1 due entirely to the Church or private initiative in the 
I 
: face of governmental indifference and accasional hostility. 
It ~as confined solely_ to Greek Cypriots . 
generally quite uneducatea. 118 
• . Turks were 
By the time Turkish rule ended in 1878 the Turkish 
;. 
/ 
.. 
t: 
···~[ 
'f 
I : 
I ; 
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' ' ' \ : 
'' . ' 
.J?opulat1.on, Moslem in religion, comprised approximately 
' 
~ne quarter of the total population of Cyprus. (Accord-
ipg to the census of 1881, Turks comprised 24.9% of a ' \ 
! 
tbtal population of _186,000.) Thus, since the establish-
ment of a garison of 16,000 in 1571, many of whom stayed 
·in tne island as colonists, the Turkish community had 
tr.a:nsformed itself into a significantly large group in 
'the total population. The immediate effect of tl1c e:nc1 of I . 
: I l 
Trirkish sovereignty was felt in the distribution of pcp-
uh.ation. The now indigenous Turks, who had inherited 
\ l:ands formerly the property of the Turkish ruling class 
·'! 
beqar.ne owner-farmers; the serious population decline in ' . i ~ l ', ~ 
th~·;·seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made it diffi-',\ 
I 
c11l:t to find tenants for farrns. • • • •, ,! • However, since the Turks \ 
CQtlld retain only a portion of the old Turkish feudal land 
system, Turkish settlements became widely disperst~d and 
separated from Greek settlements. In the major towns it 
w1s a characteristic that Turks were housed in "quarters" I . 
iri predo~inantly Greek population centres. 
·.· ·Thus , by the time the British arrived in Cyprus Cyp-
I 
·rio.'t!: society, if society there was, was characterised by 
a: 1~ctor of difference. The indigenous population was 
j culturally heterogenious, separated by religion and cus--
tom and frequently geographically separate. As an indicat-
ion of the degree of difference, by the early years of the ~ 
• 
' 
19. 
Bri ti:sh administration, Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot com-
mu,ni ties were differentiated at the institutional level 
10n purely ethnic lines. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Cyprus Under the British: 1878-1954 
'i 
The Crusades saw Cyprus assume a critical role in i 
I 
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern politics' by the middle 
of the nineteenth century the potential strategic role 
of ,Cyp.r-us became the focus of British fore i(Jr1 l)O 1 i c~·. 
As early as 1818 a British army officer ir1 India !1ad 
commented that "The possession of Cyprus would g i \re Eng-
land.~ preponderating influence in the Mediterranean and . \ 
place at her disposal the future destinies of the Levant." 2 ' 
In J:866 a l?or·eign Office memorandum, concerned with the 
status Of Crete, stated that: 
It [Crete] may be considered as one of the chain of sentries w h i ch , in conn e c t i o r1.. \·/ i t 1: c; i !.) 1: a l t c:: r , Malta and Cyprus Serve l. n fr -i -, ..,-. /.j 1 · - :-. -, ,, .·1 c· ;. , '· . ,.-., ~- \,.:__;'. 4 • ··- ~ -- • • 
- • ··- t ~ ~ t. .. ' ' • · ,..__ ' : - I • t.: le) ~ 
. open this important connectiot: : .. :it~. c::.:·__:1· ~-;:..··-·:1.-:: Em pi re • Candi a ( C re t e ) and c~ ~ ~ :~: r ~1 ?, : ... · ~ ~. - •-..: :·:·. c ~ -·_; th an once be en de s c r i be c1 a s ·t 11 c~ ~ ·~ i ~ ~: s '-· o ~ ·: ~ ·: : ·-.:. and there is no doubt that in tl1e: :·r-):--;.=->·.:.·:,,..):: of a naval power hostile to l~r1g lc1:1c.i, t:>__;~· r:1igi1t be a great menace for our route across tl1c isth-mus. l 
:undoubtedly, the major British interest in acquiring Cyprus 
is explicable in terms of defense of the Empire. The open-
ing o,f the Suez Canal in 186 9 and, before it, concern for I 
I 
actjess by Britain through the Euphrates valley to India ! 
I 
were \important considerations that inf luencecl Bri tisr1 pol-
: 
icy. Russian interest in the Balkans, follo\•1ing ti:c sign-
\ 
; 
.. 
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i· 
;· 
' '· 
\' 
\ 
f ing ~f the Treaty of San Stefano on March 5, 1878, I. I r 
\. 
1 I :the establishment of the independent state of Bt1lgaria 
i I ;· 
! j' 
i 
: and .the growth of Serbia, Montenegro and Rumar1ia, 
aroused the British government. Later in March re-
se·rvists were activated in response to this perceived 
R~ssian threat to Persia and Afghanistan and, thereafter, 
Ipdia~ One of the major planks in the construction of 
British ·policy concerned with the Eastern Question \vas 
the acquisition of a naval base in the eastern Medit-
errarl.ean. As possible sites Lemnos, Galli1:::ioli, Crete, 
Rhodes, Lesbos, Haifa and Cyprus were suggC!stcd. The 
chbice of Cyprus was made in April or May of 1878, 3 
sin6e it had the recquired characteristics of location, 
size, population, defensibility and commercial prospects. 
Furthermore, ·the position seemed to be that, in view of 
·the factor of location, "whoever holds Cyprus holds 
Scanderoon [Iskendrum] 
,gives Scanderoon. " 4 
• • • . in short, holding Cyprus 
Lord Salisbury cabled the British Ambassador in Con-\ 
staninople regarding the overtures to be made to t!1c Sul-
t~n with the argument that it would be impossible for 
' I 
E]f19land- t.o exercise the necessary vigilance over S1·ria 
and Asia Minor, and to accumulate the materials of \.Jar, \ 
"·unless she possesses a stronghold near the coast. 
Presence of English in Cyprus will enable them to strength-
en the Sultan's authority in Syria and Mesopotamia, 
• • • 
..... 
... 
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\ ·:where it will probably be much shaken." S A second cable 
was more frank and amounted to an ultimatum: 
has saved the Sultan. • . except the friendship of 
Eng:land . • . but England will desist from all further 
e:ffo:rt.$ unless the Sul tan agrees to allow her to protect I 
6 his Asiatic Empire on these terms." On June 4, 1878 a 
. "Convention of Defensive Alliance" was signed bet\,.reen • 
' 
Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire; for promises by I 
aritain to join with the Empire if Russia should encroach I I 
upon p·atts of the Ottoman Empire, the Sul tar1 agrccci to 
pr·ote-ct t.he. rights of Christians within the En1p i1-c ti and 
-! 
j_n.. drd·er to enable Britain to make necessary prov is ion 
for e'xecuting her engagement, His Imperial Maj es t~:l tl1e 
Sult~n further consents to assign the island of Cyprus 
tb be occupied and administered by England." 7 
The Congress of Berlin convened in June of 1878, 
t1:nd·er the chairmanship of Bismarck, to revise the San 
Sbe£a~o agreement and achieve, through a policy of bal-
-anc:e, some stability in the Balkan area. Se,;.reral of the 
new :states found their independence ostensibl~r rci~forccd, 
but the major aspect of the Congress for Britain, ~as ti1e ., 
legitimisation, by the Great Powers, of British control 
\ j\.n Cyprus. ( In Britain, Gladstone, while admitting that 
the Berlin agreement was not without some merit in view 
.of its humanitarian clauses regarding Christians, dismissed 
the British acquisition of Cyprus, which he called '1 an act . \ 
23. 
of duplicity not surpassed, and rarely equalled, in the 
history of nations. 118 Nevertheless, when tl1e Lil)c:rals 
returned to power, two years later, they did lit:. t le to 
abrogate the most onerous aspects of the Convention. 
IThus, British interest in Cyprus was primarily strategic; 
it remains so in the 1970's and is epitomised in the sur-
vival, in an independent republic, of two 'sovereign base 
areas', the function of which is to enable Britain to 
counter any Soviet penetration of the Middle East. 
(The survival of this article of faith of British policy 
is documented below.) 
British control of Cyprus was greeted with varying 
de:g·r·e:es of enthusiasm by the Cypriot population, 'I'ur!i·~s 
:included. Britain was democratic (unlike the Ottoman Em-
:pJre, thus giving Turks some hope of progress), Christian, 
~hua appealing to the Greeks, and had displayed admirable 
.1,?h.ilhellenic motives, both before and after 1821; Britain, 
I 
i 
I 
~fter all, was the home of Byron. I \ 
i 
\ · The British flag was raised in Nicosia on July 12, I l878 and within ten days Sir Garnett Wolsey, the first l 
I $ritish High Commissioner, arrived in Cyprus. Arcl1bisr1op i i ) I ! i $ophronios, welcoming Wolsey, waxed lyrical on the virtues 1 \ If 1 B ·t· h k' f fl l"f f 
q a ri is presence, spea ing o a new i e ... or ! I f II 
' the people of Cyprus ... with equal rights for all" and 
l l "b"l" 9 ,equa responsi i ity. It is almost axiomatic, among Greeks 
·~ 
I 
, 
\ 
!· 
I 
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' 
,. 
at I-east, that Sophronios also said "We accept the change 
o·f government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will 
help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united 
with Mother Greece, with which it is naturall~:{ cor1::c:ctcd. ,,lO 
The exact form of the speech, and exactly who said it, is 
& m.a;t:ter for some argument, but the point to be made . l.S 
that a statement along these lines had strong appeal to 
the Greek population, especially in light of Greek policy ,• 
·in the mid-nineteenth century and the expansion of the 
boundaries of the Greek state. 
It is,· therefore, opportune to discuss at this point 
the central. features of the Greek ideas of 
~and the unity of Greece, a belief that has its or ici i:"'.s .1z1 
.. 
:th·e ''Megali Idea" (the "Great Idea"). The Megali Idea was 
succinctly defined, circa 1878, by the first United States 
1Minister to Greece, C.K.Tuckerman, who wrote: 
" 
! 
The Great Idea means that the Greek mind is to regenerate the East - that is, it is the destiny of Hellenism to Hellenise that vast st:.rc27__:.c::~ ::::::,: territory which, by n at ur a 1 1 a\·/ , tl: c c~ rt_:-~~-,.-:. ~_) 1:::-= -lieve to be theirs, and \vl1.icl1 is cl1.ic_:_::1·.:- ~ =~~:J.~)i. t- _ ed by people claiming to be desc2r1clccl ~1~cr:'. ~:c~llcnic stock, professing the Orthodox or Greek fait~:, or 
,speaking the Greek language.11 
Furthermore, these people: 
i 
' l ; 
. in the appregate, vastly outnumber the I .,people of Greece proper, and are reg 2rc1c:;c1 lJ}/' the 
"Free Greece" as brethren held ir1 scr-"'Ji_ ~t1cl·2 ;J\" an 
-~ alien and detested po\ver. 11 l1crc:::: ,J.r·'--· i :-. :-:,1..:::ccJ~ c:.:1n Turkey ... not far from fiftc~n r.1illi_o1--:.s of people, of which number less thar1 four n1illions 
... 
.. 
0 
are Ottomans. The rest ... profess the Greek religion or speak the Greek dialcct.12 
25. 
Of the integral role the Megali Idea assumed in the life 
of Greece, Tuckerman wrote: ' 
However divided public opinion in Greece may be as to the proper time and method for attempting the realisation of the I-Iellenic Ic~icc1, t~:c· :_c-1•-.:::a itself never leaves the teemi11c:- br2_i_r~ o:- :=.l-~c _, Greek . . . at he art l1 e s t i 11 c 11 c r i s 11 (.::: s i _ L • • • as a tenet of his political and religious faith.13 
T]::i.is aspect of irredentist nationalism, the stress on the 
aelieni·c unity of the eastern Mediterranean and the class-
ical virtue of ancient Greece, presaged the Greek war of 
independence. Before 1821 the term genos \~as .. ... us ect \,...o 
mean nation; according to the old Greek usage tl1~ word 
..,,. 
·means 'kin' or 'stock'. By the early nineteenth century, 
' 
·when Greec·e became independent, the term \vas changed to 
' ethnos and applied to the Greek nation par excellence. ' 
Whatever the reason for the change, t.he initial instru-
mental use of the term genos, an old Greek form, was syrnpto-
. 
matic of the revival in things Greek. Another indicator 
~as the changing of names; common names like Jol1n, Peter ! - , 
'I 
or ;Constantine were changed in favour of Aristides, Them-\ 
~stocles and the like. ·.' . ! ! l i j The point of all this \~as to ap-
-peal to symbolic and historical values in aid of the inde-
pendence cause. By 1844, with the Greek state esta.blished, 
. ~ the Megali Idea appeared as a concrete policy; in a speech 
bef6re the Greek parliament Ionnes Kolettes argued that 
•• 
,· 
.. 
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"the soldiers of the revolution are not onlv those who 
""' 
rebelled in 1821 but all those who fought for lir)r~r-··::" 
S:i-nc·e the fall of Constantinople." 14 Analogous to the 
contempor.ar-y American idea of "Manifest Destiny", the 
M~gali I.dea was popularised in the historical writings 
' I 
o~ Constantinos Paparrighopoulos (1815-1891) whose most • l 
pppular work, a five volume history of Greece, revived 
. . 
upage of the term ethnos. Of Poparrighopoulos it has been 
i 
said that he "brought life to the Gree~~ past ar1d inspired ' ' 
faith in the fortunes of the future . , . . . . . ·. 1 . • n1.s n1air: .... .:..rie • 
w-as that of the nation's unity through time. 1115 
philologist Georgis Hadjidakis (1848-1941) similarly 
·popul.aris·ed the unity of Greek language since Homer, 
thus making possible the popularisation of Greek unity 
through time. The idea of a greater, more extensive 
Greece was not merely an historical myth; for nineteenth 
cent*ry Greeks it was contemporary histor~i·. "Enosis'' 
(the union with Greece) of the Ionian Islands, made pos-
sible through cession by Britain, in 1864 and the 
i9n of Thessaly in 1881 were concrete examples of 
"'le ·"': "' • aacit-
the tJOS-., 
sibilities of a Greater Greece and it is not surprising 
that Cypriots made frequent reference to the Ionian Is-
lands 'enosis! 
Cypriot claims for union with Greece were persistent 
· and popular. A memorandum to the British government in 
• I 
I 
\ 
I 
i 
· 1881 istated: 
! 
' 
~he Cypriots, mindful of their history, have riever forgotten their Hellenic origin. Rel~r-;ing on the magnanimity of the I3ritisl1 ~=·co}_lc::, :they hope that in due time -fa"JOlJrG.Ll,._: c~o:-:~-:,: c1c~r-:a ti on w i 11 be g iv en to the i r a. s ~..: i r ci. :_:_ 2_ o :~ . · . · ~' ~: c: i r 
1only aspiration is the Union ·v.ri tl:.. tl1cir :.:o~-.:.~~c;r ¢~untry, Greece, in accordance 1.-.ri th tl1e rJreccd-ent of the Ionian Islands.16 
27. 
-Furthermore, the link with Greece at this time was more 
. . 
. 
·than spiritual. With Greek mobilisation, in preparation 
.for war with Turkey, in 1880, supplies (mules, to be pre-
·cis.e) ·a.nd 150 volunteers were sent to Greece by Greek-
Cypriots, together with a letter to King George, an ex-
pression of Cypriot solidarity with t.1ot11er Greece. 
Su~h enthusiasm, however, was curtailed b:/· a r, ("') r d ''""' r .. • ".-J· ....... \.,,.,.., . l. n 
Council of May, 1881 which declared the neutrali t~· of 
Cyprus and, among other things, curtailed the recruiting 
of soldiers in the service of any other state, in Cyprus. 
In Britain, Gladstone, on receipt of several requests 
'for the cession of Cyprus to Greece, replied, via the 
High Commissioner, that "the inhabitants must remember 
that the island is occupied by England as part of the 
' 
Turkish Empire by virtue of a Convention with tl1e Porte. 
Similar proposals contrvening that Convention cannot be 
.: 17 dJJscussed." i 
' 
' 
' 
t 
i By an Order in Council of September, 1878, the Brit-, ' P· 
I 
i~h government established a Legislative Council in Cyprus. 
The Council consisted of the High Commissioner and between 
~. 
r 
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! 1our and eight other members, "half being official, t.he 
other unofficial~· To advise the I-Iigh Cammi ss ion er the 
~rder also established an Executive Council, although 
h$ was in no way bound to take its advice. "This Con-
stitution was generally similar to those granted to 
C,rown Colonies, in which the Crown has entire control 
· .of ·1egislation, laws being made by the Governor \-l i ti1 the 
18 :conqurrence of a Council nominated by the Cro\vn." In 
1·880. administration of Cyprus was deemed the function of 
the Colonial Office, to which the Foreign Office trans-
ferred the matter. In 1881 the Secretary of Stat~ for 
the Colonies ordered a report on conditions in c~·prus and, 
following submission of the report ( in 1882) certain re-
, ,f·,orrns were initiated in the system of Cypriot governance 
ere transmitted to the High Commissioner, from the 
lonial Office, in March, 1882. 19 The new Legislative 
Council was to consist of twelve Elected and six Official 
Members, to be presided over by the I-Iigh Commissioner, who i 
was to have a casting vote. Significantly, the twelve el-
ected members were to be divided in proportion to the dis-
~ribution of population between Christian (Greek) \ , l .·~os __ em 
(Turk) as shown in the 1881 census of population (see 
Il). 
' 
Thus, there were to be nine Greeks and three Turks. ! 
Apart from ·such matters as the salaries of the High Conunis-1 l 
' 
I 
sioner, judges and official members, as well as the Tribute 
1 r, f ~ - · J : i I 
29. 
(a contrbversial tax issue and part of the 1878 Con-
vention, under which the British were obliged to pay 
Thrkey; the sum was raised through taxation of the pop-
ulation), the Council was free to discuss any matter. 
However, owing to the as yet unresolved status of the 
isl-and {i.e., it was held to be not 'legally' British), 
ul'.tiin&te power to legislate through Orders in Council was 
left to the Crown. Suffrage was to confined to male 
taxpayers over the age of twenty-one. 
The reaction to the new constitution was mixed. 
Aro:on Greek-Cypriots the reaction was extremel~:{ f a,;ourable; 
Arch ishop Sophronios, in a cable to England, than~:cci the 
Quee for the reforms on behalf of all Greek-Cypriots. 
IAmQ:ng the Turkish population the reaction was quite dif-
'fere.ri:t; a petition was sent to the Colonial Off ice, stating: 
. 
The Legislative Council which is hereafter the 
'basis of the Administration will ultimatel\· bc~come :a prelude to the independence \vl-iich is tllc r:,.c,t. t_o 
. constantly repeated by our Chris ti c1n. car:,.~: c1 t:. 1 - -.~··· c~ t.:.s 
·, and on which their designs anc1 acts a 1- c e.  .: o I"'.:~>- :-. 7-=. J:~ at-:. ed ... We know perfectly \vell ·tl1a·t ~:.-~2~ :.~~-:.~ ._ .. ~ '._·:· 's :Government makes laws according to tl-_H-.:: :__: .~: ~~ ~~ C' : t:. ·,-: and requirements of every p 1 ace , anc1 , ... -,-2 -~·~ ::-:~ ·~-- -.- ·~ ·..:.o :repeat that the project of proport ic,r1..2-11 ~- ·_:~_ 1 - ·-· :~; ,~ r: t. -a tion in the Leg is la ti ve Coun c i 1 j_ s ~~ =-- ·_: ':.··_: J~·_: 2..- ·_: s -
'Peet detrl. mental to our own ri' g1,,·ts --.. ri .; .. ; ,• ~- y-• .. , ;. ~ ••;-',. 1 (.J. . .i .... L-~ :...._ .... t__: ~~; - .l.... ._..i.. · . .__.. --
_.._ . • t-
·, t Q the safety we now enJ·oy. '~1 e co~1 s·-- ,, .. -,-~--- ·· ·----~.--· . ... '1' - l ... l...: \.... ~ u. 1'- ~ .. ... ·-
_,.... • 
··-·- ·-·.:. .. ..- ~ •,, __ ~ 
-
-the liberty to solicit your Lorc1sl1i~~ t.c1 l_,,_· : ~. ·,=.:.~~·-~d 
•• '1 :to amend according to the principle~ resrJ·.:(...::t:.• __ :'--: ,:_l.~-antique the franchise in question v/l1ic::1: < ~ ~~ : ·::· proposed form) is incompatible \vitl1 loccil_ rc:-,:·~::~1~c-ments and which, if enforced, v1ill absolur- 1~.::lc.· c::or:1-pel us to leave the island for some otl1er pl~ce.20 
In addition, the Turks cabled the government in Constant-I 
. ' 
I j 
' 
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inople and received an assurance from Turkey that their 
rrti.nori ty rights would be protected. 
I 
I 
As it turned out, the fears of the Turks proved to 
be groundless, since the functioning Council was charact-
erised by an alignment of British and Turkish groups a-
gain.st the Greeks; the six Official members, aligned with 
the three Turkish Elected Officials could al\1avs eaual ... ... . I 
I jthe nine Greek votes and since the presic1ir~g :Iis.ri:. Com-
I 
.missioper was endowed with a casting vote, polic1* ,,,.·as 
: 
.· I 
• 
• :Often made against the will of the Greek majority. The I 
:T:urkish--Bri tish 'alliance' was based on three factors; as 
'f_.<:lrmer rulers the Turks felt affinity \vith the British; 
tlie Greeks, propagating 'enosis' , were perceived as dis-
I 
:L6yal partners; and, third, the alliance helped allay the 
£ears, made public earlier, of Turkish su.bj ugation. 
The significance of all this is that etl1nic differ-
e:nce was tne foundation of political clea,Iacc at tr1e level .., :! 
of· the Legislative Council. The Turkish oooulatior~ ... ... 
i£aed itself, and was seen to be so identified with 
B::ritish administration as plainly anti-' enos is' and t11ere-
fore, anti-Greek, at least in Greek eyes. As for the Greeks, 
constituting almost three-quarters of the population, they 
were a political minority in almost all cases and, there-
fore, 'subjugated' - at least in terms of the Megali Idea. I 
Needless to say the 'enosis' campaign continued un-
. ·I 
, 
\ 
-
31. 
abat~d .. The ·celebration of Queen Victoria's jubilee, 
in\ 1887, was· boycotted by the Greeks, who countered it 
:with meetinqs, led by the Orthodox Church, in support 
... ·f· , . . . , 21 
·.o .. : enosis . In 1889 Sophronios led a delegation to 
London to present a list of grievances to the British 
government and to reiterate their enosis demands. A 
protest meeting in Limassol in 1895 passed a resolution, 
typ_ical of the protest mood in the Greek-Cypriot corrunun-
ity. a:s a whole, asserting that: 
1 The Hellenic people of the district of Limassol, in concord with the rest of the Hellenic ocoole 
- -of the island, who form the grec1t n1c1jo:ci:_:_~· c·:-the whole population, has al\\~u~/S clcs i1:L:,~~, :,:·_;S .ires and w i 11 de s ire one, and on 1 ~/ o 11 c s o J_ t.1 L:. i. c: :-:. ,:1 :~>'._ ~ :: o-d a y solemnly demands the unior1 r,·?it1: l:L;l:~:_1::-:. ·_:_c: which it belongs by race and blood be effected with the least possible delay.22 
TW;o years later, when Greece declared war on Ottoman Turk-
ey, thousands of Greeks left Cyprus to join the Gree}~ 
arm~d forces; by one estimate, more than 6300 Greek-Cyp-
riots le£t the island for this purpose. 24 Furthermore, 
it has been a.sserted that "with the Cypriot volunteers in 
the war, Cyprus was a proud participant in the national 
c.ause. ~· 25 By 1899 the idea of a "Greater Greece" received 
a: fillip when Crete was placed under a Gree}: IIigl1 Commiss-'i 
I 1.oner .. In Cyprus this move stimulated widcsprc~d pro-
enosis demonstrations. Of the demonstration in Limassol 
in May, 1899, the local ·police report described a scene 
32 • 
• 
er! stirring emotion with Greek flags, the playing of the 
Gre:ek national anthem and "cheers for the 1{ing of Greece -
26 btrt no cheers were there for the Queen." 
Throughout all of this the Turkish element of the 
pqpulation was forrnulating its own, separate, demanc1s. ·' ' . 
' I 
' Irl. November, 1895, the British Ambassador in Constantin-
.,,, 
. 
ople, in reference to the enosis movement in Cyprus, 
sta;ted, in a letter to London, that enos is "\vould be viol-
entlly opposed by the Ottoman portion of the population. 1127 
! M·oreover, earlier in the same year, the 1,urJ.(.isl1 conununi ty ":I 
' 
in Cyprus, led by the Mufti (or religious leader), petit-' I I \ I 
idn~d the Chief Secretary and the Colonial Secrctar~~ sev-i \ 
e:r:a~ times, and the Turkish position, as embodiecl in tl1ese 
:Sta emen4s, is worth quoting at length, for it is fair 
by this time, the two groups in Cyprus had 
. . I den e that, 
be-
com· polarised around the enosis issue. The Turks stated 
tha "we pray in the name of all of the Moslem inhabitants 
tha~ the Government may take such measures as to prevent l I h' 
. h 
. ,... t 
the occurrence of t 1ngs causing t e exci ternerit or tr1e ?•1os-'· 
.. l 28 lems!." A second petition sepcificall~i· statecl t!1e ,rur}-;ish 
posi,ti6n:: 
.,. 
' ,. 
:'. The feeling ... that the Mohammedans \l1ill not agree 1 to the Administration of Cyprus lea·\ri11.S_r t .. 11c:: ~;r-·c·ple · to Greece is unanimous . If our is 1 ,=-ir:.c·~ }j ,,_' ·_::-~ .i. ~:. i:=:d with an unjust Administration tl10..t i::::; :-·~c!~-=- ·.:,_:·_ ci vi li sed, this Administration \·.- i 11 i :-1 er c .:~ ~:; c: the oppressive conduct and manners of our Greek fellow countrymen. 
If it be absolutely necessary ... that the is-
~· 
I 
l 
'! 
land be given up ... , in order to preserve our lives, property and honour, the favour is humbly asked that it ma~:l be res torec1 to the Ottoman government.29 
33. 
It, is. fairly clear that what had initially been a factor 
o·f difference - that is, the difference between Greek 
and\Turk per se - had by now been transformed into a 
political cleavage along ethnic lines. Indeed the oos-.. 
·itions were so polarised as to be predictable; at the 
level of the Legislative Council the cleavage was instit-
dtionalised whilst, at the local leve 1, pop'c.:.l ar support 
/· 
fgr the respective positions was solid anal i • ..; c1 -s· .... ,r · ··,ci . . 1•, .!_ J .. t..:::;: -,. -,-· ...... t__: ( !, _ ill, • 
. 
It i.s significant that, at this stage, there was little, 
if any, conflict of a violent nature, a factor \vhich 
might be explained in terms of the functional value of 
institutionalised vocal conflict in organised councils. 30 
1 Whilst both sides were vociferous in the presentation of 
their demands, it could be argued that tl1e institutional-
isation of these demands negated the need for violence as 
a rneahs of articulating demands; such an explanation seems 
tb be within the bounds of plausibility. 
_Despite the several pronouncements regarding the legit-
·tmacy of the enosis demands (most notable of which is that 
~y Winston Churchill who, as Under-Secretary of State for ··: i 
' 
the Colonies, visited the island in 1907), and opposition 
.< 
to them, the next significant period in Cyprus history con-
:\: 
!· 
'· 
> 
I. 
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• I 
cerns the First World War. With the outbreak of war in 
November, 1914, Britain, now a belligerent vis a viz 
Turkey, annexed Cyprus, following abrogation of the 1878 
Convention. By October 1915, following the Bulgarian 
declaration of war on Serbia, the allied force in Sal-
onika was hard-pressed and Britain, France and Russia 
tr~ed to enlist Greek aid. Greece was, however, strictly I 
n.eu'tral, adhering to the neutrality polj_c~~ of r\ing Con-
stantine. Acting alone, the British go\rernrnen t off c:r(:?d 
~yprus to Greece in exchange for a Greek declaratio~ of 
war against the Central Powers. The offer was refused, 
and never officially repeated, on the grounds of Greece's 
rigid neutrality. 'The Times', subsequently, described 
the offer as being "lighthearted", (see footnote 45, below). 
According to Alastos, 31 however, Britain had previously 
offerred Cyprus to Greece in 19l~in return for the right 
of access, for British warships, to Argostoli (in Greece) 
. 
in case of war, though nothing ever came of it. 
Following the war, Lloyd George, in a memorandum to 
1
-the Cypriot Mission in London, saying that he was well a-
.ware of the wishes of the Cypriot people, pointed out that I I 1
Cyirus would be considered. Hill states that Venizelos l 
I 
extracted from Lloyd George a promise to cede Cyprus to 
32 Greece when Italy similarly gave up Rl1odes. Much encou.r-
aged, Greek-Cypriots formed deputations and issued pamphlets 
in support of the enosis cause. The Turkish population, 
' 
35. 
however, was similarly vociferous in voicing their own 
demands, sending to London a petition ''from the repres-
33 entatives of the 60,000 Moslems of Cyprus" 
that they should remain under British control. At this 
tirne,.however (and despite Lloyd George's apparent com-
mitments), British policy was undergoing significant 
change. In 1919 the War Office General Staff was, in 
internal memoranda, referring to the strategic consider-
ations regarding Cyprus; in view of the ideal nature of 
Cyprus fb·r aerodromes and a flying-boat base, there were 
strong ''strategic considerations for not parting \'1 i tl1 it. " 34 
By July- of 1919 the cornmi tmen t to hold on to C\1 1J r us ~ .. ; as 
..... -
o.fficial government policy; as 'The Times' reported, tl1e I I 
·decision, in face of Greek demands for enosis, was that ' 
"Cyprifs shal.l remain under the British flag. Jr 3 5 Evidence 
o,f app:a.:rent indecision on the part of the British stimul-
ated the Greek enosis demands and in 1920 the Greek mem-1' 
ber.s o:t: the Legislative Assembly resigned. The Govern-
ment, meanwhile had enforced martial la\.; and 1)roscribed 
propagandist activity, under threat of deportatio11. 
Subsequently, following the exile of two leading Greek 
propagandists, new Greek organisations designed to give 
we·ight to the "national cause" were formed, under the di-
rection of the Ethnarch. The campaign for enosis \vas 
s~verely dented by the Greek defeats in Asia Minor in 1922 
(e.g., the debacle at Smyrna) and the Cypriot Greek Politi-
cal organisation began to decline. A further blow was 
the legitimising influence of the legal transfer of 
:Cyprus from Turkey to Britain embodied in the Treaty 
of Lausanne in 1923, thus ending any speculation that 
the ~:titish period in Cyprus was temporary. By 1925 
36. 
Gr.eek res.istance had sufficiently subsided and the 
Greek members returned to the Legislative Council. 
C:yp·ru.s became a Crown Colony in 1925, the liigl1 Commiss-
~oner being replaced by the position of Governor. 
The Greek frustrations in the Legislative Council 
·'.and in the immediate struggle for enosis led to a re-
organisation of Greek social and political organisat-• I I 
\ ' 
. iobs, a move designed to consolidate and further arti-
culate Greek demands. In December 1921, the National 
Assembly, an avowedly political organisation, was formed 
among Greeks; the executive arm of the organisation was 
the National Council. Consisting of forty-six members, 
the Council had, as members ex officio the 1\rcl11Jisl100 
-
of Cyprus, three bishops and the Abbot of K)1 }::.}~o, tr1e 
~emaining seats being filled through elections in the 
Gr.eek conununity. A major plank in the organisation's 
philosophy was systematic non-cooperation with the 
British administration, a prime example being the boy-
cott of the Legislative Council (see above). More imp-
ortant in the longer run was the establishment of a 
i : 
1 
, 
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dual education system in Cyprus; the cleavage was 
along purely ethnic lines, since schools were estab-
:'l_i.shed for the Greek and Turkish sections of the pop-
,~_lation. At the heads of the dualist system were the 
.re·spective leaders of the two groups, the Ethnarch and 
the Mufti. In the Greek school system great emphasis 
was placed on classical aspects of Greek culture and 
lartguage, whilst in the Turkish schools religio~ \~as 
:emphasised, before 1922, and following the Kcmalist 
revolution, greater stress was placed on the prime 
f . f h k' h · 1· 36 -~atures o t e new Tur is nationa ism. . . .. ' ' Furthermore, 
the ·two education systems had complete control over the 
.setting of curricula, selection of books and hiring of 
teach~rs. In these terms, socialisation took place on I I 
dis~inct communal grounds; education, if anything, 
strdssed cultural, religious and social difference at 
the expense of community-building and in sur.JIJOrt of 
sectional beliefs. "The process of acquiring categories ' 
·f.or sel'f and other people," writes Sherif, "begins \•:ith 
t-he persons and locations immediately perceivable in the 
child's surroundings, proceeding outward from his centre 
to conceptions of groupings more remote and more abstract, 
os;u.ch as f rorn • • • f . l h . . ,. 3 7 . ami y to et nic grouping . This 
is surely not insignificant; the children of the twenties 
were the parents of the nineteen-fifties. 
' 
·! 
'l 
'l I I 
·I 
·i 
l 
J 
i 
In response 
~ ; 
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to· th.e passing of the 1923 Education Law, aimed at 
giving the government a say in education through the 
control of teacher appointments, the Greek com...rnuni t:/ 
adnounced th.e move as a step towards the de-l!ellcri.is-
.~~ion of the Greeks since, said the Greek Board of .. ·i ·. . . . i 
' 
' 
' 
.. • . I 
' 
-•· 
. ' I 
_Eduqation "this law is opposed to the real and ex-i 
, I· I . pressed will of the Church of Cyprus and the Greek-
.. . • II 3 8 h Cypriots. A furt er attempt to control education, 
\ 
~n 1929, brought forth a similar Greek reaction. The 
same year the Greeks were sufficiently motivated (and/ 
or frustrated) to present a list of demands to the 
government in London, asking for a greater devolution 
_o:f legislative authority, with the British re nr•--::,,.S;·nt-.._... ........... . .__. ..... 
.. 
a~ion in the executive branch curtailed, this despite 
{or· because of?) an enlargement of the Legislative Coun-
cil, in 1925, to twenty-four members. The 1925 reform 
was such that the Anglo-Turkish alliance could still 
p_ass' .leg·i.slation in face of Greek opposition. In re-
j-ecting the 1929 list of demands for constitutional '' . I 
¢~ange, Passfield (the Colonial Secretary) s e,;c r i _ __:: l '/ re-
.... 
p·rimanded the Greek Cypriots, rejected the demands for 
, I 
etlosis and went so far as to state that "there is much I 
to be said for the view that what Cyprus needs at pres-
~-nt are fewer occasions for political discussion and 
more occasions for constructive work." 39 Moreover, 
:j 
I 
-~---....------...-----
,-·s--.. ---'-'---. - -- . 
·~· < 
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~ 
./ 
assfield countered the Greek move by presenting a 
, list of material improvements in the island during the 
:period of British rule; roads, a railt.'lay, postal serv-
,ic·es, afforestation and mineral resource de'\re lopn1c-=r1 t • 
ha·a all improved, or been newly constructed, under the 
. 1 ,, 
British. "In this place it is necessary only to point 
out that," according to Toynbee, "the progress in Cyp-
rus, though manifestly creditable in itself, was noth-
ing exceptional or extraordinary. 1140 Yet, as Hill has 
pointed out, 41 ''[the Greek-Cypriots] would prefer to 
. . 
. ' be.ruled by Greece rather than prosper under a foreign 
I?·ower," so that Passfield' s statement fell on partially 
.d·eaf ea.rs . 
·F6116wing this rebuff, the Greek reaction was to 
~urther streamline their political organisations; the 
Old organisational structure was revamped and demands 
~ade more often and more loudly. At the same time the 
Cypriot economy, the major exports of which were minerals, 
was feeling the harsh wind of economic depression as raw 
material prices fell. In response to falling world de-
mand ,. ·thousands of workers were dismissed fron1 t11c . is- .. 
land's copper and asbestos mines, agricultural \vagcs and • 
prices fell and the burden of debt increased. As if to i I \ 
compound the feeling of deprivation, in April 1931, a 
Turkish member of the Legislative Council, apparaently 
I 
I 
.I 
I 
'i 
I 
l: 
1:. 
\\ 
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\ against the wishes of his colleagues, voted with the Greek \ ! 
bloc to defeat a proposed tax measure. In response, t:1c 
mea~ure was passed through an Order in Council, ordering 
taxation increased by~20,000. As subsequent events il-
lustrated, the passage of the bill was extremely provoca-
tive, resulting in the appearance of violence in an organ-
ised, systematic form on the part of the Greeks. That 
:19 31 was a turning point is acknowledged b~/ 
~ :~/ho argues that 1931 constituted a violence thrcsl:old 
.. 
.. ' since, 
During the thirteen years following the A.r1uistice between Turkey and the Allied Powers ... in 1918, the Cypriot Greek nationalists cn1plo:./cci t-r1c I: -t ~.:. ~ i·c and cons tit u ti on a 1 method s o f Dr o t c~ :::i t:. c:1 r1 cl :: c ·.·. i · .. :... r~: r1 • - ~ In October 1931 they, or their follo~;ers, resorted to violence.43 
,I·t appears that violence was a result of an accumulation 
.. bf frustrations; the new status of Cro\.;n Color1\· in 1925, 
-
' 
I 
the rejection of the constitutional dernanc1s in 19 2 9, econ-
6~ic and social upheaval in 1930 and, finally, in 1931, tl1c 
by-passing of the administrative machinery to pass an ~..i:1.Fop-
ular tax bill were all major milestones in the process. 
Th~ September Order in Council moved the Greek National 
Movement to stir popular opinion towards boycotts of British 
go9ds and refusals to pay taxes. Meetings in early October, I l i 
to;discuss a Greek manifesto regarding action, culminated 
·in!the resignation of one of the Greek I , mcr1ocrs of the Legis-
! lative Council. In a letter of resignation, Nikhodhimos 
I 
I 
I I 
I 
t 
41. t 
I 
I 
l 
I 
/ I 
I 
M.ylohas proclaimed the union of Cyprus with Greece and 
decl~red "we shall do all that is humanly possible to I 
giveleffect to this decision as speedily as possible." 44 
Whilst this decision did receive some criticism it was 
instrumental in arousing public sentiment. In Limassol, ' 
on October 20, Mylonas made an inflamatory speech and, 
by the next day, the remaining Greek members of the Leg-
islat~ve Council decided to resign, their decision being 
annqunced at a public meeting in Nicosia. F o 11 o ",·.· i n er t 11 o J 
me-eting the former members of the Council, and ti1e oro-.. 
minent Nicosia church leaders, led a demonstration to 
Government House to hand in their resignations. When the 
'crowd of ''5000, singing the Greek national anthem and 
shouting for enosis 1145 arrived, Government House was set 
afire: and gutted. The police opened fire on the crowd, 
wounding several of them. 
The affects of the Nicosia demonstration were felt 
q.l._l over Cyprus; tension was described as "high" in Lim-
I 
I 
~ssoL, Paphos and Kyrenia and on October 23, there was a 
riot in Limassol, where the District Conunissioner's house 
46 was burned. On the village level, Greek flags were 
hiosted and local Greek Committees formed. The reaction of 
the·British government was to send more troops to Cyprus, 
frqm Egypt, to restore order. Within ten days the 'revo-i ' 
' i 
lution', as proclaimed by the leaders of the Nicosia dem-
i 
i 
t 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
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oristration, was suppressed. By the early days of Nov-
ember, two thousand persons had been arrestec1, otl1ers 
confined to specific locations and the ten leaders of 
the Greek movement (including the Bishops of Kitiu.m and 
Kyren:ia) deported. By Letters Patent of November 12, 
1931 the Governor was given all power to legislate, the 
Legislative Council having been disbanded, political 
parties were declared illegal and the press strictly 
censored. Furthermore, the display of national symbols, 
oth~r than the British, was proscribed and tl1e teac:1ing 
:of Greek and Turkish history restricted. ( Thouor1 t.i1e 
..J 
Turks did not actively participate in the disturbances, 
they were equally hard hit by the subsequent governmen-
tal decrees. ) 
Throughout.the whole disturbances, the Greek govern-
I 
meht in Athens was quite passive. Venizelos, the Greek I I 
' 
Prime Minister, had declared that the issue of union was 
~ot political, being a British domestic issue, and thus 
precludedpany official Greek support. Moreover, Venizelos• 
comment was tantamount to nothing less than an offici0.l 
apology to Britain for the activities of an unsupported 
• • minority. The 'unofficial' Greek reaction was ouite dif-.. 
'.f erent. A manifesto, sympathetic to the Greek-Cypriot 
cause, signed by a group of leading Greeks (including a 
former President) was published by the Athens press, the 
., 
43. 
Orthodox Church issued pronouncements to the same effect 
a~d there were appeals to the British Church to intervene 
-in the dispute. Indeed, the Greek government was hard 
put to contain the popular reaction; Venizelos went so 
.} 
far as to ban open-air demonstrations favourable to the 
Cypriot cause. Gradually the campaign subsided, yet the 
47 idea of enosis was not without widespread support. 
The. "Society of Friends of Cyprus" and the "Stuc1cr.ts \ 
I 
Association for Cyprus" were typical of the org c1r:i sa tions . 
that appeared in Greece following the 1931 riots. l 
. I 
: I Meanwhile, in Cyprus, political activity was chann-
, I 
! I 
, ' 
' , 
I 
~llfd in_ r1e-w directions within the new government laws. 
The trade union movement, for exam~, which in 1931 com-
i 
~rised only eighty-four persons, had by 1940 expanded to 
encompass sixty-two unions and almost 3500 members. 48 By 
1944 almost eleven thousand persons were in trade unions. 
A~cording to a 1953 report, almost seventeen thousar1d 
Greeks were members of trade unions; by comparison, only 
512-Turks were thus enrolled. 49 Among the agricultural 
population, cooperatives were formed and by 1940 over 
' 1qo,ooo·people1were members, compared to only a few hun-
dred in 1932. The Cypriot daily press, nonexistent before 
1932, made its appearance the year after the enosis riots 
' 
'· 
and by the early 'fifties comprised six Greek, three Turkish 
and one English newspapers. 
. " 
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\In 19 36 the "Society for Cypriot Studies" was founded 
by th~ leading intellectuals in the island, having as its ; f ' ' I : , I : gcbals 1 the preservation and publication of historical mater-
ial, ihe popularisation of aspects of Cypriot philology and 
-t'h.e foundation of a museum of Cypriot art. ' That this ••revo-
l~tioh'' in the organisation of the Cypriot population follow-
ed an extremely damaging blow to the enosis cat1se, tells 
us something of the nature of the articulation of grcu~ -~ 
J: 
g·o.~tls in a systematic, concrete form at critical st.ages 
of a conflict . 
. The 1937 Education laws were designed to dent the 
power of the newly organised Greeks, giving to the govern-
ment the power to investigate the affairs and accounts of 
the Church, provided the government with the 
qualify for Church office anyone deported or 
sedition and, finally, permitted the Governor to veto any 
election to the Orthodox See. Thus, it appears that these 
government acts were designed to further circumscribe the 
role of the church in the nascent Greek movement and limit 
the sub-surface development of Greek institutions. 
In the Second World War, Cypriot support for the Allies I ! 
~as accompanied by a belief that, with the cessation of 
hostilities, union with Greece would follow almos~ autornat-
ically. Indeed, Churchill's message to the Greek. Pr i:-:~.e ~·~in-
.ister Tsouderos, in October 1941, (conunernorating the anni-·\ l 
i 
.. 
1· 
.. 
I 
. I 
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Yersary of Italy's attack on Greece) was interpreted in I 
' i
·Ciprus as a clear statement of British aims 
ill had declared that "the unity of all her . . 
. 
,, ,..,. .,. "" since L::urcn-
(Greece's) 
.sons and daughters behind their King and government in 
the cause of their fatherland will bring its sure reward . ... so 
Further evidence of apparent change in the British position 
came in 1943 when, for the first time since 1931, municipal 
elections were allowed. Following its election, the new 
council iri Limassol passed a resolution asserting that, 
after the war (which it supported) the aim for all Greeks 
in Cyprus should by for the realisation of their natic~al 
wishes and that "Greeks should be officially called Greeks 
and not merely Christian Orthodox and the Turks Turks and 
51 not Moslems." 
The British position regarding Cyprus in general, and 
th~ Cypriot Church in particular, underwent significant I 
change in October 1946 when, in a written reply to a Commons 
qhestion, the new Colonial Secretary in the post-~:ar Labour 
government, Mr. Creech-Jones, announced that official pcli,c1~ 
. d . 52 was un er review. The stated aim was to evaluate the exist-
ing situation with a view to instituting changes designed 
to permit "a more liberal and progressive regime in the 
internal affairs of the island." Moreover, with this ob-
jective in mind, the Government, in an attempt to utilise 
the role of the Church in a constructive fashion, announced 
• 
~-
46. 
the, lifting of the 19 31 deportation order, thus per1ui tting 
the return of the leading figures of the 1931 campaign, 
and the right of Cypriots to fill the vacant position of 
Ethnarch. 
Among those who did return to Cyprus was r.1akar ios, 
B±shop of Kyrenia, who, on his repatriation, addressed 
a gathering of Greeks and exhorted, amidst a sea of Greek 
flags, 11 Enosis and only enosis! 1153 In June 1947, an elect-
ion was held to elect an Archbishop, in accordance with I i 
' 
British wishes. However, the successful candidate, Leontios, 
died within a month of his election and was succeeded by 
the Bishop of Kyrenia, who became Makarios II. By so elect-
ing Makarios, the Church declared itself again the leader 
of the enosis campaign, strongly influencing, tl1rougr-: its 
attitudes and policies, the political attitudes of Gree}:-
Cypriots in general. Indeed, the Church was instrumental 
in defeating the 1946 proposals. The Church role became 
diametrically opposed to that hoped for by the British. 
Under the 1946 proposals, the Governor was to convene 
a meeting of a Consultative Assembly, representing the 
various Cypriot groups, with a view to creating a repres-
entative council responsible for internal affairs. In 
March of 1947 a new governor, Lord Winster, arrived in 
Cyprus. (It is worthwhile noting that his arrival pro-
voked opposition from Greeks and large demonstrations, 
l 
I 
. #. 
,. 
.. 47. 
tn support of his appointment, on the part of the Turks} , 54 
and announced that, in accordance with official policy 
55 enunciated by the Colonial Secretary, there was to be 
no change in the status of the island; continued British 
possession was to go "hand in hand \•li th the progra.mme of 
development and the intention of establis}1ing a liberal 
d . . . . l f.c . .. 56 an progressive regime in interna a ruirs. B~i· Jt1l~l 
of 1947 invitations were sent to representatives o~ C~·p-
riot groups asking that they participate in the consult-
ative assembly with a view to drafting a constitution 
.for Gyprus. Under the leadership of Makarios I I, however, 
the $Ole aim of the Greek population was enosis. Thus, 
the Church boycotted the meetings of the assembly from 
the outset. Of the forty people invited, only eighteen 
attended the Assembly's first meeting in Novcr:1.ber 
Of these, seven were Turkish-Cypriots, eight were 
wing Greek-Cypriots, one was a Maronite and two ~:ere 
Greeks without party affiliation. "As soon as tl1.e rnem-
bers put forward their proposals, they found that the 
ter1ns of reference were very strict indeed. The chair1nan 
• • • • ruled out of order any reference to self-govern-
! 
ment; or any reference designed to give elected represent-
atives real executive authority." 57 Under these condit-
ions, the discussions entered a period of limbo and were 
formally adjourned. 
. 
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An attempt to relieve the impasse was made in May 
1948 when proposals were put forward for a "new consti-
tution" for Cyprus. There were, however, to be certain 
limits since the Government argued that they would be 
"unable to give their approval to a constitution which ' I 
I 
I 
fundamentally exceeded proposals in the direction of 
58 self government," • 1. e. , enosis could not be considered. 
i 
,Central to the new constitution was the idea of a Lee; is-
..., 
lative Council composed of twenty-two members; eighteen 
.w·.ere to be Greek, four were to be Turkish, each group 
be,ing ·elected by the separate com.muni ties. It \vas 
~_,,' 
/i±hought that "in view of the substantial Turkish minority ( ; 
... .__ I· 
•
1! ., 1 • the Turkish community should elect their own repre-
. :t, t' .. 59 
.sen a i ves. Moreover, there were to be four Official 
members on the Council, but the presiding officer would 
\ 
no~ have a casting vote. An Executive Council, con~ris-
.. i I • 
in~ three Greeks and one Turk, would be established to 1 
' 
advise the Governor, who was to have, in the last resort, 
the "usual reserve legislative power . .. I 
~l I 
the Assembly • 
1 These proposals were presented to in I ! 
! 
May, where they were rejected by eleven votes to seven: 
,the seven opposition votes were those of the Greek-Cyp-
riots who had, when the plan was first annot111ccci, rejected 
it on the grounds that enosis had not been mentionec~. 
In August 1948 the Consultative Assembly was dissolved by i 1 
• I 
I 
1 
! 
' 1 I ; 
, I I I 
I 
I 
-~ 
j 
·' 
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the Governor, although the May proposals were not with-
drawn. {Of the breakdown of the proposals, Lord ~;instcr 
i 
lat~r observed that the major cause was "political c~ci~e1:-
ard±ce. • • .an unwillingness to take responsibility, 
[which] is the curse of Cypriot policies. 1160 
At the same time as these indications of change 
appeared at the administrative level, changes were taking 
place on the local level and within the Church. Shortly 
after his election to the position of Bisl1op of Ki tiu.m, 
Makarios (not to be confused with the Ethnarch, ~iakarios lr) organised a reform of the Ethnarchy Council. B~:l the 
end\ of 1948 Makarios was Director of the Council, strongly ! ; 
press,ing the enosis issue and publishing a magazine, i 
~'Gre~.k Cyprus" promoting it. In 1949 the British Govern-
I 
ment refused to give its consent to the holding of a pleb-
-iscite to ascertain the state of local opinion regarding 
the future form of Cyprus government. The official answer 
was that, first, the government was not aware of any gen-
eral demand for a plebiscite and, second, it would not 
61 serve any useful purpose. Yet in face of officiLll dis-
approval the Church, under the apparent direction of the 
younger Makarios, organised its own "unoffical" plebiscite. 
The voting, in January 1950, revealed an overwhelming sup-
port for enosis; of the Greek-Cypriots entitled to vote, 
95.7% (i.e., 215,108) voted for union with Greece. 62 
_; 
so. 
The response from the Turkish-Cypriots was immed-
iate. The head of the Turkish National Party described 
i 
the, plebiscite as "an unwarranted political manoeuvre." 
1 
Turks were, he went on, opposed to even a genuine plebi-
scite because "they believed that for econon1.ic, military, 
geographical and political reasons the island should re-
main in British hands. If Britain ever left Cyprus, 
then the island should go to its previous owner, Turkey. \ I 63 -~nbsis would bring misery." 
\·· In Greece, Church and press reaction to the plebi-1 I 
sc~te was loudly in favour of enosis, whilst the reaction ' I 
of the government was one of deliberate silence. 
The plebiscite, and its aftermath, mark a turning 
point in the Cyprus conflict. First, it revealed the 
extent of Makarios' influence upon popular Greek opinion. 
Upon the death of the elder Makarios, in 1950, ~1akQ~ios 
Mouskos, a Cypriot by birth, comrni tted to the ic1ea of a 
Greater Greece, was elected to the position of Ethnarch, 
from which he led the anti-British campaign. Secondly, 
the plebiscite brought forth from the Turkish community 
another clear statement of policy, avowedly anti-Greek 
and prb-British. The two Cypriot groups were openly 
committed to incompatible goals. The plebiscite \.;as 
clearly catalytic; as a result of its being l1elc1, firm 
political goals were enunciated by both groups and t11e 
factor of difference, which had escalated to disagreement, 
·"······-«--~-.. --=·· r----------
was now a state of mutual exclusivity of goals:if one 
was to be 'successful' it would be at the expense of 
the other. 1 • • • 
51. 
As Ethnarch, Makarios pressed the enosis campaign 
with: unmitigated zeal. On the diplomatic level, visits I 
to Greece, France, the United States and Britain (all 
within a five month period) helped bring attention to 
the _Greek-Cypriot cause. On another level, ~1ak~rios, 
in conjunction with,~another Cypriot, Grivas, began org-
a:n.is.ing a political campaign, the aim of which was to 
pressure Britain into leaving Cyprus, by raising the 
costs of staying, i.e., systematic violence. 
The organisation of what later came to be called 
E.O.K.A. (National Organisation of Cyprus Fighters) 
dates from July 1952, when a meeting was held in Athens 
under Makarios' chairmanship, to discuss the liberation 
of.Cyprus from British rule. The prime mover in organ-
ising the meeting was George Grivas. In the middle of 
1951 Grivas had undertaken a study of the problems in-
valved in waging a guerrilla campaign in Cyprus. The 
i I I . 
formal meeting gave recognition to the Grivas plan and 
two committees were established - military and political 
- to help implement it. In November 1952, Grivas went 
to Cyprus, for four months, to survey the mountain reg-
ions and the coastal sites where landing of arms might 
i 
;· 
' ,· 
•. 
52. 
be possible. When the period of planning ended, Grivas 
J returned to Athens :to assemble arms, many of them rem-
1 rnants of the Greek Civil War, and begin a period of more I • • ' ! 
~ ~ystematic planning. The attempt to organise a guerrilla : i I 
campaign was not without opposition; Grivas himself re-l 
counts the nblunt refusal" of some groups to participate. 64 
More important, an overture to the Greek government re-
ceived a firm rebuff from the Prime Minister, Marshal 
65 Papagos. Nevertheless, the campaign to organise the 
66 movement proceeded apace and in late 1954 Grivas left 
Greece for Cyprus to begin a campaign which altered the 
nature of the Cyprus conflict. 
In the period 1878 to 1954 the conflict in Cyprus 
had been "colonial," the majority of the population 
wanted a change in the island's sovereignty whilst the 
colonial power, and with it a minority of the population, 
wanted the status quo to prevail. After 1954, the Bri~ish, 
the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus, and the governments 
~ 
,of Greece and Turkey, became committed to separate and 
conflicting policies over the status of Cyprus and, at 
the same time, the dispute over Cyprus functioned as a i I 
I 
catalyst in the further worsening of relations between 
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots within the island itself. 
53. 
CHAPTER 5 
Cyprus Under the British: 1954-1960 
The factor of Greek involvement is crucial for it 
is the active involvement of the government in Athens 
that separates the post-1954 enosis effort from that df 1931. Not only did Greece suppl::/ Grivas \•.riti1 arms 
and aid, it put the Cyprus issue before the Uni tecl 
' 
Nati6ns in five consecutive sessions. Moreover, the 
· Greek government, by taking up the Cyprus issue, jeop-
a~dised its successes in other areas of foreign policy 
I · I 
- -
1
not lec1.·st its new-found friendship with Turkey. ' ' : I 
I 
\ Following its success in the election of November 
1952, the Right-wing, conservative Greek government of 
Marshal Papagos was committed to a five-point foreign 
policy: perpetuation of peace through United K~tions 
diplomacy; friendship and cooperation with Turkey; 
bett~r relations with Yugoslavia; cooperation with ! ! 
Britain, France and the United States on aspects of 
western defence; and a realistic :treatment of the Cyprus 
issue. 1 Shortly after the new government assumed power, 
' ' 
I . Papagos approached the British Ambassador in Athens with I : 
' 
a p~an for a liberal consitution and a plebiscite within 
2 two years. In September of 1953 the Cyprus issue was 
' 
'· 
I 
' 
• 
:;, 
. t: 
T 
I 
! 
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raised in the General Assembly debate, with a hint that 
the Greek government desired bipartite negotiations with 
B 't. 3 
_ ri ain. Later the same month Papagos met Eden, British 
Foreign Secretary, in Athens and was told that Cyprus was 
not an issue, nor could it be one. The British position ! 
was further reiterated by Eden in December in a meeting 
with the Greek Ambassador in London. 
Thus, by the beginning of 1954, with popular opinion 
in Gr~ece (urged on by the Athens press) in f~vour of 
· enosis and the British government inflexible in its re-
fusal even to discuss Cyprus as an issue, the Greek gov-
ernment was seriously weighing the costs and benefits of 
going before the United Nations to call for negotiations 
with Britain. Public statements from Stephanopoulos, 
F9reign Minister, and Kyrou, Ambassador to the U.N., I 
were evidence of firm intent by the Greek govern~ent. 
On March 15, however, Eden again reiterated the Dritish 
position when, in the Commons, he stated that, desoite 
... l +nformal approaches from the Greek government, I 
esty's Government cannot agree to discuss the status of 
•. 
. 4 
-~yprus·." 
wa~ made 
. \ 
fore the 
The decision to go 
5 on April 15, 1954. 
before the United Nations 
By placing the issue be-
U .N. the Greek government hopec1 to pressure 
Great Britain into negotiation, but Papagos was anxious 
not to let the gulf between Greece and Britain grow too 
I 
! 
i 
l 
j 
' 
I 
large. 
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(Following a demonstration in Rhodes, in favour 
of enosis, Papagos had stated "We intenc1 to prevent any ' I : 
achion which may damage Anglo-Greek frienc1s11ip 116 ). In 
~e:g·ard to the Turkish position, the Greet:s \•lere op to irni s-
tic, mistakenly so in view of the Turkish commitment to 
, the status quoi 7 a belief that any negotiations over Cy-:\ 
' I 
prus should be tripartite and a Turkish statement to the 
e~fect that a U.N. debate would damage Greek-Turkish re-
lations, were the major planks in the Turkish argument . 
. In view of the growth of cooperative ventures be-
tween Greece and Turkey in the early 'fifties, Greece ' 
could little afford a costly rupture, yet the 
issue eventually nullified these early gains. P.s oart-
.. 
ners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation after 
1952, and under Anglo-American pressure to cooperate 
in the field of Balkan security, Greece and Turkey 
grew closer in view of a corrununity of security interest. 
In February 1953, representatives of Greece, Turke~· and 
Yugoslavia met to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Coop-
eration. Soon ratified, the agreement was the founda-..:.. 
tion of the Bled agreement of August 1954, linking the 
three states through a Treaty of Political Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance. 
however, short lived. ~ 
This new-found community was, 
; 
British intransigence and a refusal to discuss the 
·-.......,, 
! 
·j 
; 
I: 
I· 
., 
' 
•: 
' 
> 
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status of Cyprus was linked to the progress of the 
negotiation with Egypt regarding the Canal Zone Base 
Agreement. On July 27, 1954, Britain and Egypt se-
cured the "Heads of Agreement" regarding the Suez base, 
thus paving the way for the final agreement (October 19, 
1954) under which Britain was to evacuate her base with-
in twenty months. The new headquarters for Middle East-
ern Command was to be Cyprus. Thus, on July 28, 1954, 
Mr. Hopkinson, Secrij,tary of State for the Colonies, told 
the Commons that "there are certain territories in the 
Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circum-
stances, can never expect to be fully independent. 
l have said that the question of the abrogation of 
• • 
British sovereignty cannot arise ... that British sov-
ereignty will remain." 8 This was, Mr. Hopkinson had 
said, a "vital strategic area." 
At the same time, the 1948 Constitutional offer was 
withdrawn since ''it had not been taken up by responsible 
and representative political leaders." 9 Thus, tl1e C.JO'l-
ernment planned to introduce a new constitution, having 
provision for a legislature containing both Official and 
Nominated Members - together forming a majority - and 
·Elected Members, together with the appointment of Elected 
Members to an Executive Council "totake charge of depart-
ments.'' This was, however, to be only a step in the dir-
:, 
; ! 
i 
I 
,. 
I 
.!. 
i , .. 
! 
' 
"'., 
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;~c·tion of "constitutional advancement ~,lO To forestall ' l. 
any Cypriot reaction the government invoked the e:-:isting 
anti-sedition laws (under Cypriot law, sedition \•las de-
fined as any attempt to bring about a change • in sover-
eignty), with a statement to the effect that a hard line 
11 would. be followed, and giving notice that any publi-
catiort~ or persons advocating union with Greece would 
be severely punished. In response, the Cypriot nrcss 
... 
suspended publication for a week. 
By the middle of August, the Greek campaign for 
enosis was underway. Students at Athens University, 
urged1 by their rector to hate Britain, demonstrated in 
favour of union and nationwide demonstrations were spon-
sored by the Pan-Hellenic Committee for the Struggle of 
12 Cyprus. By the end of August, the British consulate 
in Crete had been bombed, Makarios had led an anti-Brit-
ish.demonstration and more than sixty Greek students 
were injured in demonstrations in Athens. More s icrni-.., 
·. I ·r ficant, perhaps, were the positions of the three govern-
,men.ts involved. Papagos, in a letter to U.N. Secretary 
General Hammarskjold, asked that a plebiscite be held, I 
u~der U.N. auspices, to decide the will of the Cypriot I 
people. 13 The British response was to argue that the 
Cyprus issue was purely an internal matter and, with 
l" the government of Turkey, agreed to oppose the Greek 
• 
-- --...------...... -----
<•·_' .... ,~.~..,, •. ·--.~--~~~-~-~--, 
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move at the U.N. on these grounds. \ I 
I 
The Greek diplomatic campaign was not without 
i ,some success. On September 24, the General Assembly 
decided to include the Greek item (calling for the 
"Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, 
of the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples in the case of the population of the island 
of Cyprus, 1114 ) on its agenda, although the Britisr1 
gate, Selwyn Lloyd, argued that it had no right to 
, ____ 
1 e:. 1 c- -\. ii. I 
~ 
ClO 
so. When the issue came before the Assembly for debate 
and voting, in December 1954, it was approved by fifty 
votes to none, with eight abstentions. The British 
g9ver~ent claimed that the passage of the resolution 
relegated the issue to a relatively minor status, since 
"no further action 1115 was to be taken al tl1oucr:-: the issue 
: ; 
_.i 
would :remain before the U. N.. Thus, the r1,ur}~i s:: C~o .. ,e:1-D-
ment ~lso considered the issue closed and Prime ~1inistcr 
' . 
._./ 
. 
Mender:es expressly stated this view in a call for better 1 
16 relat~ons with Greece. 
In Cyprus itself the U.N. decision precipitated a 
series of protest strikes and demonstrations. In one 
such incident, in Limassol, a dozen persons were injured 
when British troops fired at rioters. Shortl\· 
.... 
rurn(?urs began to circulate that Britain was to 
new offer regarding self-government and the Governor, Sir 
59. 
::Robert Armitage, urged Cypriots to adopt a cone i 1 i a tory 
attitude. 17 In face of persistent violations of the 
·anti-sedition laws, however, the British army arrested 
fifty demonstrators and, in London, the Colonial Secret-
ary, Lennox-Boyd, quashed rumours of an impending const-
:.t.t.utional of fer. 
The failure of the Greek resolution to gain little 
more than passive acceptance at the U.N. prompted a change I I I 
i~ Greek policy, for in January 1955, Papagos, who had ' 
previously rebuffed any offer of aid to Grivas, came out ~ f h O 1 
I 18 +n support o t e vio ence campaign. At the same time, 
"the organisation" was given a name - E.O.K.A. - and a 
i 
~ist \of its· ~ims drawn up. Indeed, the prime aim of the 
organisation was such that it could be construed as being 
complementary to the official government policy in Athens. 
As·Grivas published it, the aim of the organisation was: 
to arouse international public opinion, espec-ially among the allies of Greece, b~/ c1eecls of heroism and sacrifice which will focus 2tLcnt-ion on Cyprus until our aims are acY1ie'";.~ec~. The British must be continuall}l l1arr iecl '..lD ti 1 they are obliged by international c1iplor.:clc::/ exercised through the Uni tec1 Kat ions to e:-:am-ine the Cyprus problem and settle it in accord-ance with the desires of the Cypriot people and the whole Greek nation.19 
The E.O.K.A. campaign began on April 1, 1955, when, • in 
the early hours of the morning, bomb explosions destroyed 
property in Nicosia, Lamaca and Limassol; a radio station 
., 
n.~ar Nicosia was also damaged. In Athens, the press 
blamed the outbreak of violence on British 
(as did Makarios) whilst a semi-official newspaper 
argued that, whilst violence should be disapproved, 
all. "national revolutions" were legitimate. 20 The 
60. 
leader of the Turkish-Cypriots, Mr. Paiz Kaymak, denounced 
the British f~r not dealing with the campaign quickly, 
whilst Makarios, for the Greek-Cypriots, announced that 
he would not meet with the Governor until self-deter-
mination became a subject of discussion. Among Greek-
Cypriots, the bombings stimulated interest in the E.O.K.A. 
campaign and voluntary recruiting to the organisation 
followed. Significantly, the Cyprus police appealed for 
·men "of all communities" to join a special police force 
with the intention of putting down the "mounting anti-
British demonstrations 1121 • (By February of 1957, the 
A ·1· 1· f 97% T k' h . 22 ) uxi iary po ice orce was ur is -Cypriot. 
Moreover, the first death of the E.O.K.A. campaign oc-
curred on June 19 when, in a series of bombings through-
out'Cyprus, a Turkish constable was killed in Nicosia. 
The effect of the violence was sufficient to provoke 
a response from the British government. On June 30, 1955, 
after pers.istently arguing that Cyprus was a purely dom-
l 
esltic issue, Eden, in a Conunons address, invited represent-
at:ives of Greece and Turkey to a conference, in London, to 
61. 
discuss "problems of security • the Eastern Mediter-in 
ranean, including Cyprus. "2 3 
Agreement from the Greek and Turkish governments 
was almost immediate, despite the worsening of relations 
between Britain and the former as a result of a series 
of radio broadcasts, from Radio Athens, which Britain 
claimed incited the Cypriot population. In Cyprus, 
Makarios, who was not invited to attend the ,-con re re n c e, 
quickly denounced the inclusion of Turkey on an cq~al j 
. I 
fo6ting with Greece and predicted the failure of the 
tripartite talks. In spite of an announcement that talks 
• 
would be held, they did not commence until August 29, 1955. 
The rationale of the British government, in convening the 
' conference, seems to have two major aspects: first, by 
introducing a diplomatic 'barrier', before a ''last resort" 
to the U.N., the British hoped to deflate the Gree~ effort. 
In this respect it was partially successful since the 
Greek government, in submitting a second request to the I 
-
U.N., asking the General Assembly to call for Cypriot 
self determination, made recourse to the U.N. contingent 
uponlthe success of the London conference. 24 Second, I ! 
. 
and ~erhaps more important, Britain formally invited 
Turkey to become a party to the dispute over Cyprus, in 
support of the British status quo position. More than 
this, however, the British overture to Turkey is linked, 
/ 
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'I. 
-~n' a fundamental way, to long-term British policy in 
the Middle East. At the time of the signing of the 
"Balkan Pact in August 1954, 'The Times' gave weight 
to the Turkish position: 
By virtue of her geographical position and the numbers and quality of her armed forces, TurJ.:e:l is called upon to play an important part ir1 tl1e defence system of both the Balkans and tl1e :.~icldle East . . . . 
Turkey possesses an army and a long tradi·tion of bravery and endurance, supplemented with a familiarity with the kind of \varfare that \•Jould be waged in a mountain region .... The importance of the Middle East lies in the fact that it contains 54.7% of world oil re-sources.25 
By courting Turkish favours, Britain could be assured of 
a loyal ally in the Middle East and in the Cyprus • issue. 
Yet Turkey was not without her own rationale. B}' f irrnly 
opposing enosis, Turkey could rule out the not-so-remote 
possibility that Cyprus might at some future date beco~,.e 
an island base of a Communist-controlled Greece, \•li tl1 all I 
t~e attendant strategic risks. ! Indeed, the 1958 election 
f 
success of the Leftists in Greece, gaining 25% of the 
popular vote, did much to reinforce this Turkish view-
' i, point. Moreover, Mendenes publicly called for the status 
quo to prevail several times in the interim period before 
the conference convened. 
In Cyprus, the violence campaign was well underway 
a.na: g_eneral strikes, riots and police involvement became 
.• 
'i 
63. ! 
' 
·al1nost nor1nal occurrencies. Grivas' campaign had crossed 
• i 
a ~eqond barrier when support from the student populQ~ion ' 
was ~nlisted to demonstrate and distribute leaflets. 
The success of E.O.K.A. was such that Makarios sent a 
message ·t:·o Grivas saying, "I congratulate you. E.O.K.A. 
has contributed more to the Cyprus struggle than seventy-
iive years of paper war." 26 Meanwhile Greek-Cypriots 
1 
were ~esigning from the police force en masse, to be re-
placep by Turks and British officers hurriedly flown ' I 
from other colonies. 
' The London conference convened on August 29, in the 
wake of a series of demonstrations and killings in c~·prus. 
Under the chairmanship of the British Foreign Secretar~·, 
MacMillan, the first days of the conference consisted of 
presentations of initial positions. For Greece, Stephan-
opoulos argued that the value of Cyprus as a base depended 
upon the goodwill of the people of Cyprus and that Cyprus 
was now more than a domestic issue. Maclvlillan stressed 
Britain's commitment to hold the island, together with a 
~onunitment to keep order, whilst Zorlu, for Turke:/, ' 
s~ated in no uncertain terms, that if Britain left Cyprus, 
·Turkey would take control of it. With pessimism descend-
ing, the prospects for success were further exacerbated 
when rioting broke out at Izmir and Istanbul. Turks, ap-
parently in retaliation for bombings of Turkish buildings 
i' 
64. 
·• 
ip Sa'lonika, rampaged through the streets burning and , 
lobting Greek stores and firing Greek churches. t: 
. i I {Fol~owing the coup d'etat of 1960, evidence came to 
light in Turkey that the Izmir riot had been planned by 
Mendenes, as well as the Salonika bombings, to act as 
a show of Turkish interest in Cyprus, but later got out 
of hand; indeed, there were suspicions that this was 
. • 
I 27) the case as early as mid-September. 
In these circumstances, MacMillan put forward a 
\: 
pl~n offerring to Cyprus a "substantial measure of self 
government," without implying that self determination 
would follow; 28 an assembly with an elected majority, 
appointed minority and proportional representation for 
Turks was to be linked to a Council of Ministers, auto-
nomous in all affairs except foreign affairs, defence 
and public security. To give effect to the plan a tri-
partite commission would be established in London. Not 
unexpectedly, the plan was not well received and the con-
fer~nce ended within ten days of its first session. 
The\ "Manchester Guardian", recording the end of the con-
ference, reported "The discussions on Cyprus have come 
• •. to an inconclusive end. Indeed it is worse than 
inconclusive. The effort has been seriously to worsen 
relations between Greece and Turkey while Britain's own 
position in Cyprus has not been in the least improved ... 29 
• 
-· 
• 
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Xnde~d, the situation was such that Greece severed sea 
and:'.air links with Turkey and refused to join N.A.T.O. I 
l : 
exercises and meetings of the Balkan pact in face of 
Turkish hostility. The British response, following 
the London conference, was to send more troops to Cy-
prus. On September 16 the E.O.K.A. movement was de-
clared illegal and, following a series of attacks on 
:[!>olice stations and thefts of arms, the "security forces" t 
Regan systematic searches for arms caches. A second 
Greek-Cypriot organisation (M.O.K.A. - Mystery Organis-
ation of Cypriot Fighters) formally announced its found-
ation and its allegiance to E.O.K.A. in mid-September 
' i 
an4 the frequency of violent outbreaks increased. I 
The Greek diplomatic campaign received t\.;o major 
. setbacks in the month of September. First, the ... . .Arnericam 
Secretary of State, Foster Dulles, sent almost identical 
letters to the governments of Greece and Turkey, telling 
them to "mend their fences" in the interests of the soli-
darity of the alliance. 3° For the Greeks this was an 
unfortunate reprimand since they deemed the Turks to be 
at fault, whilst Dulles' letter seemed to cast equal blame. 
The feeling was further compounded when, within two da)'S, 
the U.N. steering conunittee voted against the inclusion 
of the Cyprus issue for the tenth session. Of the seven 
votes against the Greek position, five were from N.A.T.O • 
66. 
allies - among them the United States, Britain and 
31 France. In Athens, the conservative, pro-western 
newspaper "Kathimerini" spoke of the betrayal of 
Hellenism. 32 On October 5, Papagos died and Constan-
tine Karamanli·s was appointed to the position of care-
taker prime minister, pending the holding of a general 
election. I I 
i 
Further evidence of a British commitment to 11 order 
in Cyprus" came on September 25, when Field r-.1arsl1al Sir 
John Harding, former Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
was named Governor of Cyprus and commander-in-chief of 
the security forces. Explaining the replacement of a 
,civilian, Armitage, by a soldier, the Colonial Office 
cited the need to maintain the security of the base in 
Cyprus. In response, Stephanopoulos announced that the 
appointment of Harding was tantamount to a British declar-
atioJ of war upon Cypriots, 33 whilst Makarios announced I i 
' 
the f~rmation of a passive resistance movement. The 
situation in Cyprus itself was, however, far from passive, 
with strikes and clashes with troops taking place on a 
greater scale with greater frequency. More troops were 
flown to Cyprus from the Sudan and, in response, E.O.K.A. 
increased the frequency of its attacks. 
Towards the end of October the Governor banned the 
Greek celebration of Greece's rejection of Italy's ulti-
67. 
matum in 1940. The effect of the ban was to precipi-
tate riots, against the ban, in the major towns on the 
·island in which many were hurt in clashes with troops 
sent, to control them. Moreover, the sentencing to death 
of a Greek-Cypriot for killing a policeman, caused furth-
er violent outbreaks, both in Nicosia and in Athens. 34 
The policy initiated upon the arrival of Harding 
was two-pronged; in addition to trying to eradicate 
E. 0. K .A. through a systematic campaign of la\a; anc1 orcler, 
there were also intermittent negotiations with 
on ways to end the violence and endo-v; Cypriots !,,;itr1 1:)oli-
·tical responsibility. Harding had stated his objective 
as being "to establish and maintain law and order . • • 
and to be prepared at any time to discuss constitutional 
deve:lopments towards self government on the basis of the 
35 proposals put forward at the London conference." ! 
Eirly on in their discussions there were reports of a 
narrowing of differences on the issue of self determin-
ation, with Britain willing to discuss self-go~:cr~~~ent 
if the violence ended. In return, Makarios reportecil~' 
dropped the issue of enosis in favour of self determina-
. I 3 6 t1bn . The British strategy seems to have been that if 
. E.O.K.A. could be curtailed, then the power of Makarios 
to bargain would be severely eroded and a settlement 
reached. Yet, according to Charles Foley "the bargaining 
I 
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advantage lay with whoever was more successful outside . 
the conference room. 1137 
By November of 1955 the Greek-Cypriots clearli' had 
the upper hand. The campaign to save Karaolis from a 
sentence of death for murder, encompassed most Greeks on 
the island~ Students demonstrated, bombs were thrown at 
Btitish buildings and installations, British soldiers 
were killed and, in response, schools were closed, the 
police ca1npaign stepped up and more stringent mea~u:ces 
invoked. Following the killing of a British soldier, II i 
ih retaliation for the death of a Cypriot, a state of 
emergency was declared and, with it, emergency regulat-
ions were introduced. Thus, the carrying of arxns was 
punishable by death, public meetings were prosecuted 
and strikes made illegal. 
Meanwhile there was much discussion on the subject 
of· repairing the Greco-Turkish rift that 
London conference and the Izmir riots. 
f o 11 o · .. ; e c: t l': e 
The a o -:. r r..:. -r- r ....... e n t __,; • ._ -- .... • • . • l 
in Athens held that no conciliatory action was rossible 
until .it had been indemnified for the damage to Greek 
property and, in anger at the Turkish position, threat-, 
!ened to leave the Balkan alliance. Responding to this l 
\impasse, the government of Yugoslavia attempted to inter-. . ' 
d i t I h d' 38 h k vene as me ia or int e 1spute. Te Gree response to ! 
' 
·th¢ now deadlocked Harding-Makarios negotia·tions was to '· 
\ I 
' ! 
I 
.. 
.. 
'· 
, 
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send'a representative to confer with both. As a result 
the Greek government was "hopeful" that some success 
would be forthcoming. According to Xydis, the Greek 
representative, Mr. Liatis, was sent to inform Makarios 
of the extent of Greek support "and to suggest to him 
r;;$. 
t.hat he should resume his talks with the Governor" on 
t·he basis of a revised British proposal for some degree \ 39 of self government. The talks resumed on J anuar)r 9, I 
1956 ,. and there were press reports of Bri tisl1 concessions 
in the offing. 40 The magnitude of the gains in the tal~s 
was such that agreement was reported close by both . -S lC!8S; 
:Makarios was asked to accept a compromise proposal of 'lb 
self rule followed l;)y self determination later, "when 
+,, t . ·a t· 
. ,. 4 l h G k C 
s 1 ra egic consi era ions permit. Forte ree - yp-
riots, Makarios was to try to end the violence. The 
positions were thought to be close enough to make a 
settlement possible and Dulles, for one, was pressing 
the British to k~ep the negotiations going. 42 I-larding 
was called to London for talks and returned to continue 
the negotiations with Makarios. At the same time, Greece 
was reported to be satisfied with a Turkish indemnity 
offer, related to the Izmir riots, and agreed to attend a 
meeting of the Balkan pact. 
One of the major obstacles at this point of the nego-
tiati~ns was the control of the police force during any 
. ·.7.· 
: 
' 
I 
i 
' ,1 
' 
I 
inte mediate period of government. Grivas infor1tted 
Maka'ios that the control of internal security must 
not e left in the hands of the British. 43 In turn, I I 
' I 
Makarios amended this condition, to agree to British 
1control of the police, if the auxiliary force (which • 
was ~y now largely Turkish-Cypriot) were abolished. 
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As if to reinforce the Greek-Cypriot opposition to the 
.. au:x.iliary force, Themistocles Dervis, tl1e >1a~~{or of 
Nicosia, called the conduct of the police in quelling 
a student demonstration "barbaric. 1144 
The impending Greek election caused a slow-down 
in the negotiations with Britain waiting to see the 
' 
evolving Greek policy. The election success of Kara-
manlis and the National Radical Union on February 19 
ensured the continuity of Greek policy - despite criti-
cism ~rom opposition parties. 
The day to day events in Cyprus were such that • :j ' 
violence was by now becoming an endemic feature. Assas-
stnations and demonstrations were widespread and repri-
sai killings frequent. Indeed, the violence was a key I : • I 
i I. 
to tre success of the negotiations, since the British 
demahded its end before agreeing to a settlement. Thus, 
o~ February 16, Grivas ordered a suspension of all 
attac~s in order to promote a settlement. With an agree-, 
:m·ent 9-pparently close at hand, Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, perl1aps I 
1
·fearin,g any compromise might be a prelude to enosis, ' \ 
f 
·~ 
spoke for the Turkish-Cypriots when he announced that ' 
they would fight enosis. 45 
Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, flew to Cy-
prus to confer with Hardingi the United States Consul 
G~neral told Makarios that the United States tl1ought ·, 
71. 
the terms of a British settlement "fair" ar1d a settle-
.. 
metit seemed nearer yet. As mediator in the 1-Iarc1ir:c;-
.., 
M~karios talks, Francis Noel-Baker, a Labour Member of 
Parliament, guided the parties. Fluent in Greek, Noel-
Baker was employed to journey between Government Haus~ . 
• 
and the residence of Makarios, with details of the I ' 
difficulties outstanding; the role of the police, compos-
ition of a Cypru$ parliament and an amnesty for E.O.K.A. 
members. 
· That the negotiations subsequently broke down, 
with agreement apparently so near, may be explicable in 
terms of factors extraneous to the Cyprus disputes per 
s:e:. · On March 1, 19 56, General John Gl ubb \-las dismissed 
.. a·s.\ :head of the Jordanian Arab Legion and summarily order-
ed to leave the country. Due solely to a personal disagree-I 
Il}ent with King Hussein, the dismissal of Glubb was per-, 
ceived in Britain, and especially by Eden, as a portent 
of instability in the Middle East. The net effect in 
London of the Jordanian disturbances was to convince the 
British decision makers (primarily in the Cabinet) that I 
1: 
B~itain must adhere to a rigid policy of strength in 
th$ Middle East - including Cyprus. 
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The saine day, with negotiations again at an impasse, 
-L'ennox-Boyd returned to London and terrorist activity 
erupted again. Makarios blamed the British for the 
failure of the negotiations: specifically, Britisl1 un-i 
w~llingness to concede on three issues; on a cruc1r c1n tee ..,; 
~- l 
ttiat the projected Legislative Assembly would have a 
Greek-Cypriot majority; on a time limit for the retent-~ 
ioh of police powers by Britain; and on a proposal for in amnesty for all political prisoners. 46 The changed 
' 
principle of British policy, with negotiation being re-
placed by coercion, manifested itself shortly thereafter 
when Britain suspended the negotiations and gave priority 
to 1 ending the terrorist campaign. l Lennox-Boyd, anno~nc-
.itig the decision, stated that Britain had the resolution 
and force to restore order and blamed Makarios for not 
. 
condemning the violence on the part of the Greek-Cypriots. 
Harding inunediately echoed this by refusing to accede to 
:Makarios' demand for an amnesty for those held on charges 
;of carrying weapons and rebuked Makarios for not calling 
'f I d · 1 47 f h h : or an en to vio ence. As or t e At ens govcr:~~ent, 
the British "januned" Radio Athens, long a sore poi:1t, be-
tween the two, thus cutting off its link with Cyprus. 
Reciprocating, the Greek radio ceased broadcast of all 
• 
• 
73. 
B.:. B .•. C. programmes. 
On March 9, Makarios, Bishop Kyprianou of Kyrenia 
and tow others were deported from Cyprus and flown to 
th.e Seychelles . Explaining the decision, Lennox-Boyd 
.. told the Commons that there was evidence of their "con-
' 
' 
ftect;ion wit~ violence" and, l in light of it, "their influ-' 
. b 48 ence must e removed." Two days later, on March 14, ' 
Eden addressed the Commons to explain the recent go\rern-
mrnt ~olicy on Cyprus and concluded by outlining 
ppilosophy of the government: 
Her Majesty's Government must be_ concerned .. to protect the vital interest- s of its O\•:n c i ti-zens. The welfare and indeed the lives of o~r people depend upon Cyprus as a protect:.iiJ~ c_J'.,i,::11:--c1 and staging post to take care of those i~tcrcsts, above all oil. This is not imperi2J_isrn. It sl1ould be the plain duty of any Governn1en t a11d we in tend to do it.49 
T~e\effects of the decision were widespread. Greece was • ! ! 
' the1scene of fierce anti-British demonstrations, the Greek '· i 
gov.~rnment protested to the U. N. and wi thc1rew its ambassa-, 
I dor'from London. The United States, surprised at the de-
_portati.on, voiced its "sympathetic concern 11 to Greece and 
; 
., 
c::alled fo·r a resumption of talks. In Cyprus itself, after i 
atj 1 hiatus, the violence began again, preceeded by a general :! 
st:til<e during which only Turkish stores were open. Needless 
tb say, the Turkish-Cypriots, by their acquiescence, gave 
tacit approval~ the British decision. 
With a rapid increase in the campaign of violence, 
'·· 
' 
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Jl'a7din·g announced that Britain might need six months 
t.o .eI"f.d the terrorist campaign and, until it was ended, 
• \ 
11 
5 0 :no t~lks on self-government would be held. 
Towards the end of March, relations between Greek-
and Turkish-Cypriot took a sharp turn for the worse. 
The facts of the matter are imprecise, but by one report 
a
1 
group 
I 
v~llage 
Turkish 
of Greek-Cypriots, apparently drunk, entered the 
of Vasilia and began attacking the Turks in the 
t . . . 51 quar er, inJuring many. In retaliation, Turks 
in Nicosia stoned Greek buses and damaged Gree}~-o;,,rr1cc1 
property in Hermes Street, the border between the two 
quarter·s o·f the town. The effect of these incidents was 
to reveal the nature of "normal" day to day relations be-
tween the two Cypriot communities; superficially, relations 
~ere good, yet single provocative incident immediately 
polarised the cornmunites, with violent incidents follow-
• ing. Indeed, the Vasilia incident turned out to be only \ I 
the ·s·tart of violence between the conununal groups. The 
general s·ituation worsened when, in April, a British ci,.ril-
ian was shot dead by E.O.K.A., the first British civilian 
to be killed, and a force of British police volunteers 
were flown to Cyprus to aid in the general law enforce-
ment and security duties, the first such unit ever de-
1 d ·a . . s2 p oye outsi e Britain. 
By this time, with violence fir1nly entrenched, the 
positions of the parties were clear. On three separate 
occasions, British representatives (Eden, Harding and the 
.. 
., 
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I· 
Uhited Kingdom delegate to the Council of Europe) reit-
53 erated that order must prece&talks. The EO.K.A. pos-
~tion was also hardening, with suspected Greek-Cypriots 
now being killed. The Ethnarchy Council, at its first 
meet~ng since Makarios' deportation, ruled out further 
negotiation until the return of the Ethnarch. Thus, 
within two months the positions were almost completely 
, 
altered; conciliatory attitudes gave way on all sides 
to hard line, intractable bargaining positions. The 
last. vestiges of moderation disappeared with the execution 
of twb convicted Greek-Cypriots, Karaolis and Demetriou, 
and the reciprocal execution, by E.O.K.A., of two British 
soldiers. 
' The violence between the Cypriot communities in-
creased sharply. Following the killing of a Turkish 
policeman, with E.O.K.A. claiming responsibility, Turkish-
Cypriots rioted throughout the island. In Nicosia, Greek 
shops were burned and stoned and British troops were called 
54 in to separate the Greek and Turkish quarters. Shops 
were damaged in Lamaca and Limassol, whilst further a.trued 
clashes were reported elsewhere. I 
In Paphos, another Turkish policeman was killed and 
in Nicosia, British troops were again called in to separ-
,ate groups of fighting Greeks and Turks. 
With the situation becoming worse by the day, Harding 
---~~---=~------ -----------
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was ca·11ed to London amid reports of an imminent British 
change in policy, despite a speech by Eden to the effect 
that Cyprus must be held to safeguard British oii. 55 
Shortly thereafter, the British Cabinet was thought to 
l be ready to offer to Cyprus a draft constitution with I I 
\\ 
.,, 
I 
I 
! 
fairly liberal provisions, and a date for self-determin-
• • ation. But to be accepted the plan had to receive Turk-
ish SUf>port, and this proved to be the stumbling bloc}(. 
,\ 
;The Turkish government argued that the offer of self-
\government to Makarios in March had gone too far and ; 
! 
\that it opposed any change in the present status of the I ' 
;. 1 d 56 is an. Moreover, Menderes argued that any move to-
I • 
:wards the granting of self-determination would be 
violation of the Lausanne Treaty, and that Turkey would 
, h "t 1· 57 C h , . ' ·never c ange 1 s po icy. In yprus, t e Tt1r.1--:.is11-C:/p-i 
ribt leader Kuchuk warned that if Cyprus were grar~te(} a 
liberal constitution, then Turkey would leave the 
dad Pact and sever ties with Britain, in spite of assur-
ances that a constitution would preserve Turkish rights. 
Nevertheless, in July, signs appeared that the 
British position, in face of almost unrestrained violence 
and the exacerbatj_on of relations between the comrnuni ties 
in Cyprus, was changing. Harding, following the London 
meeting, went back to Cyprus stating that, if Makarios 
denounced the use of violence, then "a new situation 
~: 
I 
! 
!' 
' 
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would be :created." More important, Eden announced that 
Lord Radcliffe would be sent to Cyprus to guage the 
state of local conditions, but that a constitution would 
I 
not be offerred until the terrorism endea. 58 Whilst 
Dervis called the proposed visit a waste of time, Kuchuk 1 
came out in favour of it, but insisted on equal :tur::ish 
·repr~sentation. Despite the initial Greek protests, Rad-
cliffe was able to meet with both Cypriot groups before 
:returning to London . 
In August the Governor announced an extension of 
the scope of the emergency powers in an attempt to curb 
' the mounting violence. (During the month of July, seven-
teen deaths were reported.) By the middle of the month, 
however, the violence was interrupted by an eleven day ' 
truce. In an interview with the "Cyprus Times" Ilard ing 
~ut the onus for any initiative on E.O.K.A. by sa~1 ing I 
"Let the murderers make the first move if there is to be 
a stopping of the violence and its consequences." 59 
E.O,K.A. quickly took up the offer and called for nego-
tiations along the lines suggested by Makarios in March. 
After eleven daJs, however, the truce collapsed over the i i 
issue of E.O.K.A. surrender and the violence resumed with 
·increasing frequency: in the following month, seventeen 
deaths were reported. 
In the meantime, the Greek government had aecided 
·to take the matter of Cyprus before the United Nations 
.. , 
I 
l 
' 
• 
.. j 
' j I 
' ! 
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yet:again, on the grounds that Britain had failed to . . ' \ 
'· 
1tak~ the necessary steps to solve the Cyprus problem, I 
the truce offer notwithstanding. At the same time, 
Britain referred the Cyprus issue to the United Nations 
in ~iew of the suspected involvement of Greece on be-
half of the Greek-Cypriots, not least in the matter of 
arms shipments. (Both claims were included in the As-
sembly agenda for the eleventh session.) A second dis-
pute between Greece and Britain arose over the role of 
Makarios. Britain claimed that Makarios was not indis-
pensable to any negotiations, whilst (in a speech to the 
Greek Chamber of Deputies) Averoff-Tossizza, the Greek 
Foreign Minister, hinted that Makarios would soon be 
released. Greece was, moreover, ready to discuss any 
suitable offer from Britain. 60 ! 
In the wake of an unprecidented wave of violence -
dUring the month of November, thirty-four deat!-:s ,,:ere 
recorded - and in face of the Greek willingness to negot-
iate, Harding flew to London for talks with the Cabinet. 
Several days later, after talks with Harding, Lennox-
Boyd flew to Greece for consultation with Karamanlis. 
on 1 December 19 a White Paper, embodying Radcliffe's 
! 
proposals, was made public and presented to the Conunons 
by the Colonial-Secretary. The major provisions of the 
proposals included the establishment of a legislative 
.'! 
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afsembly with twenty-four Greek members, six Turkish ! 
I 
members (elected by the Turkish conununi ty) and s i:..: \ . i 
official members appointed by the Governor. The assembly 
was empowered to exercise full control in all areas ex-
cept foreign affairs, defence and internal security. 
In fact, British control of the police was the major 
reason for the Greek rejection of the offer; it was upon 
this matter that the Makarios talks with Harding had 
floundered. 
Yet a more significant development at this stage I 
was· not the rejection of the Radcliffe proposals but the 
I 
introduction of the possible option of partitioning the L 
' island. Lennox-Boyd, winding up presentation of the 
Radcliffe proposals, had maintained that: "Her t-1ajestj, 's 
i 
Gov~rnment recognise that the exercise of self-determin-, l 
ati~n in such a mixed population must include partition I,, I. 
amohg the eventual options. 1161 The possibility of part-I 
iti~n, a concrete Turkish presence, officiall~r recog~ised, ' I 
was quickly picked up by Menderes and "ta:-:in1" 
remained the Turkish, and Turkish-Cypriot slogan until 
1958. Indeed, such was the Turkish enthusiasm for the 
i ', • • pa~t1t1on proposal, that a concrete plan was presented in ! ' 
i . 62 JaAuary of 1957. 
\ The by-now systematic E.O.K.A. campaign of assassin-
ating Turkish policemen precipitated a further crisis early 
-------------~-~ 
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~n 1957. In response to such a killing, Turkish youths 
set
1 
fire to Greek buildings in Nicosia and, in defiance 
.. of~ curfew order, demonstrated en masse at the ensuing 
fun~ral. More such clashes followed and relations wors-1 
ened further. Indeed, the Greek parliament called for 
a·United Nations force to be sent to the islana. 63 i ! 
i 
R~ther than give sustenance to the Greek cause, the 
United Nations did much to defeat it. When the joint 
Greek/British items were considered by the General As-
' 
' 
' 
s~mbly they were resoundingly defeated when the Assembly 
I 
voted, by 55 votes to none, with two abstentions, a reso-.· 
-! 
lµtion calling for "an atmosphere of peace and freedom . ; 
i 63~ of expression" to achieve a solution. The Greek react-
ion was to ask Grivas to effect a cease-fire in order to ! 
j • 
• • 64 . h . stimulate negotiations. With t e leading E.O.K.A. per-
sonnel either detained or killed, there was little Grivas 
could do but comply and, on March 14, E.O.K.A. offerred 
to suspend operations if Makarios were released. 
Harding was immediately called to London and, after 
Cabinet discussions, the British response was announced; 
Makarios would be released if he denounced the use of 
violence. This he duly did and was released from the Sey-
chelles on April 7. Grivas was given an offer of safe 
conduct out of the island. The effects of the release 
of Makarios were widespread. In Greece, the reaction was 
81. 
extremely favourable and Ambassador Mostras retu~ned to 
London. The Greek-Cypriots responded by demonstrating 
r 
in!favour of enosis and were dispersed by troops. The 
Turkish government, however, viewed these developments 
with considerable alarm; coupled with the debacle of 
Suez, the release of Makarios seemed to be a clear sign 
of British weakness. Indeed, the popular press reflected 
this attitude and later began an attack on the Orthodox 
Chur,ch in Cyprus. Among Turkish-Cypriots, the slog an 
was still partition. 
~hus, events seemed to taking a turn for the better, 
especially with the entry of British troops into the c;rcek 
quarter of Nicosia, the first such venture in fourteen 
: 65 mo~ths, There were, however, significant developments i 1 
: 
regarding relations between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. 
Whilst Makarios was calling for the exclusion of Turkish-
Cypriots from any negotiations he gave guarantees that 
their rights would be uphela. 66 In return, Kuchuk re-
f d 
. d d b k . 67 use to attend any meeting atten e y Ma arias. By i 
May the Turkish-Cypriots were solidly in favour of part-
~ ti:on and Kuchuk was in Ankara conveying the message to ' I l 
' 
the Menderes government. The size of the rift between 
.1 I 
~he two primary parties was made clear when, on June 3, ! ( 
' 
~ighteen Turkish-Cypriot members of the local town coun-• I ! 
dils resigned en masse, charging that their Greek counter-1 
,. 
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~arts.were seeking to use their majority status in sup-
. 68 port of solely Greek aims. The truce, however, proved 
tb be durable and Harding, after another visit to London, 
lifted 33 of the 76 emergency regulations on August 9, 
~ore :than four months after the start of the truce. By ' 11 " . i . 
. \ ' 
,· ' 
ea~ly September the new bargaining positions were clear; 
Karamanlis stipulated that self-determination for Cyprus 
was the pre-condition for Greek participation in any 
talksi Makarios had agreed to join talks with Turkey pres-L· 
en\and Turkey (and with it the Turkish-Cypriots) were 
r
1
igidly adhering to the partition plan. As Fole~~l puts 
it, "Speeches were filled with Taxim and Taxin1 came 
booming over the radio from Ankara. 1169 
On October 11 the truce ended. By Grivas' own ac-
count, th.e violence began again in reprisal for a British 
raid op a Troodos hideout of E.O.K.A .. On October 19, 
Harding was replaced as Governor by Sir Hugh Foot, pre-
vibusly Governor of Jamaica, and popularl:i" regarded as 
•1iberal". With the news of a new Governor came an in-
crease in the violence, but it was not solely confined to 
Greek-British clashes. Volkan, a Turkish underground org-
anis•tion, warned that" for every dead Turk there would 
be five dead Greeks," in response to the killing of yet 
another Turkish policeman. 
i 
' f 
r 
/ 
' 
With the defeat, in the United Nations General As-
I 
f: . 
i. 
y 
\:· 
• 
• 
' . 
I ' " . 
sembly, of a fourth Greek resolution, riots empted in 
the island, with several killed. Yet the defeat at 
the United Nations again stimulated diplomatic efforts 
to achieve a settlement. In Paris, Paul-Henri Spaak, 
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srcretary General of NATO, initiated negotiations dur-
i~g a NATO meeting. Involved were the Foreign Ministers \ ' 
of: Greece, Turkey and Great Britain. In the same place, 
Pr1esident Eisenhower conferred with Karan1anli s. 7 O 
a month in Cyprus, Foot flew to London, whilst ~1akarios . 
went to Athens, amid speculation that an ini tiati 'le ·.,,·as 
\' 
~ear. Foot, however, warned observers not to expect • \ 71 1'miracles." Yet the signs persisted that something I I 
i 
was in the offing as, first, Lennox-Boyd met the Turk-
ish Ambassador and, second, Foot flew to Ankara, with 
Lloyd, for talks with the Turkish government. 
Yet while Foot was in London and Ankara, the inter-
communal conflict reached new dimensions as British troops 
clashed with Turkish-Cypriots in the Turkish quarter of 
Nicosia. Furthermore, the previously united Greek-Cyp-
r~ots were beginning to fight amongst themselves; left-
ist 'and rightist factions openly fought each other after 
two Greeks of leftist leanings were killed. An anti-
E.O.K.A. demonstration, 3000 strong, again preoccupied 
the British force in Nicosia and Kuchuk was sufficiently 
alarmed to call attention to the situation. The worst of 
~-----,----------. _,.· 'L••,Y, ,----~ ·: -~-,. .o-,· - _. ·~- '• -- • 
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it was, however, yet to come, for within two days Turkish-i 
cy\priots rioted in Nicosia in favour of partition, with I th\e mob stoning police and causing widespread damage. 
In more clashes with police, four Turkish-Cypriots 
we~e killed. The government countered by placing the 
Turkish quarters of Nicosia and Famagusta under curfew 
w9ilst local leaders in the areas hurriedly appealed for I 
72 
oI1der. 
! 
With th~ talks continuing in Ankara, a statement 
W'q.S issued by Menderes, to the effect that Turkish-Cyp-
-
riot interests would be guaranteed in any settlement . 
Th~ press, however, assailed the British handling of the 
riots in Cyprus, the first open criticism of the British 
1 position. After leaving Ankara, Lloyd flew to Athens for 
talks with government officials, accompanied by reports 
that tripartite talks might soon result. trhey dic1 not, 
but the general opinion prevailing in Athens was tl1at 
73 ·the negotiations had entered a "new phase." Indeed 
they had, since Athens was the sc~pe of a meeting between 
·.foot and Makarios. 
Despite the rising dissatisfaction among the Turks 
(a rally in Nicosia, on February 11, saw the appearance I 
I 
of it,hie slogan "Partition or death! ") the Government was I . 
~ufficiently confident that it per1nitted tourists to I : ' ! : ~ 
• 
' 
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~nter the island for the first time in two years. The 
ae-cisrion proved to be a little premature for bombings 
increased in frequency throughout March and, on April 4, I 
two Greek-Cypriots were assassinated. The assassination 
of two British soldiers (May 4) led to the reimposition 
of ·the death penalty for terrorist offences and the 
.I 
arrest 1 of 500 Greek-Cypriots for questioning. 
Meanwhile, the Turkish-Cypriots had formally de-
-olar-ed themselves independent of the G:!:"eek-Cypriots. 
At a meeting held on April24, 5000 Turks had voted to 
fo~m separate municipalities in the main towns of the 
island and to pay no more taxes to the Greek Councils. 74 I 
Amidst further rumours that a new British Plan \.;as to .... 
be offerred for discussion, the Turkish-Cypriots threat-
ehed a renewal of violence if partition were not included. 
On June 3, in a pro-partition demonstration, three T~rks 
were killed and more than twenty injured. (In a·a·~(1l· ... ,.;r,n ....... .._.. __ . ...__.., ... , 
the Ankara government was persistent in its par tit, ion 
. 
~. ~ 
! 
demands and, as if to epitomise the popular feeling of 
Turks, Makarios was burned in effigy in Ankara. 75 ) 
Things became worse-when reports circulated throughout 
the island about the "Guenyeli massacre." A party of 
Greek-Cypriots had been arrested by British troops and 
driven to a nearby Turkish village and told to walk home. 
.. 
. ,,, 
.- -. . 
When the British left, a group of Turks attacked the Greeks, 
l 
I 
I 
\ 
' I 
:• 
• 
•• 
j 
--·~------------· 
.... -.~- ·--·~ ...... ,._-_,, ____ ~ 
I :. 
L 
killing several. Of the impact of the incident, Foley ' ;
86. 
'has written, "After Guenyeli any semblance of a civil-. i~~d society vanished." 76 Indeed, the situation seem-
,ingly worsened on all fronts. Two batallions of troops 
were dispatched to Cyprus by Britain, whilst Greece, in I l . 
face of ever more persistent Turkish protestations over 
I 
~artition-, withdrew all its personnel from NATO head-1 i 
I 
tuarter~ in Izmir and severed all military ties with 
Turkey. There were, however, reports of an impc21c·iing 
~ritish initiative, which seemed to be supported when l 
the Greek-Cypriot mayors of Cyprus met Foot before go-
ing to meet Makarios in Athens. 
The initiative came when MacMillan announced a 
tieW plan before the Commons - "A new adventure in part-
nership" between the communities in the island and also 
-~- the governments of Britain, Greece and Tur}:.ey. 77 With I 
the initial assumption that the status of the island 
1 
w0uld not change for seven years, the major elements 
were outlined. There was to be a separate House of Rep-
r~sentatives for each conununity, each having final legis-1 ! ; 
lative authority in communal affairs; the authority for 
internal administration, other than communal affairs and 
internal security, was to be undertaken by a Council pre-
sided:over by the Governor and including representatives 
• 
-------------~~·~ .. 
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of the Greek and Turkish governments, together with 
si.x elected members drawn from the Houses of Represent-
~tives, four Greek and two Turkish; the Governor, acting 
in: conjunction with the Greek and Turkish governments, 
would have "reserve powers" to ensure the preservation 
of conununal interests as well as control over defence, 
1. ' 
i 
internal security and external affairs; and, finally, l ' ; 
' 
r~p~esentatives of the Greek and Turkish govern~1ents 
would have the right to require any legisl2tior1, de~ined 
by them as discriminatory, to be reserved for ini:/e:s ·c:.i:_;,1.t:-
ion by an impartial tribunal. Further , Mac!'<li 11 <J.!1 ·.,:e :1.. t_ 
on, "we trust that this imaginative plan will be \..relcom-
ed by all concerned in the spirit which it was put for-
· .. L ·a··.. Ii 7·9 war· •. 
·1 
[n ess~_nce, the plan was a basis for discussion. 
~t dontained some element of partition by giving both ·r 
communities separate legislative assemblies and it offer-
red some degree of encouragement to the pro1_Jor1cn ts of 
enosis by institutionalising a link with Greece. Predict-
ably, Kuchuk and Menderes rejected the plan, almost in 
unison, since it gave no mention of partition, as defined 
by the Turks. Makarios' position did show some sign of 
c~nge, however, for whilst he did reject it, he did ad-
mit that self-government was some way along the road to 
self•deterrnination. Averoff-Tossizza, in a speech before 
; I 
\ 88. 
the Greek parliament, told deputies that Greece would 
postpone its demand for self-determination if self-; I 
.government was off erred. 79 I I 
,, 
,, 
~- The diplomatic activity was accompanied by a per-·i r 
\ 
iod of relative quiescence in Cyprus, but this was 
btought to a halt when a Greek-Cypriot was shot dead ' 
• 
in the Turkish quarter of Limassol. The killing of l 
s~ven Turkish-Cypriots (July 12), which brought the ' 
tdtal of dead, in little over a month, to forty-t\~O, 
p~ecipitated strikes by Ttrrks in Farnagusta. In an 
i 
attempt to calm the situation, Foot, Dervis, and Deh-
! 
:k~ash, leader of the Turkish community in Kuchuk's 
absence, issued an appeal for calm and an appeal for 
an end to the violence. 80 By early August, Menderes, 
in a significant gesture of consiliation, asked the i 
i 
Tuikish-Cypriots to curb the prevalent violence. -
Indeed, conciliation seemed to be the prevailing 
lmo~d at the diplomatic level. MacMillan asked ~e~dcres 
and Karamanlis to join him in a joint appeal for ... an e11e1 
to the· violence and E. 0. K .A. an11ounced a truce. At the 
invitation of the Greek government, MacMillan flew to 
Athens and, later, to Ankara for talks with t-1enderes. 
Significantly, Menderes accepted the British partner-
ship plan', calling it "compatible with the ultimate 
Turkish demand for partition.~ 
} . 
,. 
r 
; 
I . 
... ' 
; 
89. 
These discussions led to a modification of the 
partnership plan, details of which were announced on 
August 15. The June 19 plan was modified at four major 
points; first, there was a suggestion of an island-wide ' I 
1legislature, superior to the two conununal chambers; 
second, there were to be invitations to the Greek and 
Turkish governments to appoint liason representatives 
to the Governor, instead of having members in the Gov-
ernor's Executive Council; third, provision was to be • 
made for separate Greek and Turkish municipal councils 
i:n s.ui;table localities, which would add separate commun-
al executive functions to those already outlined; and, 
~-fourth, the proposal that Cypriots have dual national-
ity {both British and Greek or Turkish) was deferrea. 81 
At this stage, with Makarios and Karamanlis reject-
ing! the proposals, it appeared that NATO might becor:,e 
intrumental in bringing about a settlement. Since rrurke11 
a.cc~.pt:ed the British plan, Spaak went to Greece to tr:/ 
to persuade the Greek government to do likewise and 
asked Britain not to implement its new plan until all 
involved agreed to it. However, the Greek government 
re used to consider the NATO initiative since it believed 
that the British plan was prejudicial to the long term 
future of the island. In the meantime, Makarios i1ac1 
put forward his own plan, which ruled out any union with 
;' I 
.! 
. , 
Greede· and assured the Turkish-Cypriots that their 
ri~hts would be safeguarded.8~ 
90 . 
With the limbo in negotiations the violence in the 
island erupted yet again; with British civilians the main 
\ 
ta+get. In face of the new campaign, Foot offerred arn,s ' 
:·to. British civilians wishing to arm themselves 83 and 
. ' 
troops combed the island in a new wave of anti- E.O.K.A. 
-
~ctivities. On November 22, E.O.K.A. declared a truce, I 
just at the time the thirteenth United Nations ::-~ S S r,r· ·,.- 1 Y • • 
..._. •• l u 
was considering a draft Greek resolution calling for 
CY:prus independence after a trial period of self-govern-, 
' 
' 
msnt. After much debate, the Assembly finally passed~ ; I 
... , M~~ican-sponsored compromise resolution calling upon all i 
th~ nations concerned to strive for a "peaceful, democrat-. t t 
ic\ and just solution. 1184 With the Greek initiative at the. I 
United Nations again defeated, MacMillan urged Greece and 
.... .,, 
... 
"· 
Tu:rkey to confer with Britain, pledging to accen·t an'l 
-
..... 
agreed 
amendments to the British plan. The offer was taken uo and, 
... 
! 
amid signs of Greco-Turkish raprochement, events took a 
. turn for the better. Talks in Paris between the Greek 
Ambassador and the Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu were 
followed by visits to the sa.me place by Averoff-Tossizza 
and a statement from Foot that, if the present truce were 
made permanent, then Makarios would be allowed to return 
to·cyprus. The comings and goings of January culminated 
·~· ... 
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in an announcement that Karamanlis, Averoff-Tossizza, 
Menderes and Zorlu had agreed to meet in Zurich on 
Fenruary 5. Thus, after persistently refusing to enter 
into talks with Turkey and after five attempts to bring 
the United Nations into the dispute on its side, the 
Greek government had been forced to accept tl1e position 
it had for so long tried to avoid. I 
I 
i From the six-day conference came the skeletal feat-i l 
ure~ of the Cyprus constitution of 1960. Agreement was 
reached on the issues of president and vice-president; 
the former was to be a Greek-Cypriot whilst the latter 
r 
would be a Turkish-Cypriot and have veto powers over pol-
icies affecting Turkish security and the Turkish-Cypriot 
community, including foreign affairs and the appointments 
:,ilitary and police chiefs. There was to be a joint 
I lJegislative chamber, with two-thirds of the seats allot-1 : 
:ued to the Greek-Cypriots. The independence of the island ' 
was to be safeguarded by a tripartite agreement between 
Britain, Greece and Turkey, whilst a joint Greek-Turkish 
garrisoh ~ould be stationed in the island. Great Britain 
. . ·1·t b h . 1 d 85 was to retain its mi 1 ary ases on t e is an . 
This done, the proceedings moved to London. Greece 
invited Makarios to attend and Turkey made a similar 
gesture to Kuchuk. Makarios took issue with several as-
wects of the Zurich agreement, not least those of the 
I . 
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vice-presidential veto and the 30% Turkish representa-
tion. But since Greece was already in agreement, ~1akar-
±os was given a clear alternative - either to agree or to 
disagree. The former was chosen and the London agreement 
s~gned on February 19. 
In Cyprus, the Governor released the prisoners ·, I 
! 
h~ld in detention camps on February 22, declc1rec1 an am-
nesty for E.O.K.A. members on February 27 (incl~ding safe 
passage to Greece for Grivas) and revoked the order ex~l-I 
ing Makarios on March 1. On March 9 Grivas gave his full 
,slpport to the new arrangements and returned to Greece, 
I 
ito be met with a hero's welcome, and seemed set to retire 
from public life, only to return by July. Later in the I 
year the cleavages in the island grew wider. Greek-Cyp-
riots became more disorganised and split into ,... . . tdctions 
{with Grivas openly critical of Makarios by early August 86 ). 
By Octdber the constitutional negotiations v1ere susr:.e::-.,~:e:c1 
following reports of arms smuggling to Turkish-C~{pr ic\ t.s. 
Indeed, the mood was tense enough to provoke the Governor 
into increasing British army patrols to keep order. In 
~urkey, denials that Turkey was implicated in any arms 
smuggling were profuse, whilst the Greek government was 
cautious. Makarios, however, trying to keep tl1e Greek-
Cypriots united, urged moderation and a return to nego-
\ ;, 
! 
I . 
! 
i 
:I 
I 
I 
l 
i 
\. 
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tiations, which duly reconvened in early November. 
Constitutional development continued throug~1out 
the year. A Joint COnsti tutional Cornmiss ion r,,,'as es tab-
lished at Zurich and empowered to draft a constitution. 
A.second committee was established to plan and super-
yise the orderly transfer of power at independence, and i I 
' 
both proceeded with their work in orderly fashion. On 
October 27 the draft of a defensive agreement was init-
1 ialled by Greece, Turkey and Britain, and on November 10 
M~ka~ios and Kuchuk agreed on the respective powers of I i 
the offices of president and vice-president, but not 
without several deadlocked sessions. 
By early December, however, the rift in the Greek 
·ranks manifested intself when Makarios found himself 
opposed in an election held to fill the Presidency. 
After a somewhat acrimonious campaign r.1akar ios \t1as el-
ected, defeating John Clerides, the second Greek candi-
date who had opposed the pre-independence agreements. 
IKushuk was elected to the Vice-Presidcnc\r ' 
~ ' 
\ It had been announced in 1959 that Cyprus would be-
com$ independent in February 1960. As event turned out, 
negotiations over the size of the British base areas pre-
occupied British and Cyprus representatives for much of 
January; by Cypriot request, indpendence was postponed. I 
Outstanding points of difference were settled by July 1 
9nd August 16 was set as the formal day for independence. 
'· 
I 
i· 
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CHAPTER 6 
Cyprus and. Constitutional Conflict: 1960-1963 
On August 16 "a sovereign and independent republic" 
·of Cyprus came into being. In tl1eor:z' and in la\•l, c::prus 
was sovereign and fully independent; in fact it r.,.~as :-:ot .• 
The powers of the Cyprus government were circ\.l.IT\sc:I-.::_:..,e:ci 
:s~verely. True, the Constitution assured the legal. inde-
pendence of the republic, but two other important docu-
ments accompanied the Constitution - the Treaty of Alliance 
.and the Treaty of Guarantee. Under the terms of the I 
,\Treaty of Alliance, effected August 16 1960, Greece and 
T,urkey were empowered to participate in the conunon de-
fense of Cyprus, and, to this end, establish a tripartite I I 
military headquarters in the island. For this nurscsc, ... ~ 
950 Greek and 650 Turkish officers and men were st~~io~ed 
~n the island, the command of the headquarters rotating 
b 1etween Greek, Turkish and Cypriot every year. 1 
! 
1 The Treaty of Guarantee recognised the 0 independence, 
territorial integrity and securityll of Cyprus, yet con-
tained the following provision: 
I 
•i 
I. 
I 
,( 
', 
·, 
, 
Article IV: In the event of a breach of the present treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United KinsdoD under-take to consult tog ether w i tl-1 res:.::· e c: t t~_o :_~ ~->---: r ,2 -:- ~- ·-.: -Sent at i On S Or me a S Ure S n e C e S S ::-i r · ~ 
_i_ 0 ,C -.., ..... ' - -. - r r -, '" ~, - · · c"" .J. l.-- -_! ... • 0 ... _ ..i;. l.. ·_; "~-· ... _,, ~::, ,_: _.__ . -1ance of those provisions. Insofar cis cor:~~-:-'.c.:-: c:_· .·c):i-.certed action may not prove possible, eacr: c~ t_·.:.e 
... 
,.. three uaranteein Powers reserves the riaht to ta e action with the sole aim of rc-est~L1.isning the state of affairs created b1· tl1c p1~ese;nt treaty.2 (Emphasis added.) 
The treaty was inherently contradictory since, whilst 
firmly recognising the independence of the republic, j 
~t gave to each of the guarantor states the rigl1t of 
1·unilateral intervention. But the treaties were what 
they were - fragile documents which reflected minimal 
conunon interests by all those concerned in its planning 
! 
• 
. and construction. Surely, any document born of five 
I 
~ears of animosity could be little else? 
l'. As if these were not enough, the provisions of I 
' \ 
tihe Sovereign Base Agreements further articulz1ted the 
powers of the Cypriot administration. U , ' . n c1 er t. r:. e ;:, r o -
... 
visions of- the "Treaty Concerning the Establisl:r:~.e:r.r~ of 
the Republic of Cyprus," the republic was to con1p1· i se 
95. 
the island, and offshore islands, with the exception of 
two areas - the Sovereign Bases of Akrotiri and Dhekilia. 
I 
Moreover, under Annex B, section 3, 
The United Kingdom shall have the right to use the airfield at Nicosia together with an~r facil-ities on or connected v.ritl-1 tl1e air-:-ic.;J_ .. _-: :-_c, · .. ;:-.:1t.-ever extent is considered ne cc s s 21~\- =~ ::cc,:-:-. ~_:_ ~ :~-.'~ ~.:o time by the United Kingc1on1 autl·10:-c~t~i0s :c:- -~.,~: Operatl.. on of Uni' ted Ki' ng. dom -,I -i 1 1 r--::. ,-· .r -, ~ ... - ,, ":- ,-, .:- • i .n \,. l ~ \,. __,__ .....;..... -- ,__. u ...... ,r -.~ .... -- ....... '--' -- ..._-4 _.,_ 
-~ 
....... ~ peace and in war, including the exercise of any operational control of air traffic.3 
Thus, Britain maintained the right to use Cyprus as an 
air base, in pursuit of its Middle Eastern defense policy. 
··~· 
:;., 
\ 
• 
\ 
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Irtdeed, it may be argued that, of all those involved 
in the Cyprus issue, Britain got "the best of the deal, '1 
for Cyprus was still a base, just as Britain had wanted, 
whilst Britain was rid of a thorny and, no less import-
~nt., costly colonial problem. 
Within these strictly defined limits, the Cyprus 
constitution was supposed to function. Howe,,er, the new 
constitution was the embodiment of the ethnic difference 
in Cyprus! The major provisions of the constitutio11 are I 
illustrated in the diagram below. Article T\tJo of ti'1e 
Cyprus Constitution recognises the existence of t\vO et.h-
• nic groups: 
(l)The Greek Conununity shall comprise all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin anc1 ~t·,·!1ose mother tongue is Greek or v1ho s 11 c1 r c t~: e c~ 1~ c; e: :.:~ :· -__: l t -ural tradition or who are men1bers of t.~-.!~ .· ;~_-t.::.:·=-::~-.. 1-t.h-odox Church. {2)The Turkish Conununity comprises all cit-.i::e::"..s c: the Republic who are of Turk is~: orig i:-: ,=1:-~.: ·.,;::cse mother tongue is Turkish or r.,;}10 sl12rc L::e ·:·-...1:r~: .. :.ish 
• cultural traditions or who are t·los J_en--(s. q 
In ~ddition, both languages are regarded as "official" 
and receive equal recognistion. Also recognised is the 
right of both groups to celebrate Greek and Turkish nat-
ional holidays and to fly the Greek or Turkish flag. 
Thus, the 1960 Constitution was built around a bicommunal ' ' ! ! 
;· 
st.ructure and the factor of "difference" institutionalised 
at a_ll levels. ) . . 
' 1 
I 
j 
L 
r· 
I· 
! . 
. ,) 
The Constitution expressly states that the President 
.• , 
I 
:j 
I 
I 
FIGURE II 
Constitutional tructure: 1960 
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i 
mdst be Greek and the Vice-President Turkish, each 
.. 
b~ing elected by their respective communities. Yet 
this presidential system is further moulded to fit a 
bi-communal system since, if the President should be 
unable to perform his function through incapacity, the 
.. 
role. 
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Vice-President would not assume the presidcr1tit1l 
This would be done by the President of tl1e IIouse .,... ·""l. 0 t-_ .... t.~o-... -..... ~ .... , .. "'-' 
... 
tesentatives - a Greek, by law. Under Articles 4 8 <l.t~ci 
-49 of the Constitution, the President and Vice-President I 
.l 
hav~ the right of final veto over decisions of the Council I 
of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defense and sec-
• urity. 
The Council of Ministers emphasises the bi-communal 
plit at a lower but more widespread level. B', ;\ )- ~- i c--. l , • ...l ......... L ....... .,..,._\..... I, i 
I 46 of the Constitution, the ten-man Council must co~;~rise 
... 
s·even Greeks and three Turks, with one of three major 
~inistries being under the charge of a Turk - Foreign Af-
fairs, Defense or Finance. (In fact, a Turk held the 
position of Defense Minister.) Decision making in the 
Council is by an absolute majority, with the presidential 
veto in certain prescribed areas of competence. 
i 
In legislative matters, the House of Representatives I 
was to reflect a similar 70:30 ratio between Gr~e~ ... a n-, C " .. C.i. ., ;1 ,, 
1 
Turk. Moreover, each group of representatives was to be f 
relected by the communities separately. In its delegation ' 1 I ! 
i 
! ' 
I 
' ' 
' i 
I 
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ci1f legislation to committees, the House was e,mpo\•lered 
to assure the representation of both conununal grou;:s in 
d.ccordance with specified formulae. 5 The oresidinc of-... 
_.l 
ficers must, by law, be representatives of both groups, 
each having the right to take over the presidential or 
vice-presidential roles, as noted above. 
Beneath the House of Representa'ti,.res in the adrnini-
strative hierarchy are the Communal Cl1ambers ,, :. 'r'\ ,, ' c .. l ~ ~ • ' . •· .,, ,,, s e ' ' ' f • ,,. ,__ • "" ,._. I 
perhaps more than any other, epitomise tl1e separa t. :.o:: 
• and institutionalise the difference between the etl1r.ic 
I groups, since 
The Greek and Turkish Communities re spec ti \rely shall elect from amongst their own members 2 
·Conununal Chamber which shall l:.u'/e t.1-:c c_:c:-:·:::,e t.er1ce .. I reserved for it under the provisions o:: t~~"'-c Con-,1 sti tution. 6 
Article 87 enumerates the reservations, which incl tide all 
r~ligions, educational, cultural and teaching matters, . l.S-
su:es of peronal status, the composition of courts set up 
i ' 
toi aeal with civil disputes dealing with status and the ! ' 
impbsition of taxes and fees on Community members in order 
.to: provide for their respective needs and institutions. 
(This last emphasises the aspect of group need and its 
r~lation to "the state"; it is, in fact, a recognistion 
th~t an institution something less than the state, the I , \ 
ethnic conununity, is the only institution capc:ible of ful-
filling certain needs. See Burton on this point.) These 
._ pro~is·ions ensure that socialisation will take place 
at the ethnic-group level, rather than at the level of 
a higher community. Moreover, under Article 108, 
(1) the Greek and Turkish Communities shall l1.ave the right to receive subsidies from tl1e Greek or Turkish government respe cti ,.re 1~:/ ..-:c<c i~~s ~---it:.-utions of education, cul turo, c1thlct:.ic::.; ,=i.=--~·:_: charity belonging to the Greek of rru::c1-:is~: Corn-munity respectively. { 2) Also where either the Greek or Tt1r}:.i sl: Co:-~·..r:-;'__::-1-
. ity considers that it has not the r:.ec~c~ss,=12~~· number of schoolmasters, professors c)r~ cJ e2.~g 1·-me n for the functioning o f i t s i r: s L i :~. ti t i c :-~ ::-:· , such Community shall have the rigl1t:. t.o clj; r:;.in and employ such personnel to t11e e:-: tcr1 t :; ·_ :::_-ict-ly necessary to meet its needs as ·t11e CJ~·~(_;~-: or Turkish government respectiveli' n1ai.r p:r:-o~/icie. 8 
100 . 
Thus, if the communities themselves are not able to pro-
vide the instruments of socialisation, they may ask for 
aid from their "mother country," when tl1ey then1se1,,es 
deem it necessary, in order to ensure the preservation 
of the group. 
·In the public • service, there was to be a quantita-
tive1distribution in all grades of the hierarchy on a 
70:3<) basis, the Greek having a majority. The Public 
Service Commission was similarly split. 9 The axtned 
forces of the republic were set at two thousand men, 
split 60:40 between Greek and Turk, whilst the security 
folfcJs (police and gendarmerie) were to be compr i se:c: of I 
I 
70~ Greek and 30% Turk, except in the transition p~riod, \ 
du~ing which (by virtue of their predominant role during I ! 
101. 
the emergency period) Turks could be employed to a 
' 
maximum of forty per cent. 
t 
l l I Yet the constitutional separation of the two eth-l : 
ntd groups in Cyprus is only one aspect of t~-1:e seoar-.. : I 
alien issue. For one thing, the Greeks and Turks were ' ; ! I 
geographically separated, and for another 
· ~ e .,.- c• n s '·' -,•-, ~ - I' 
... .. 
,chologically separate. According to data made D ' , ~, 1 ~ (-. 1· n u ... ..; ....... -~ 
... 
1964, of the 634 towns and villages in Cyprus in 1960, 
onty 114 were classified as "mixed" i.e., having both 
Greek and Turkish population; 62.4% of all the settle-
ments were wholly Greek, 19.1% wholly Turkish, and the 
re,mainder mixed. 
Table III, below.) 
(Fuller information is contained . in 
Yet even in mixed villaacs and towns ~ 
Greek and Turk were separated into quarters and 
cotirse between the two groups reduced almost to 
1 n• .. L.·~ n 'r -....... ~ ... ..,. 
. . 
a rrl1n1.--
mal level. Foley, for example, in a description of 1:·arr.a-
gusta noted that "it was really two very different townsn l ! I 
with the Turks in the Gothic area and the Greeks in the I 
10 rtewer part of the town. Given that this was a descrip-
tion of the 'fifties, it is hard to believe that the ces-
! 
sat~on of hostilities did much to change it for the better. 
By 1960 economic separation had become a major problem. 
:rndeed, by 1960 Cyprus had a form of dual economy, although 
interdependence between the two groups fluctuatcc1 ·,.;itl1 pol-
' \i tical events.. Nevertheless, Meyer was moved to conunen t I ; 
' I 
i I 
; ! I ! t 
' 
\ ' i 
·I 
. 
I 
' l I 
' 
' ' l 
' I 
' 
' 
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{in 1962), 
Despite the logical arguments against economic separatism, and the drop in its in tens i tJ· aft er independence, it still remains c1 ccnt:r~_-:.:t :-~:c:,,}em I t ha S n O e CO n Om l, C ]. , l S ·t.' - -i _;-: -i c , --, ; ~ r· ., ~· r ;-- · , , ~ ·, · • • • l..,_4,. 
-- ......... _.a._ ·-· '- ... -~· _.._ ...... ... .. 
-~ .... 
... ...... ~...; kind. Contemplation of -the cost.=-, :1 ::,-.i_::::__· ;.~-,:1· i\re di ff i cu 1 tie s and utter f l.1 t i 1 i t '/ o :~ s c ::.:, ,:..~ ~~ ·~i ·_ ·~ :· Ll <: i 1 -~ 
-it i e s and econ om i e s f or th e i s 1 Ll r:. : l I s ' ~ 1~ c:; e :.-.. c1 :-·~ c : l Turk i sh C ornm uni ti es i s a me 1 an ch o 1 \ · t .:i s }.:. i :-,. c·: e; (~ - : • 11 I 
-
w~vertheless, perhaps the most important cleabage at inde-
~ 
:P~ndence was psychological - indeed, constitutional, geo-
g;raphical and economic separation are merely surface indi-
cators of an incompatibility of group values. If, in t.he 
preceding account, a great deal has been made of the ideas 
of goals, goal articulation, demands and counterdemands, 
it is because these are the central featt.:re;s ~ ~ . .. 0 'r t·. r""' ...... ......., r l. -~. ., ..... l,; "J . 
.. 
: I I mary dispute in Cyprus. I Dur l.. ng the ' f 1· -+= ~- -; ,-. s *- '.~. ·-· • ·, { ~ •· o "-..L... L _._ ~ \_~ ~ .. '-"" ... , 1:._..., :.~-, . ~ · •·-
o~,difference was manifested in the extent to wk1ich ~oth 
G~eek- and Turkish-Cypriots articulated separate demands 
- by means both pacific and, later, violent. Indeed, by 
the day of independence the separate positions were almost 
irreconcilable; the constitution reflects this state of 
affAirs. 
I 
The constitutional base upon which an ''independent• 
republic of Cyprus was founded was f lin1s~:/ anc1 fragile at 
the points where cooperation was expected. That it ~ .. :orked 
~ at all is surprising; that it failed after a short time 
~airly predictable. 
l 
1. Yet even when the constitutional syste.m did work it 
worked badly, to the extent that deadlock over interpret-
.. , 
I 
J 
aticn·s 
pbs~d 
I . 
I 
Of what the constitution actually meant (as op-
to what it said) precipitated crisis after crisis 
103 . 
and, subsequently, a resumption of violent conflict. 
The major tension areas were four; the implementation 
of the 70:30 ratio in the civil service, the implement-
ation of the 60:40 provision in the army, income tax 
legislation, and the municipalities law. These four 
1
·areas' merely reflect the concrete expressio~s 
·Greek and Turkish communities; the Gree}cs st1bscr-iLe: to 
the view that the constitution was to be imolemented for .. 
the good of all Cypriots (most of whom were Greek) wl1ilst 
the Turks sought to preserve Turkish rights through a mini-
mali~t interpretation of the constitution. 
In the civil service issue, the Turks argued that the 
Gr~eks had been privileged far too long and t.l:at Tur}:s 
.should be given adrninistrati ve positions, \1lr .. i ls L t:1e Greeks 
countered that the Turkish position put f> 
b . 1. 12 I i 
• h . 1 
. 
a l. l. ty. n an attempt to circumvent t e prob ... e:rr~ .. _:·10 
President and Vice-President set up a joint committee to 
study the problem. A report ensued and precipitated an-
other conflict over interpretation. One of the . maJor 
conunents made by the committee was that "The Commission i I i 
had to draw from a population forming the 18% of the pop-
ualtion which was poorly educated in order to fill 30i 
of the Civil Service [and] made it difficult to fi~d cual-
" 13 ified Turks for many posts." In turn, the Turks criti-
} 
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·cised the Public Service Commission. To find a solution, 
the issue was submitted to the Supreme Constitutional 
Court which adjudicated in only five of almost thirty 
cases submitted to it on the question of the 70:30 ratio. 
With the resignation of the President of the Court (in t 
May 196314 ) the issue became deadlocked and has never 
been solved. 
\ Similarly with the army ratio. The question arose 
as to whether the contingents of each group shotJ.lc: be 
mixed; the Council of Ministers argued that they sl1ould, 
the Vice-President that they should remain separate. 
(Osman Orek, the Turkish-Cypriot Minister of Defense, 
:argued that the army should be comprised of five batallions, 
each with three companies. The Turks believed that batal-
lions could be mixed, but that, because of religious, cult-
ural and disciplinary problems, companies could not.) The 
Vice-Presidential veto returned the matter to the Council 
bf Ministers for reconsideration and the latter dUl)r reit-
.erated its earlier position. The deadlock was never re-
solved. 
Article. 7&(2) df the Constitution stated that "the 
adoption of any law. • • . imposing . • . taxes shall re-• 
quire a separate simple majority of the Representatives 
elected by the Greek and Turkish Communities respectively 
15 taking part in the vote." The Greeks viewed this pro-
-------------~~ 
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v±sion as obstructive, clearly giving the Turkish-Cyp-
riots a more than proportional say in conunon affairs, 
fhilst the Turks argued that they had simply been ac-
borded egual rights. With no agreement on a tax struct-
ur~ at independence, the colonial system was 
' 
temporarily (as provided in Article 188 of the Cr:--.:;t.i.t-1 
ut~on) whilst new laws were made. On the matter of a 
second extension, the Greeks favoured three months whilst ' 
the Turks argued that two would be sufficient time to re-
' 
so~ve the issue. Moreover, a Turkish Representative ar-i 
gued, in the House, that "if a· two month period is pot ~ 
~-• accepted, our group (or a majority of it) will vote a-
gainst [any extension] 
h . 'b'l' .. 16 t e responsi i ity. I 
i 
\ 
• • • . and the Greeks ~;ill bear 
When the matter came to 
o·n!March 31, 1961, eleven Turkish-Cypriot votes ~ere 
cast against the Greek proposal and the measure failed. 
With a further resort to the House blocked in December 
1961, the matter reverted to the Communal Chambers and, 
on December 20 1961, the Greek-Cypriot Communal Chamber 
I 
passed a law relating to "Personal Contributions" (based 
on the defeated House bill) and abolis11ecl tl1e conununal 
tax implemented in 1960. The Turkis11 Chamber 5 i ~~ ~ l :1 'l'- 1 'II' ... .i...L ....,_.-4...... J 
passed a law legalising taxation at the cornmunu.l :e .. "el, 
both laws be-ing upheld by the Supreme Constitutional I 
1· C~urt when it was called upon to adjudicate on the matter. I f \ 
I . 
I 
.. 
;. 
I 
By far the most important issue concerned with 
t;-he separation of the communities and the devolution 
of. authority was that of separate municipalities. 
· 106. 
!According to Article 173; 
(l)Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of the Republic ... Nico-. . 1 
1 
. 
. 
sia, L1.masso , Famagusta, Lamaca anc .. P2pr:os D:.l .. the Turkish inhabitants thereof .... 
,l(:2)The council of the Greek n1unicipalit:.l shc~ll be ! elected by the Greek electors . . . , t1-:L· cour1cil . . of the Turkish municipality by the Tur}.:.isr1 elect-ors ."17. 
;Until 1958, these towns had unified municipalities : 
.a 
'but in April 1958 the Turkish-Cypriots set up their own I . I i 
;mu*itipal system. {See footnote 74, Chapter 5.) By . : • I I ; I 
i1959ithe Turkish municipality was recognised as being i i ,I . . . 
llegal. With no agreement on a unitary system at inde-
, 
i 
; 
J • 
\pendence, Article 188 was again invoked, aivina time for 
I 
-' 
_, 
'a compromise to be worked out. 
bf municipal separation was extened eight times, until 
\1962. By March of 1962, however, Makarios issued a state-
ment to the effect that any partition would not be count-
·. : 18 enenced. In reply, Kuchuk argued that partition was 
possible. A compromise position was presented to the House 
of Representatives on December 22 1962, by Glaflos Clerides 
President of the House. Instead of the existina seoarate .., .. 
municipal councils, a Joint Cammi ttee was p2:o~:C1Sec: :or each ' ' 
town, its membership reflecting the proportional reprLse::t-
! 
, 
~tidn of the population in each town. 19 Kuchuk replied i 1, ! 
I l 
. ! 
', 
I 
I 
'· 
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·tha~ any constitutional change would be premature and 
irreversible and argued that the existing system should 
. 20 continue. 
With the positions becoming ever clearer, Makarios 
issued a clear statement to the effect that there was no 
hope for a solution, but, more important, "Neither at 
present nor in the future will we ever accept geograph-
. 1 "t" .. 21 1.ca parti ion. The Turkish response was to pass 
their own law, "The Turkish Municipal Cl1c1n·\ber 's ~~tunici-
• 
pal Corporation Law" on December 31 1962. Greek action 
was taken in the Council of Ministers, where a decision 
~as made to the effect that all municipal territories I I 
would come under the "Administration and Improvement Law," 
\ 
a restatement of a colonial law which established the 
. 
mixed councils in 1950. 
Both Greek and Turkish actions were submitted to ~ 
. 4 
·the Supreme Constitutional Court, where they were declared 
ultra vires. Significantly, the decisions of tl1e Cot1rt 
refl~cted a plit within the organ itself since the :2ecis-
±onb were by majority, with the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot 
judges voting separately on each issue. 
By the middle of the year, with the constitutional 
system deadlocked, reports appeared that Makarios was to 
bring the United Nations into the conflict by going before 
the organisation to denounce the Constitution as u.nwork-
i 
I 
l 
I 
' 
• 
I 
• 
I 
\. 
I 
,al>l,e .and. ·to unilaterally abrogate the Treaties of Al-
' '· 
' 
. i 
I 
d 
J 
!j 
·.j l 
I 
J ' j : 
-: 
·! ; 
I : l . 
J ~ 
l 
1 
' 
l 
l 
' l 
l j 
. i 
l 
liance and Guarantee. 22 In an interview with the 
_"Contemporary Review", Makarios, asked whether he was 
"seriously contemplating this course" 23 answered: 
My view is that the Treaty of Guarantee should cease to exist ... [it] comes into dircrt con-flict with the very sense o-f inc1cpe:1::~c :-. c: e: , :1r:cl is, in my view, contrary also t.o r.:·.l1c.:: ;:.,,:·:sir._: ::r.-in-ciples of the Charter of tl1e Cr1i t.-=.ccl ~~.·:.: =-~:-.>:. We do not recognise the Gua::can·t.eeir:.r~_! F'c·.,:.:..;rs ~c) have any rights of interference ir: i~~-~ 1=.: i:·~ :_c_;2·:-:ci 1 affairs of Cyprus, and we s11all reject_ ,·11->.: o!:pose any attempt by any one of them to intcrFe~ i~ any way . 
The revision ... of certain constitutional provisions has become beyond doubt necessary, in the interests of the sn1.ooth rt.11111. i r:c; c) -:= !~:.11e _, state .... Our intention is not t.o c:iis1-ccrard ..., the interests of the Tur}ci sl1 co1-ru11t111 it:.:·. . . . The proceedure that would be follo\·.~ec:l for re-vision of the Constitution has no·t 1~et been de-cided. 24 
l t·More specifically, Makarios argued that "the rights ' l 
\·granted to the Turks" by the Cons ti tut ion" \ale re out of J, I 
i . 11 
. ..2s '. a l?roportion. Makarios' comments ref lectec1 tl1e , . I ! . I 
!,;general mood of the Greek-Cypriots in face of Tur~;.ish ' 
i 
r. I I 
.;intransigence. "Throughout the last months of 1963 
108. 
\ the new line w.as publicised in speeches, broadcasts and \ 26 \newspapers." 
\ 
1
1 I A critical point was reached when, on November 31, 
1963, Makarios submitted a list of thirteen proposed a-
mendments to the Constitution, designed to rectify the 
faults in the existing structure. The thirteen points 
,, 
.. 
were: 
1. The right of veto of the President and Vice-
President of the Republic to be abandoned. 
2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise 
fQr the President in case of his temporary abse~ce. 
3. The Greek President of the House of ReDrescnta-
... 
tives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by 
the. House as a whole and not as at present, the Presi-
dent by the Greek members and the Vice-President by the 
Turkish members. 
109 . 
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives 
to deputise for the President of the House in case of his 
temporary absence or incapacity. 
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate 
tt),ajorities for enactment of certain laws by the !louse of I 
i 
i 
! 
Representatives to be abolished. 
6. Unified Municipalities to be established. 
7. The administration of justice to be unified. 
8. The division of the security forces into police and 
gendarmerie should be abolished. 
9. The numerical strength of the Security forces to be 
0determined by law. 
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and 
Turkish-Cypriots in the composition of the public service 
and the forces of the Republic to be modified in proport-
ion to th.e ratio of the population of the Greek and Turkish-
.• 
,, 
; 
·I 
·1 
r 
.I 
i 
.I 
0 
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Cypriots. 
11. The number of members of the Public Service Com-
mission to be reduced from ten to five. 
12. All decisions of the Public Service Conunission 
to be taken by simple majority. 
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished. 27 
Whilst several of these changes would have given the Turks 
more representation (e.g., Vice-President tempor2ril~· ~ill-
ing i the position of President), six may be consicie1.~e:·: . 
tempts to curtail Turkish authority; the vice-presiclential 
veto would be abolished; simple, unified majorities would 
circumvent Turkish separation; unified municipalities and 
' judic~al systems would curtail Turkish influence as well as 
the aytempts to unify the armed forces and civil service. 
As Makarios must surely have expected, the proposals t.-:ere 
rejected by Kuchuk and, • directive from in a 
Turkish government. 28 What, then, the were P .. rchbis:-:.on' s 
... 
motives? It seems evident that there were several. By 
I 
producing proof of intransigence and deadlock on the part 
' .. 
off the Turks, Makarios could go before the United Nations 
' . 
and ask it to produce a solution. By so doing, several 
courses of action could be ruled out; a Turkish invasion, 
p~rtition, a regional peacekeeping force and an agreement 
I• 
orl the lines of the London or Zurich agreements. 
M&karios wanted the United Nations to legitimise .. 
~-
I 
I 
dypriot action in Cyprus. Makarios, present at the 
Banding conference in 1955, and clearly aware of the ,. 
composition of the United Nations in December 1963, 
could go before the General Assembly with a clear case 
for United Nations intervention as an alternative to . . . . 
29 unilateral intervention by other states. 
. "' 
By the middle of December the parties in Cyprus 
were far apart on almost all issues. It appears, also, 
that preparations were underway, and had been for some 
i 
conSiderable time, for armed conflict. \'lro te 
Since the failure to agree on the munici;::o.li '-.:.ies 
issue, the Turks had been getting ro~1cl~·; i:-'. ·a::-
uary, by tapping their frequent~. tel.(~; ::c.:--:.'2 , ·~: 2_ s 
to Ankara, the Greeks discovered ti::1t :-.:.::c,ic:: c;::-
ponents could already call u~on a force of 2500, 
partially armed and trained.~o 
'\ Moreover, following the May rejection of the municipal-
111. 
it±es ca~e by the Supreme Constitutional Court, the Greeks 
• 
had begun a military training programme. 
"By December 
(1963) the Greek-Cypriots had 5000 fully trained men, 
\'y'ith another 5000 in various stages of readiness. 1131 
Under these circumstances it was, perhaps, to be expected 
that a relatively minor incident could touch off 
s·cale violence. 
I 
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·I· CHAPTER 7 
Separation: 1963 to the Present 
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l On December 21 1963 the action which further seo-
.. 
a.rated the Cypriot communities occurred. On a street 
bordering the Greek and Turkish sectors of Nicosia, a 
Greek-Cypriot police patrol stopped a group of Turks and 
asked for means of identification. The Turks refused, a 
scuffle followed and two Turks were killed; nine other 
. 1 
. . d l peop e were inJure. The following day a funeral was 
·held for the dead Turks, attended by several thousand 
people. Following the funeral large-sca.J.e s t::ree ·~ : ig:1t-
ing and shoo:t:ing began in Nicosia. The U11i tee: ~·<!~.es 
Ambassador and the Acting British High Cornmis s io::.c:r~ cal lcd 
on Makarios to appeal for calm and the Greek goi/e!~n_r:·.en t 
sent a statement of concern. 
\ action was more vociferous. I 
In Turkey, however, the re-
Deputy Prime-Minister Fey-J 
' 
zioglou, called for the punishment of those guilty of per-
pettrating the crimes against Turkish-Cypriots, and there 
were widespread anti-Greek demonstrations in Turke~,. 2 
With the fighting continuing, the British 
called on Greece and Turkey to formally join in a concil-
I 
iato:r:y approach to Makarios, whilst the Greek deput~./ Prime ' ' 1 
i 
Minis·ter Venizelos, called for a conference between the 
factions involved in the fighting. 3 (Indeed, it was far 
.... 
'•. 
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• 
from clear what units were involved in the fighting. 
As later evidence revealed, the Turkish policemen left 
the :police force to fight with the main Turkish groups, I 
' I 
whi!st Greek-Cypriots formed themselves into special 
units and began policing the Nicosia area. The Greek 
and Turkish army contingents in the island formed the 4 
nucleii of the irregular forces of both groups.) 
Makarios and Kuchuk, in somewhat uncharacteristic fash-
ion, acted jointly for a cease-fire and one was ef~~cted .II:, 
on December 25. By the next day fighting had resu.rr~eci, • 
,however, and Turkey charged that Greeks were undertaking 
algenocide campaign against Turkish-Cypriots. 4 
In the meantime, the Turkish government action was 
.more than vocal. On December 25, T ,~. . . ,r;: .. ur~isn aircraL~ sweot 
... 
low over Nicosia and a fleet of surface sr:.ics le:t . ... 
for Cyprus. In a speech before the Turkisl1 p~1r 1 i ~1.:·:·.e:--... __ , 
Prime Minister Inonu made public these moves and ;~as loudly ' 
t 5 
a~plauded. In face of the Turkish action, British recre-
... 
' 
, sentatives asked Makarios to agree to the stationing of 
a tripartite force in the island to forestall any further 
deterioration in the situation. Makarios agreed, as did 
Kuchuk. 
As the tripartite force, mainly British in view of the 
existing resevoir of men available in the base a~ca, 
tQok its prophylactic function the tension abated. 
I 
" unc1ur-
The 
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i 
lpcal ·fighting ebbed, Erkin, the Turkish Foreign ?-1inist-
er, ordered the surface fleet not to land in Cyprus, and 
.In0nu issued a statement to the effect that the situation 
had improved. Despite the British presence, shooting inci-
dents were not totally eliminated; witness the large scale 
incident in Paphos on December 28. In order to further 
p~event further fighting, Sandys, the Br i ti sl1 Commonweal th 
Secertary, proposed the establishment of a neutr~l zone 
i~ the middle of Nicosia, separating the Greek and Turkish 
quarters. (This neutral zone later became kno\-.rn as . ' ..... '""""' e ' . . ..... . . ' 
"Gre~n Line.") At this stage, the estimated number of I 
- f~ta~ities was put at between one- and two-hundred. 6 
The Turkish position, meanwhile, had led to the 
involvement of the United Nations in this phase of the 
conflict for, as a result of the Turkish overflight of 
Nicosia, the Cypriot delegation asked for a meeting of 
! the Security Council to consider a complaint against Turkr 
' ey. Whilst a meeting was held, its effects were inconclus-, i 
i ~e since it adjourned without taking any action. 7 llo· .. ;e·.wer, 
1.the Cypriot representative, Zenon Rossides, argued that the ' 
protest from Kuchuk, against the United Nations meeting, 
had "brought into sharp focus the need of United Nations 
action to restore the situation in Cyprus and the safe-
s guarding of the independence of a member state," a de-
i 
m,na not inconsistent with Makarios' thirteen points pro-' ' I 
' 
pQisal • 
.. 
\: 
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Significant developments occurred on December 31 
when Kuchuk proposed that, since the two Cypriot com-
munities could no longer live together, the "constitut-
ion no longer exists. " 9 For the Greek-Cypriots, ?-1akar-
ios stated his intention to scrap the Treaty of Guaran-
10 tee. 
\ ! 
' f 
During the fighting of late December the Greek ir-
r\egular uni ts had undertaken a campaig:: to I 
\ 
nprthern suburb of Nicosia, an area aln1os t <' 
.Turkish-Cypriot. In the course of this operation, sev-
eral hundred hostages were taken. With the release of 
these hostages, and a reciprocal move by the Turks, events 
took a turn for the better and, despite Greek and Turkish 
threats of unilateral intervention, the outlook was further 
brightened when Makarios and Greek and Turkish representa-
tives agreed to attend a conference in London at the suggest-
11 ion of Sandys. 
In the meantime, with the British force under pressure 
to keep an uneasy peace, Britain requested ( to 'C rp'h ;'."'I .. - • . . .. {,,.,.... .... .._. ' 
the United Nations send an observer to supervise the exist-'I 
' 
I • 
~ng, but precarious, cease-fire. Indeed, with British trooos 
.. I 
~n control only in Nicosia, the general situation was quite ; 
' 
~nstable. By January 5, however, British troops advanced 
tp Trakhonas and Omorphita, north of Nicosia, villages 
' . 
• 
that had been heavily damaged in the fighting. 
: ; 
i 
~ 
\ 
I 
I 
' I 
I 
1: 
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As the London conference approached, position 
statements appeared periodically and in confusing fash-
ion. Thus, for example, on January 6 Rauf Dewktash ar-
gued that the Turks "may not seek partition, but a major .. 
sl}ift of populations" at the London conference. 12 ' 
Ku¢huk, three days later, argued that the Turks would 
13 qe~and partition of Cyprus along the 35th parallel. I \ I ; 
i I I l The position of Turkey was made crystal clear by Erkin 
who stated that "Turkey's main concern in any consider-
, 
' 
at~on of the future of Cyprus is to strengthen the guar-, , 
antees of the Turkish community in the island. 1114 Effect-
ively, the Turkish adherence to the status quo precluded 
any change in the status of Cyprus, the prime aim of 7urk-
ey. Greek reaction was to place the matter before the 
NATO Council with the objective of forestalling Turkish 
intervention; when the Council met, on January 2, it 
i 15 heard "three conflicting reports" on the situation in 
the island. The British position was to effect, as 
quickly as possible, a conference in an attempt to fore-
st.1al1 United Nations action; the "New Yor}~ Tin1es" cor-
resp©ndent reported that "The view here [ in Lonc'ior! J 1.s 
th\ t i th O d f t • b the T " "\" 11 1 6 
. a · ere is no nee or any ac ion y u ... , • , 
~leatly reflecting a British desire to retain some degree 
, 
of control over the situation. 
_ By this time, however, the British peacekeeping 
I 
I 
I 
1 
' I 
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force was coming under heavy criticism from Kuchuk who 
argued that, since the British had handed back to its 
rightful owners (Greek) property in the Turkish quarters 
of Nicosia, the British were extending Greek positions . . 
whilst a cease-fire was in effect. 17 
! 
~he London Conference opened on January 15, accom-
J~anied by loud pro-enosis demonstrations in Athens and 
~alonika. More important, there were accon1nc1r1\· incr 
- .... -· 
. 
signs ,' 
i 
\of pr0gress in Cyprus with the dismantling of se,/e1.-c1l I I 
' 
~oadbiocks by both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, the dis-, I ,. 
1p~ay Qf "enormous goodwill" between the two commuri.i ties 
during the cease-fire, and the resumption of some com-
I I 1 I I I 18 m rcia activities. Nevertheless, it must be stated 
tHat, ·for the most part, the Turkish community was con-\ ·, 
I 
ce~trated in several enclaves; in the northern part of 
Nicosia, in a narrow area astride the Kyrenia road (north 
• 
of.Nicosia) in the Town of Louroujina, in an area near 
' t 
·Le~k~ and.at two beachheads at Kokkina and I i· Tukkb were in heavily defended enclaves. 19 
L l. rn """ i ·- i· ,...,. •· ·h e l \ .,. .. ....... l.~ ..:::, ,_ • 1 
tw1oreo\rer, I 
·t·he location of these areas illuminates, to some degree, 
the relationship between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots: 
if supplies were to be landed, then the north coast was 
the most convenient area and if the supplies were to be 
moved to Nicosia, they would have to move along the Ky-
re:nia road. 
) 
- ~-----~------------
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At the London conference Erkin plainly stated the 
Turkish position; "Cyprus is too important strategically 
for Turkey to feel secure unless she has an army conting-
20 ent permanently in Cyprus.'' In addition, Denktash ar-
gued that only by living separately could the Turkish-
Cypriots feel secure. For the Greek-Cypriots, Glaf~os 
Clerides argued that the constitution should be replaced 
by': "a unifying document • " (It is perhaps ir1c1icc1ti·lc of 
the mood that, despite their adjacent table positions, 
·the Cypriot delegations made no contact, "not e\ren g lanc-
~s. 1121) The talks soon entered a deadlocked stage, exern-1 I I 
plified by the dispute over the status of Spyres and Kyp-' I 
' 
• rianou. Sent by the Council of Ministers, Kyprianou 
claimed to represent the Cypriot government, but Denktash r 
argued that, since no Turkish minister had been present, 
Kypr.i'anou was not representative. On Januc1r:i 19 a clelay 
in the proceedings was announced whilst Sand~·s, the Chair-
man, conferred with Cypriot representatives, and Pal2~3s, 
the Greek foreign minister, returned to Athens. A more 
significant development in Athens wasfue invitation sent 
by Grivas to Greek-Cypriots to travel to Athens for talks 
with him; one hundred and thirty attendea. 22 The inference 
to be drawn from this, in view of Makarios' quick rebuke to 
G 1 • h' 
. f 23 
. h G . rivas warning im not to iner ere, is tat ~rivas was 
sounding opinion regarding a potential new role for himself 
J 
... 
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I in Cyprus. (See below) . 
With the talks at an impasse, Britain took the inti-
ative by proposing the formation of a ~ATO peacekeeping \ 
force, with the aid of the United States. The Washington 
reaction was quite cool, but the British arguecl tr1at, a_bove 
?4 all, Cyprus was "a problem for the Alliance. 0 ... l!o\t.~e,lcr, 
I 
I 
the British plan neglected three major factors; the ~~:~%s, 
the Greek-Cypriots, and the Turkish-Cypriots, all of ;~!:c~ 
were opposed to the NATO plan. Yet with tentative corr~"T.it-
ment of units from several European states, the plan pro-
ceeded. Military discu5::i..ons were initiated in Washington, 
yet the United States government was anxious not to offend 
Turkey, where the United States had bases. On Januray 29, 
Turkey left the dormant London conference al tl10,.1g:-~ Ez.-~~in 
agreed to stay in London. At the same time, fou~-~~ec:1 shios 
.. left Iskendrum on what was described as "an of:i·":.i_,-11 
sea exercise", whilst the Greek government annou11ccd 
1 d , . . C 25 an ing exercises in rete. 
. 
:-1 i .,- -
Ii..,-~ ~ "" 
With the situation in Cyprus quiescent, the next few I I f 
days saw a search for a NATO force. Following visits to 
Athens and Ankara by Lyman Lemnitzer, the NATO Supreme Com-
mander, Erkin termed the prospective Uniteci St~tes involve-
26 ment "a good development. " Yet the es tc1b J is 11:~:.c !"1. t. of the ' : 
~orce was conditional; the United States argucc1 ti1c:1 t if the 
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NATO force were to become operative, two conditions must I be tfulfilled - approval from the Cyprus govern.rnent (, ... ·r1ich 
had not yet come) and a suspension of the Treaty of Guar-
antee for three months {to which Turkey was opposed). 
Indeed, whilst the British and American government were 
debating how to launch the force, Makarios was stating 
that he would oppose any NATO force; Makarios repeatedly 
argued that any peacekeeping force should 11ave tl1e author-
isation of the United Nations and that its task s!10-...:J.: bo 
to prevent any unilateral intervention. Makarios ~:as not 
:without support; since the start of the December f is:-~ t~ ing, 
the Soviet government had persistently warned against i,~ATO 
and Turkish intervention. On January 30 the Soviet Union 
sent a note to U Thant, United Nations Secretary General, 
informing him that the Security Council was responsible for 
27 keeping the peace in Cyprus. 
Despite this opposition, concrete proposals were announ-
ced the following day. I 
.1 
6f at least 10,000 men 
An international force, consist:.:-:-:: 
.., 
would be deployed in Cyprus, the 
United States contributing 1200 combat troops and 11 as many 
28 support troops as necessary." Whilst Turkey and Greece 
now. accepted the plan, the Cypriot foreign minister, Kyprian-
ou, rejected it on the grounds that, if the British forces 
were inadequate (as Sandys had argued they were) then the 
United Nations should take the responsibility for a peace-
:i--
( . 
. ( 
i. 
l 
; 
I 
1 
Keeping force. 29 
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At this stage, reports appeared regarding a build-up 
of anti-American feeling in Cyprus, together \vi th strong 
pressure among the Greek-Cypriots to reject the plan. On I 
february 1, Makarios rejected the idea of a NATO force 
''definitely". With the rejection of the NATO plan violence 
erupted sporadically in Cyprus and bombs damaged property 
at the United States Embassy and the British Iiigr1 Corr.mission. 
The British government, despite Makarios' rejec:t.ic-r1, t~icci 
to muster forces for a reformed peacekeeping force, yet re-
: . 
c~ived a blow to their hopes when U Thant stated that the 
Security Council should handle the matter. 30 ; 
' I 
' . 
I 
I 
l 
On Februaryll new violence erupted in Cyprus, with 
:Lirnassol the centre of fierce fighting. The fighting had ' . I . 
I been,sparked by an incident south east of Nicosia where 
1
eieven were killed and fifty injured. Within three days, i : 
1more than fifty dead were reported in 
:ing, with more than a hundred injured. 
1force unable to control the situation, Britain finLill·t 
.... 
asked for a meeting of the Security Council, to "consider 
the urgent problems raised by the deterioration of secur-I ; ' 
itr in Cyprus." 
I 
'. \ At this stage it is perhaps opportune to discuss Brit-\ I 
' ! 
ish and American motives before the Council debate. Anthony 
Verrier has written; 
·-~._.:·.: l 
T 
.I 
I 
I 
,1 
I 
i 
., 
' I 
,. 
It is essential to correct a general impression that the British forces are in C:/prt1s solcl·:· ·--·.o keep the peace. They are not. Tl1e~/ .:-1~~·2 ::~.e~_..e first and foremost to preserve Brit2~~'s .~~~~t­e g i c inter e s ts in the i s 1 an c1 , i .. : h i c ri , L: . r :: ~_: ,_~ :-: bases and installations, provicle irl ·t.::.~:ec1-·:· t.::e fa c i 1 it i e s for ope r at ions in tho >: i c': (} l e -:. :--. -~ F' c1 r East. Since these interests cannot_ ;_;:_; ::_, ~ e: 3 o :-~~.red while the is land is in ferment , ti~c_; ~; =. ·r ,- ::_ ::-~ c~~ , reinforced from the United KingC:lon';, ~:E1E; perforce switched to internal security duties.31 
122. 
This adequately reflects British motives; to retain control 
over the situation to preserve intact the functio?~inc: ,.. n .... ,. '-' .... 
the base areas. Of the United States, it ma~,, 
.1 r)e s a i :: 
its prime motive was to preserve stability in the NATC al-
liance; indeed, in view of the aid going. to both Greece and 
'Turkey one suspects that the United States was instrumental 
in.reconciling Greek and Turkish attitudes regarding the 
NA'rO force. 32 
Despite the presence, since January 17, of a United 
Nations observer (General Gyani) and the British force, the 
situation in Cyprus continued to deteriorate as the Dr~~ish 
troops were hard put to control fighting in Polis ~ ·-· , l a 'r,r-1 -~ I . er-
"' ~ l... -· f 
---- ...-... ' ..... .• 
I 1a. Furthermore, reports circulated that illegal 
. ments into Cyprus were increasingly frequent, daespite den-I 
• Jl; 33 ia : s. 
i 
., 
' 
' I The first meeting of the Security Council (February 17) 
was brief, postponing debate one day until U Thant had fur-
the:r talks with participating delegations. This is not the 
' pla\ce for a detailed analysis of Security Council politicking, I ~ 
j 
., 
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\ 
l 
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but it should be obvious that a great deal of intensive 
activity was necessary to launch the United Nations Force 
in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Whilst the first debate opened on 
February 18, the resolution authorising the establishment 
of the force was not passed until March 4 1964, during 
which time the Security Council met on no less than eight 
• separate occasions. The Security Council debates consid-
ered, in essence, two major perceptions of ~:hat a force 
shocil do. On the one hand, Britain (supported b~r, among 1 J 
.oth r~, the United States, China and Norway) argued t~1at ! : 
the first priority was to restore peace in the island. 
The !united Kingdom representative stated that ''since t.he I 
b~ginning [our efforts] have been directed to one end only 
.. ' . namely, to calming the situation ar1c1 restoring peace 
• • • . The right course was to address oursel.,:es to tl1e pro-
bl~m of restoring peace and thereafter to move on ... to 
34 so~ vi·ng the political problems. " On the other hanc1, 
Cyprus presented a different view, supported by Greec~, 
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Kyprianou argued 
that the Council "should, primarily, and \vithout waiting 
for any other action, take the necessary measures for the 
protection of the territorial integrity and the independ-1 
~. 35 \ence of Cyprus." Whilst it was admittec1 that, in tl1e 
. 
terms of the Treaty of Guarantee, there was a right, of in-
tervention, this was not, argued Kyprianou, a right mili-
-.c-:7. . 
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i 
t~rYt intervention. But, more important, the Treaty was 
;ill gal. Under Article 103 of the Charter, obligations ! 
\under the Charter prevail over other agreements and, since I i '' 
• I 
~ilitary intervention was proscribed by Article 2(4) of • l 
~h1e Charter, then the Treaty of Guarantee was an invalid ! ! 
l document. Such was the Cypriot rationale. 
\ 
l· 
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i I 
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I 
In essence, the conflict was over what a force could 
Whilst the British argued for a prophylactic role 
\(i.e., peacekeeping) the Cypriots argued in favour of a l 
~ re positive, political role (i.e., peacemaking). • The l 
~{nal resolution may be considered a mixture of the two i I 1 • j 
I 
~nd, in view of its importance, it is given in full. ' ' I l 
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The Security Council 
Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deterio1:-a·te unl~ss additional measures are promptl:z1 ·ta}::.er:.. t-o :--:1:~in-tain peace and to seek out a durable sol;~:i~-ic:::·--~, 
Considering the positions taken by the pQrties in relation to the treaties signed at Nicosia on August 16 1960, 
Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: 
"All Members shall refrain in their inter-national relations from the thrent or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepenc1ence of 2:r.~· Stat~·::, or in any other manner inconsistent witl1 the Purposes of the United Na tior1s, 11 
1. Calls upon all MEnlber States, in conformi t:/ with their obligations under the Charter of the Cnited :Nations, to refrain from any action or tl1reat o~ 'action likely to worsen the sj_tuation in the saver-. i I I 
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eign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger inter-national peace; 
2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restnrat-
125. 
1.on of law and order to take all -::-:ic1 --~-i•--ir,,....,_-.·1 ..... ,·0~s-, Cl .. (_;._ ~ c_. ...._ ··~· l l !. -- • , , - (:• -ures necessary to stop violence anc1 }jlooc.1s:1e(.: in Cyprus; 
3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint; 
4. Recommends the creation, with ·tl:.e ,--~o:-~sen t of the Government of Cyprus, of a Uni tee: ~~,::1 t,ir l;.S Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus . rr11e c:c):~~r~r<::, ~-~~-~CJD and size of the Forceshall be es·talJlis~:e._~ ;..,·.· ~:..:-~e Secretary-General, in consul·ta·tion ~.,:it.~-: ·---~~·--= ~':'".:crn-ments of Cyprus, Greece, Turke~/ a:1c1 ~=.~1e c:-~i ;~_·2 : Kingdom of Great Britain and l'~ortherr1 I r.-'21 ~:--.c:. The Commander of the Force shall be aoc-oi:-: tecl !)\" ~ -
~ the Secretary-General and report to !1 ir:·l. r:=_'}-:.c Sec-retary-General, who shall keep the co,1cr~r1e~~s providing the Force fully informec1, sl1al.l 1~c::::o:r:--t periodically to the Security Council on its oper-ation; 
5. Recommends that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving inter-national peace and security, to use it.s ;](~st_ efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting a~d, as nec-essary, to contribute to the mainter1,:J.r1cc Clnc: res 4..:.or-ation of law and order and a return to norm~l condit-' ions; 
6. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all cost.s ~-~e2:~~,~l2-:"'.-ing to it being met, in a manner to be cis:-·:..::e .. ~ ,...:~~:::: by th em , by the Governments pro "vi c1 i I1 g l~ 11 e (_: r_:; =-~ · ::_ :-~ : ~ -en t S and by the Go Ver nm en ·t o -f C }~pr us . rr r1 •-..:: 5, ~ ,,_ ~ ~- e: t. <i r y -General may also accept voluntary contributions ~or that purpose; 
7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Go~~ernme~t o~ c~·p-rus and the Governments of Greece, 1.1 LJrj·~e·: :i:-.. ~ :_~:-~ United Kingdom , a med i at or , \v 11 o s ha 1 l_ \J s e : : i_ :: s - -~..::: s t endeavours with the repre sen tat i \ 1 e s o £ :.:.~--..c: _'c:·:.:-:·.,-::-: -i ties and also with the afore s a ic1 f ou1_- c;o-.re; r:-::'.-.e: :-. ;:_ s , . for the purpose of promoting a peaceful sol~:~~~~ ; and an agreed settlement of ·the prolJl(::r:1. cc;r:.~1~:::-. ·~ing 1 Cyrpus, in accordance with the c:r1arter of t..}:·~ ~::-:i t:ed Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people 
• 
: 
' l·- . 
j· ·, 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
ot Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretar~1 -Gen-eral on his efforts; 
8. Requests the Secretary-General from funds of the United Nations, for the remuneration and expenses and his staff.36 
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This resolution, jointly sponsored by Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ivory Coast, Norway and Morocco, was adopted unanimously. 
The resolution authorising UNFICYP is in many ways 
a radical departure from the resolutions that established 
previous United Nations forces. First, it called for vol-
luntary contributions to meet expenses, clearly reflecting \ I • l 
~ des4-re not to compound the disastrous debacle c~.;e:r fin-
_ancing that preoccupied the nineteenth session of the Gen-
eral Assembly. Second, it ventured into the realm of 
peacemaking by appointing a mediator and asking the force 
to promote "a return to normal conditions." Third, clearly 
mlndful of the Congo operation, the resolution set a (re-
newable) time limit upon the duration of the force. Fourth 
the resolution tried to specify as precisely as possible 
the mandate of the force; indeed it was fairlv si1r~cesful. 
-
The area of dispute surrounded the interpretatior: of 11 norm-
a1·conditions." (As a goal, U Thant interpreted this to 
mean the removal of barriers to free movement of population 
a~d daily commercial intercourse.) 
Despite unanimous approval of UNFICYP, it was not de-
! 
I 
127. 
clared operational until March 27, during which time there 
were ominous developments. (Not least of these was 
statement from Grivas, denying that he was about to restD1e 
underground activities. 37 ) The voluntary financing clause 
caused some states to think twice before committing troops 
to the force, whilst several of those states to whom ap-r 
:proaches were made (Canada, Sweden, Ireland, Finland and 
Austria) asked for clarification of the size, comoosition .. 
. 3 8 and function of the force - as well as finance. l 
i 
theless, the first United Nations troops (Canadiar!) 
in Cyprus on March 15, following commitments fron-.. F'inl;1r.~:, 
Ireland, and Sweden, and financial cimmitments from 
United States. Yet another .. first" for the United 
force was its inclusion of troops from a permanent 
me~er of the Security Council, Great Britain. This was a i 
t 
so~ewhat realistic assessment of the situation since the 
British forces were equipped, quartered and storeli . in t.he 
. 
,- r-" 
...... / '-
..... "' 'II. s .-c, I i i " 
.. • ' L.1. '-- .,AA-
A. -
island itself; on the debit side, however, it 
~embered that Britain, as the former colonial ,,....,_ -· o ~ · i'"'l. .,,~ • • a- s W ••• i:...,; ~- I •'• \ .. 
I 
~he object of a great deal of hostility, not least from the 
Greek-Cypriots. 
Despite this progress, the situation remained extremely 
Turkey continued to mobilise its forces, the Turkish 
Communal Chamber voted to "give" po\•1er to Ir~or.u to intervene 
and, when incidents did occur, Turkey threatened reprisals 
"·"'.., 
I 
I 
1 
\ 
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I ~·or the damage incurred by the Turkish-Cypriots. I 
··[ 
i 
:1 
r , On March 25 the appointment of Sakari Tuomioja as \ 
mediator was announced, following prior discussions be-
I 
tween the Greek, Turkish and Cypriot groups. Within a 
day of the appointment being announced, the United Nations 
force was called upon to halt fighting in Nicosia and in 
a skirmish between rival factions, the force was fired 
upon. On the ninth anniversary of the conunencement of 
EOKA activities, Grivas announced in Athens, that he would 
39 be prepared to fight again to liberate Cyprus. 
By early April, with UNFICYP assuming peacekeeping 
I 
du-µj.es on a large scale, Makarios announced that C::lr:rus 
was, unilaterally, terminating the Treaty of Alliance. 
k . d Mk . ' . 4 0 Inreturn., Tur ey reJecte a arios action. This done, 
the Greek government, with Makarios, argued that self-
deter1nination was "the only permanent and just basis for 
a solution to the Cyprus issue." 41 Whilst all this man-
oeuvring was going on, in preparation for Tuomioja's med-
iation effort, the conditions in Cyprus were f~r ~ro~ sat-
isfactory. Grivas was by this time moving, in periodic : j 
: ( 
statements, towards intervention in the Cyprus dispute in ; . 
. t· 
. 
42 d 1 h . h k . 
an ac ive capacity, an UNFICYP cases wit Gree units 
became more frequent. By the end of April, the Turkish-
Cypriots had ;ejected a conciliatory move by Makarios to 
issue a general amnesty for all Turkish-Cypriots and were 
• 
' 
i 
\ .. 
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engaged in heavy fighting in Kyrenia and Ayios-Theodoros. 
The Orthodox festival of Easter led to a lull, during I 
I 
whic~ U Thant put forward a peace initiative; at a level 
sµbservient to that of mediator, it was proposed that a 
political officer should be appointed to settle day-to-
J day conflict, in accordance with the terms of the United 
NJtions resolution, to effect a return to normal life. ' 
\ On May 11 Galo Plaza, a former President of Ecuador, was 
appointed to the post of special represent~ti~1e, ,~ith 
assigned task of undertaking direct negotiations ·,.;it::-: 
Greiek- and Turkish-Cypriots "on immediate and pressing . I . . ! ! : 
' ' 
. . t.ne 
proplems" which included "measures to end hostilities and 
pre~ent their recurrence and to generally bring about a r 
1... 1 1· · d' · " 43 ret 1urn to norma iving con itions. With the United ' I 
Stat~s now actively involved in a search for a settlement 
(Pr~s·ident Johnson had appointed Senator \•lilliam Fulbright I 
.a ~pecial envoy to Athens and Ankara and had lQter warned 
~l 
• l' • 1 4 4) • "". 1 • t~,e two governments not to act mi i tar i y, tr1e a 1.p or:~.a tic I ' I ! 
activity was seemingly advancing on a broad front. 
1 By June, however, the (by-now solely Greek) Cypriot I I i : : 
I • 
.House: of Representatives passed a bill authorising conscrip-
tion, an increase in the size of Greek-Cypriot forces, and 
i the purchase of arms from overseas. Kuchuk responded by 
:vetoing the bill and, in turn, Makarios argued that Kuchuk 
had.no powers whatsoever, giving them up in December 1963 
! 
\ 
r: 
when he led the Turkish "insurrection." To forestall 
a
1
~y rash Tur~ action, Johnson (through Lemni t::e1~) ' 
I 
issued a stern warning to Turkey saying the United ! 
States would not permit any conflict between Greece 
and Turkey. 
Against this background of initiative, counterin-I . .i 
I 
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i.~iative and contradiction, U Thant presented his first 
report to the Security Council on June 16 1964. The re-
\ P~ft was far from encouraging, the relative quiescence :I ij 
Wa$ attributed to the harvest period, during which the \; . ' 
coriununities got on with "normal" activities as far as 
'. . 
45 po,sible, under the watchful eye of UNFICYP troops. 
(There were in fact, reports of cooperation between the ! . 
I 
G~eek and Turkish-Cypriots, although it is not clear to ' . 
· 46 what extent.) Indeed, the UNFICYP forces carried out 
·extensive activities accompanying Turkish-C)'priot groups, 
ensuring the flow of foodstuffs to the Turkish encl(-1~.rc.:s, 
and locating missing persons. I However, U Thant stated 
that, despite the United Nations presence, the military 
positions of both groups had improved relative to each 
other. 47 Furthermore, the arms supply problem was crit-
ical and, in face of a clear lack of encouragement, Tuom-·~- ! 
ioja'~ task was increasingly difficult. In spite of, or 
i 
perhaps because of, U Thant's report, the m~nciate of the 
force, was extended a further three months by a unanimous 
.. 
' I . 
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vote of the Security Counci1. 48 In its renewing reso-
lution, the Council included a paragraph calling on "all 
S·t·ate members of the United Nations to comply \.Ji th" the ' 
enabling Resolution 186 and Resolution 187 of March 13 I : 
19r64 (designed to deter further Turkish action) and re-
frain from any action likely to exacerbate the situation, i l : 
4 9 cl~arly a second reprimand to Turkey. At the same time ' ' 'i ~ ' I 
' l 
qyrni was replaced as force conunander by General Thinunaya 
I • of\Finland • 
. \ , 
! : \Towards the end of June, reports appeared to the 
ef~ec\t that Grivas had returned to Cyprus and was con-
, 
. 
I 
I 
ferribg with Greek-Cypriot l~aders. In spite of offic-" ,1 I 
I 
ial denials of Grivas' presence, a broadcast over Nico-
sia radio, by Grivas, confirmed his presence. On June 29 
Grivas issued a call for a "free Greek Cyprus. 11 
With the renewal of the UNFICYP mandate, the diplo-I 
matic1 initiative was taken up in Washington, reflecting i ! 
I 
a United States desire to preserve alliance solid2rity I 
' 
a.Ind pull back Turkey from the brink of invading C~.lF',rt1s. 
I~ a Washington conference with Johnson (June 22) Inonu l ·. ! I 
a.:tgue,d that the Turks could not stand by and see the Turk-I : 
ish-Cypriots massacred. At the close of the talks,, two ! .. ' 
' ! 
dayr later, a joint communique reaffirmed the validity of 
the! 1960 Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, a clear re-
buff to Makarios' denunciation of them. With the Greek 
.. 
. I 
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government unwilling to participate in joint discussions, 
Johnson assumed the role of intermediary, mee tir-:c1 P,J.?· c1r1-
dreou on June 25. In a news conference, Papandreou ... c•e- -.... , . .4. 
·Clared the 1959 treaties invalid and opposed direct talks 
f I 1 a· t 
• , 50 p~e erring to eave me 1at1on to Tuom10Ja. Furthermore, 
ih a meeting with U Thant, Papandreou argued that a meet-! 
ihg with Turkey would only compound the mutual differences; I I ' ' I 
as ·for a solution to the Cyprus conflict, only a plebiscite 
would sufficeo 51 
Again the scene shifted to the United Nations and 
~uomioja arranged mediation talks in Geneva, asking 
~nd!Turkey to send representatives. ,. 
' 
This they duly 
{'~""' 
~::reece 
When the Geneva meeting opened on July 5, the United 
:State:s was represented by Dean Acheson, former Secretary 
of State, sent by President Johnson as an official repre-
' 
. 
~entative. Meanwhile, Grivas, in Cyprus, was urging enosis, ' I I l ·. qalling on Greek-Cypriots to "march hand in hand toward vie-
. 
' I 
1 
52 ~o~yor glorious death" in the cause of a "free c~·prus. " ' . ' 
At the same time, it was announced by Galo Plc:122 tr-:at: a 
neutral zone had been established along the Nicosia truce 
line, within which the United Nations would have the exclus-
53 ive right to patrol, search, disarm and arrest. A further 
development on the local level came on July 9 when the House 
10f Representatives announced a modification of the Cypriot 
judicial system, abolishing the separated lower courts (where 
I i 
1 ~ 
' 
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a Turk was tried by Turks) and refo:r,ning the Supreme Court. I 
However, the situation in the field was deterior2ti~s r~p-
idly as both sides were reportedly receiving illicit sup-
plies of a:r:1ns. The Greek-Cypriots urged Greek businessmen 
to halt the sale of "strategic items" to Turkish citizens. 
(By 1967, the selective Greek-Cypriot embargo limited Turk-
ish fuel consumption to two gallons per ve11icle per \ .. !eek, 
and prohibited the trading of electirc plugs and fittings, 
among other items.) The aim of the Greeks at ti1is .3 t.dcre 
-
w~s :twofold; to prevent a tactical build-up of materials 
and to discourage Turkish settlement in the enclaves. In 
fact, the situation was somewhat anomalous; whilst most of 
the Turkish population perpared to live in enclaves, many 
didlnot and engaged in "normal" commercial transactions ' 
with Greek shopowners and merchants. But, as U Thant re-
peated frequently, even in the periods of greatest calm, 
54 freedom of movement was far from complete. 
The major outcome of the Geneva meetings came to be 
known as the "Acheson Plan", which reflected tl1e i\.Ir,(;!~ :.:.~~~1n 
desire to achieve a settlement and some degree of stability 
in the Mediterranean. The plan called for "the union of 
most of Cyprus with Greece," "adequate provision for the 
well-being of the Turkish-Cypriots" and a "sequestered base 
55 for ground, air and sea forces" of Tur}:e:/. Whilst Turkey 
accepted the plan as a basis for discussion it was firmly 
I· 
I 
' I 
I 
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turned down by Makarios and the Greek government as '1 ab-
solutely unacceptable'1 , 56 on the grounds that it was re-
cognition of the Turkish claim for partition. 
With a :settlement far off, fighting broke out on a 
large scale in the Kokkina region, with other clashes re-
ported in Kyrenia and Nicosia. According to contemporary 
reports, more than twenty deaths were reported, with two 
tju:ndred injured. 
' i 
i 
! 
Turkey, by this time read:/ to in tcl~\"er1e 
~s a matter of course, sent aircraft over the island, : 
' 
~ombing Greek emplacements near Kokkina. Yet another crit-1 I 
I '. . I 
-~ ~cal point had been reached. In response to the Turkish 
''/> 
\ . bombing, a meeting of the Security Council was held, but 
adjourned without taking substantive action. The Turkish 
government justified the action as "police action", whilst 
the Greek government condemned it as a "massacre 11 • 57 The 
Soviet Union and the United States, both anxious to stab-i 
ili~e the situation, expressed concern. Makarios, however, i 
i 
<halled upon the Greek-Cypriots "to fight to the death 11 • 
Moreover, Turkey threatened to attack Greek-Cypriot posit-
ions again unless the pressure on the Turkish-Cypriots was 
relieved. The warning went unheeded and the Turkish bomb-
ings renewed, as fighting around Kokkina continued. 
In this almost anarchic situation, with the UNFICYP 
troops unable to affect the course of events and nre"'.·ious ... 
United Nation resolutions being constantly violated, the 
' i 
I 
! 
', 
' 
' 
·.• T\ 
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$:equrity Council met in emergency session and unanimousli' 
passed.a joint Anglo-American resolution (193[1964]) call-
ing for an immediate ceasefire by all concerned and as}:i11.g 
Turkey to "cease instantly the bombard.ment of and use of 
58 military force of any kind against Cyprus. 11 After initial 
noncomrni tal statements, Cyprus and Turkey accepted the terius 
of the ceasefire on August 10, although Turkey argued that .: I 'I 
it would continue "warning flights" until the positions 
p~evailing before ~ugust 5 (i.e., before the Greek advance I I t. t l 
to Kokkina) were restored. 
J 
I ' 
· ;\ ~ The events of early August 1964 reveal a degree of I ; I j ; : l . 
cqnfusion. With Turkey actively involved, Greece relatively I I 
s~lent, the Cypriot communities in constant conflict, the 
U~it~d Nations trying to mediate, and the United States try-1 . I i I ' I 
irig ~o influence events, the situation was clearly transit-
, 
. i 
i~nal. After the initial fighting and diplomacy, which proved 
I 
1 
,· 
"~nsuccesful, 11 the parties involved seemed to be tr~.{ing, in 
f~c~ of military stalemate, to consolidate positions before I • 
b~rgaining. 
Thus, by the middle of August, conciliatory overtures 
appeared. In a note to Papandreou, Inonu called for a 
quick settlement stating that "maintenance of friendly re-' i . 
tations between our two countries is a requirement of our 
national interest and ideals. 1159 The same day, the Greek 
government castigated Makarios (or Grivas?) for acting mil-1 . ' I 
• l • 
~tari~y without prior notification. On August 13 Papandreou 
136. 
·
1 x,ej ecte·d bipartite negotiations with Turkey but argued I i ; 
that a peaceful settlement was desired, a clear reference i 
~o the mediation effort of Tuomioja, Further evidence I 
I 
of a Greco-Turkish detent appeared on August 19, when the 
two governments agreed to return their forces to NATO, 
from whence they had been drawn earlier. 
At this time however, the United Nations mediation 
'effort was held up when Tuomioja, after a stroke, died on 
jl\Ugus·t 16. Not until September 16 was a successor 3.ppointed, 
~alo Plaza. During this month-long hiatus in the mediation ,· . ' i 
~ffort, the Cyprus situation was further worsened when, in 
... 
retal~ation for the Turkish bombings, the Cyprus government 
refused to permit the normal rotation of the Turkish a1:1t1y 
force in Cyprus. The Turkish government said that it would ' i 
' 
' • 
relate its garrison by force, if necessary, but, after con-, 
sultation with U Thant, agreed to postpone any action "for a 
certain time''. But as this problem was shelved, another one 
I 
wpr.sened. On September 10, the Turkish government submitted 
Cyprus government•s 
f"inhuman blockade [economic] against the Turks of Cyprus", I I 
especially those in the Kokkina area who were "in danger of 
starving to death. 1160 In response, Makarios invited General 
Thimayya and representatives of the International Red Cross 
to vi·sit Kokkina. After doing so (on Septembe1- 12) a report I 
w!s issued in which conditions in Kokkina were desc1=- i;=:~-:-: 
I 
asi "subhuman". On receipt of the report, Makarios agreed to 
. , 
- ---- -- ----- - -_. -;::;r 
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i 
I 
I 
l 
per~it £cod to be taken into Kokkina, at the expense of 
the Cyprus government, and allowed Turkey to land food if 
.the United Nations were allowed to take it into Kokkina. i ; : 
On September 15 Makarios put forward a peace plan, under \ 
which the Government would remove economic restrictions i I 
i 
on tpe Turks, order the removal of armec1 posts if the ' I 
I Turk~ would reciprocate, give financial assistance if the ; I 
Turk~:wished to return to their homes, grant 
rtesty.and accept practical suggestions aimed at pacifying 
· 61 the island. 
With the three month extension of the UNFICYP mandate 
drawing tot>a close, U Thant reported to the Security Council 
on September 10 regarding the activities of the force. 
Despite the efforts of the force, Thant arguecl, 11 it had not 
been able to prevent a recurrence of figl1ti:-:g", 1 . . a t t -, Q, ., , r .. ,-"!< 
..,_,. ..... '\.-•:J•• it 
h d d I 'd f 1 • 62 
. 
a prevente inci ents rom esca ating. Furtr1er~~c~e, U 
Thant put the United Nations force into military perspective: 
whilst UNFICYP numbered little more than 6000, the C:/I)l.~t1s 
~overnment National Guard (led by Grivas, who was appointed 
to the position of head on August 13) had grown from 15000 
to ·24000, whilst the Turkish-Cypriot "army" nu.mbered 10000, 
excluding 1700 police and elements of the Turkish army. 
" 
Despite this military situation (and the fin2ncial problems 
bes·etting the force), U Thant went on "to wi tl1cir2.\,; -:..::.r:c:! ::c?~ce I \ . 
at (:thd.s time could lead to utter disaster in the islar:cl. 1163 i 
I 
I 
I 
l ' l. 
I 
i' 
: ' 
1\'. 
·, 
-----------~-----
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However, the present mandate of the force was such that, 
if it were to discharge its duties effectively, certain 
! 
.. 
d~anges would have to be effected, most notably giving 
~he force greater freedom of movement, the right of self-
defense and the right to dismantle fortifications and 
establish buffer zones. (In the period the force has been 
in Cyprus, this was the only occasion wher clarification 
of.its mandate was requested.) Following debates the Sec-
urity Council unanimously adopted a resolution (194[1964]) 
renewing the mandate of the force. At the same tirne, U 
Thant informed the Council that the Cyprus government had 
i 
i 
~greed not to interfere with the Turkish troops rotation 
~?1;d that the Turkish government had agreed to place its ; l : j • 
: ~:d.bop. contingent under UNFICYP command. : . 
i • 
I l 
·1 : 
i I 
With the renewal and clarification of the UNFICYP 
; ; 
\mandate the disputes entered a period of general stability, 
1 
~uring which sporadic outbreaks of shooting were reported, 
bharacterised by general signs pointing to an impro\·ement 
~n the situation. For example, on October 26 1964, the I 
' 
; Kyrenia- road was opened to civilian traffic (under United l ' ., 
I 
Nations escort) for the first time since December 1963. 
:In g~neral (but with reservations detailed below) the situ-. 
ation that prevailed in 1964 is that which presently prevails; . \ I 
t~~ two communities are far apart, both physically and polit-1 • '' i 
ic~lly. Whilst the UNFICYP troops have the task of quickly 
ca\lming down any sporadic outbreaks, the administrative a1.1n ~ . : 
; 
I 
I 
·1 • 
1 ! . 
. i 
I 
• I 
: 
.. 
; t 
' I 
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' . 
' ·1 
o:e, the force (UNCIVPOL) is performing a valuable funct-i ·1 : I 
I 
ion in terms of returning conditions to "normal". This i 
said, however, it must also be repeated that the stable 
situation depends upon the attitude of the Turkish gov-
1 ernment. Witness, for example, the crisis of November 
1967. 
The crisis was centred round the desire of the Cyp-
ru:s government to resume its own police pat-rols 
riot National Guard escorts in Ayio-Theodoros. ;\1· ___ ::c·~:,.Jh 
the local UNFICYP conunander had agreed to this proc:e :-__:::~e, 
the Turkish-Cypriots had not. Patrols resumed, desnite .. 
Turkish opposition. T\alo patrols on November 14 and 15 
encountered no resistance. Later in the afternoon of Nov-
ember 15, however, a second patrol accompanied by the Nat-
ional Guard·was fired on by Turkish-Cypriots. By early 
evening the~ National Guard (equipped with armoured cars) 
· had overrun the village, leaving 
.· 64 Cypriots dead. In a report to the Security Council the 
------
following day, U Thant stated; "The magnitude of tl1e ;,1-ios-l • ; ; 
~heod~ros operation and the speed with which it was carried ' 
qut clearly indicate that the National Guard had planned 
I 
in advance to carry out this operation in the event of any 
• show of opposition by the Turkish-Cypriots." 65 Despite 
efforts by UNFICYP to interpose its forces between the Cyp-
tiot groups, they were unable to do so, being overrun and 
~-
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i 
' : 
disarmed by the Greek-Cypriot force. 
Turkey, which had long warned that if shooting oc-
' 
' ; curred then it would intervene, acted rapidly. A note 
' I 
1Was sent to Athens, blaming Greece for the action and 
demanding the recall of General Grivas, the man held resp-
66 onsible by the Ankara government. (The Greek govern-
men~ recalled Grivas to Athens on November 19, ostensibly I 
for lmilitary consultations.) With sporadic firing in Nie-• ' ! 
l 
osii, Turjey issued a statement to the effect that, if the 
United Nations could not control the situation, then Tu~kev 
... 
would be force to act. Turkish overflights of the islanci 
w,re reported the next day and mobilisation orders were is-, ' 
s~ed to Turkish forces. Foreign Minister Caglayangil issued 
:a\ statement to the effect that the Turkish-Cypriots would be 11: 1 ; l I 
1 \ ! frotected. With the worsening situation in the island (Greek 1 t , I I 
l~ha Turkish units had overrun several United Nations oosts 67 ) ... 
·~nd large-scale demonstrations in Turkey nress incr -
...,. 
~or an 
~nvasion of the island, the United States intervened to ' ;
~ve'r~ any further moves likely to worsen the already pre-I , l 
~arious situation. President Johnson appointed Cyrus R. i l 
' 
~a~ce as special envoy to go to Athens, Ankara and Cyprus I j I 
~o work with the special United Nations representative f ' 
!<Rolz-Bennett) to achieve a solution to avert any Turkish ', 1 
lntervention - not to solve the whole Cyprus issue. 68 At 
~he saJne time, a third mediation effort was launcl1ed by i i 
; 
1 
1 
i 
1 
~ 
:i 
~ 
\ 
:\ \ 
1 \ 
' ·, 
' 
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I 
I NATO ·:when Greece and Turkey accepted an offer from Manlio 
Brosio, NATO Secretary-General, to try to arrange a settle-
ment.\ 
' 
' ' 
~11 this intense diplomatic activity produced results 
when, on November 31, Greece and Turkey reached an accord, 
calling for; the disbandment of the Cyprus National Guard, 
leaving only a reorganised police force; the immediate evac-
'' 
iation from Cyprus of all Greek and Turkish troops in excess 
Of th~se allowed by the London and Zurich agreements; 
' 
' 
, I 
imrned[ate demobilisation of the armed forces held i . ~ . 1.n reaa1.-
ne,s~ in Turkey; and an expanded security role for the United 
Na.tions force. 69 According to a "New York Times .. report, ' 
1Vance had planned to fly to New York from Athens, but was 
forced to fly to Cyprus to obtain the consent of Makarios, 
in'.view of the latter's concern for adequate guarantees a-
1 70 ga·nst outside intervention in Cyprus. 
On December 22 1967 the Security Council extended the 
UNrICYP mandate by unanimous vote (resolution 244(1967]), 
but not without some discussion as to the future role U Tha.nt 
should play in determining the exact role of UNFICYP. 
Furthermore, the resolution called upon the parties concerned 
to "undertake a determined new effort" to keep the peace and 
achieve a permanent settlement to the Cyprus dispute. 
By the end of December a more significant, in ter1ns of 
a long-term resolution of the conflict within the isla::d, 
cazp.e when the Turkish-Cypriot leaders announced the formation j 
. ... 
-----z -
/ 
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of a "Transitional Administration" to administer the af-
fairs of the Turkish-Cypriot community "until such time 
as the provisions of the 1960 constitution have been fully 
implemented. 1171 A system of administrative procedures was 
effected and Kuchuk was appointed President of the Transit-
ional Administration, with Denktash (who had been living in 
Turkey since 1964) appointed Vice-President. 
Responding to the new Turkish-C~priot move, the (Greek) 
Cyprus Foreign Ministry warned all members of the dip lo:-:·.:~ ·~ic 
corps not to have any contact with the new Turkish administ-
ration and declared a Turkish diplomat, who had attened the 
meeting that approved the new system, persona non grata. 
On December 31, Denktash was arrested after landing in Cy~-
rus and deported to Turkey without charges being preferred. ! 
\ The early months of 1968 again saw a reexamonation of ' 
U Thant's role as coordinator of UNFICYP activities, whilst 
. Greece and Cyprus argued that he should try to achie\'e a 
pe(t"ma.nent settlement, Turkey considered that his r)o~, .. ~crs 
should be limited to, and defined in terms of, the context 
'f h' • d I I I 7 2 o t ·e 1.nune iate crisis. Indeed, the question of perspect-
ive •critically affected the implementation of the December 3 \ 
' I 
~greement. With Greece and Turkey complying with the pro-i 
Jisions relating to troop reductions, Makarios replied to a 
Turkish note regarding the disbandment of the National Guard 
tjy arguing that this would only be possible within the terms r l 
l 
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of a general settlement of the whole Cyprus issue. 73 
Furthermore, Makarios called for a presidential elect-
ion to "receive a new mandate" following the crisis of • 
1967. Despite opposition from a pro-enosis candidate 
Do¢tor Evdokas, Makarios received 95 per cent of the votes 
74 cast in the election held on February 25. 
I, 
' I 
' . 
I 
I 
Following the election success, Makarios initiated 
ftew peace moves; by the end of March the ban on an~r diplo-, 
matic contact with the Turkish administration was lifted I 
' 
'1 
and on April 13 Denktash was allowed to return to Cyprus 
frqm Turkey, the step generally being interpreted as a re-
' 
flection of the new initiative to obtain local-level aaree-
.,; .. 
ment. On June 24, Denktash and Glafcos Clerides conferred 
for the first time in an attempt to find a settle~ent. 
That these talks continue to the present time (l~ta~:{ 1971) 
perhaps a reflection that little subs tan ti ve progress r1as 
. 
.lS 
been made. However, it does also reflect a desire, bi' both 
parties to keep open channels of communication - in itself 
not a negative development. 
The appearance of this new plateau of negotiation, how-
ever, moved extremists within the Greek-C)rpriot ranks to 
form: a right-wing, pro-enosis political grot1p, ti1e . ~;ational \ \ 
~ t Ftont, in March 1969. (It has been suggested that . 1 ·--os-.___ 
-r 
-
! 
sib~li ty that the Front has link with dissident Gree:-.:. :1:::-:-:·.1· 
officers serving with the Cypriot National Guard cannot be • 
l 
l 
\ 
! 
f 
l 
·' 
' 
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entirely discountea. 75 ) The National Front has under-
t4ken a systematic campaign of violence and assassin-
ation which began in March 1969 with 
sassination of the Chief of Police. 
the at ter.1n t:.ecl as-... 
In subseque~t months, 
further attacks were made on prominent public figures a~d 
the organisation was proscribed in August 1969. In Janu-l '' ' I' 
,ary 1970 the Government passed a law giving to the police 
,.· 
l 
i 
' I 
powers of arrest and detention of sµspects for a period of 
a maximum of three months. 
On Marcl81970, an attempt was made on the life of 
Makarios when a helicopter carrying him was fired upon 
in Nicosia. (The National Front, disclain1ing any respons-
ibility, was later freed from blame by ~lakarios,) One 
~eek later, Polycarpos Georghiades, former Minister of Int-
erior, was found shot dead by a roadside near Kythrea. The 
circumstances of Georghiades; death are far from clear, but 
in view of his opposition to the policy of Makarios after 
1969, a serious challenge to Makarios' leadership, (indeed, 
Foley argued as long ago as 1964 that Georcr 11 i acl es ' .., role w~as ' 
important76 ), rumours circulated that Greek army officers 
h . 1· d 77 were. some ow imp icate . 
' ! 
i 
l 
.1 
The present situation is, therefore, stable but in a 
d~cidedly negative sense. U Thant's most recent r P "'\""'. r'. 'Y' ~--
- ~' '•..._/ J,._ i........ 
-(S/10005) yet again deplores the lack of any progress to-
.... 
:1. 
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I 
wards a settlement, nor even towards normalisation. 
The Turkish enclaves still exist, supplied with nec-
essary materials and aid from Turkey. According to ! 
a recent report, 78 the completion of an airstrip in 
the major Turkish enclave is indicative of the present 
state of affairs. Yet another recent report describes 
the Denktash-Clerides talks as "worse than c1eetcilc)c~:--:eci ... 79 
One wonders, in fact, if any progress has been :-:1ci,.:e at 
! 
:111. Whilst Makarios argues that "Cyprus is a Gree:, is-, j ' 
land. We shall maintain it as a unified island until we 
~ 
80 ha'.'Te handed it back to Greece" [sic], Clerides argues 
that enosis talk is· "a bit overdone", whilst the Turks 
s·ee their worst fears confirmed. The present situation 
is ,perhaps epitomised by a recent press comment, to the I I 
·effect that "One madman on either side could blow the .. 
1 t . 11 81 pace up a any minute. To safeguard the situation, 
however, the UNFICYP troops still patrol in Cyprus, with 
tth.e sole puJ:pose of preventing small scale incidents "blow-
i • 
I' 
ing the place up." 
At this stage, perhaps, it is opportune to put the role 
of UNFICYP into perspective, since it is the most stable ele-
ment in an unstable situation. From the beginning, U Thant 
interpreted the mandate contained in the initial enabling 
• resolution of March 4- -19 64 as a threefold task; to or event .. 
a recurrence of fighting by interposing the UNFICYP troops 
. / ... 
I 
I 
\: 
' 
'l 
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between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots; to define law and 
order in general terms, not relating to the 1960 Constit-
ution but to a sense of stability, and third, "a return 
to normal conditions" was interpreted as a return to \i 
,·normal" in social terms, i.e. , the reopening of shops, 
factories and farms. The Secretary-General's logical 
' premise was that the force could try to create "an atmos-
phere more favourable to the efforts to achieve a long I I 
term settlement." 82 Achieving a long term set t.lement, 
however, was not the task of the force. Whilst the ad-
ministrative arm of the United Nations force (UNCIVPOL) 
' 
could perform a centripetal function in the short term 
and in relation to inunediate issues, the long term settle-
ment was a matter for the United Nations mediator and the 
parties involved. 
. ' 
It is sufficient to comment that since the report of 
th~ United Nations mediator, Galo Plaza, was publisl1ed in 
March of 1965 83 the situation has changed little. In es-
sence, the Plaza report is a significant yet neglected docu-
ment. Perhaps for the first time, the mediator's report 
gave primary emphasis to the local level. 11 In my view the 
procedure most likely to produce fruitful results would be 
for a meeting or series of meetings to take place in the 
first instance between representatives of the two principal 
' 
: . parties who belong to Cyprus; the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-• . ! ' I ( 
. ' 
r ~ ' 
. ! 
I 
' ' ' j 
' 
' 
~ 
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l C . t . t . ,, 8 4 ; yprio conunun1. 1.es. The reasoning is quite clear: j 
j 
1 ; 
'i 
I "It is between those communities that peace, agreement 
and understanding must be formed before there is any 
solution to the Cyprus problem; it is, at base, they who 
bear arms against each other; and it is they who must 
live under the terms of any settlement." 
I 
,. I 
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c·HAPTER 8 
The Elements of a Model 
At this stage it is necessary to elaborate on those 
i~sues to which allusions were made in the preceding text, 
but which were neither explicitly mentioned or dcfi:1ed. 
This section is, in a sense, a gathering together of loose 
ends which have been present in the preceding account and 
which, if they are to be of more than passing value, need 
to be expanded and elaborated. Whilst no claim is made in 
favour of "a model of conununal conflict" based on the Cyp-
1 
rus.case, it.is to be hoped that a classification of major 
points may be of some heuristic value. 
" 
1. The levels of conflict; parties and issues. It is fair-
ly evident that there are at least two disputes relating to 
Cyprtis: at the primary level, there is the conflict in Cyp-
rus concerning the issues of day-to-day participation and 
coexistence between two separate groups - the Greek- and 
~urkish-Cypriots. At the secondary level is the dispute 
\ concerning the eventual status of Cyprus, the parties to 
this dispute being Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. It is, 
of course, not easy to separate the two in a clear cut fash-
ion, but an examination of two a:ttempts to solve ''the Cyprus 
149. 
:issus•1 illustrate the confusion that results from inter-
locking one conflict level with another. In 1959, for 
example, it was assumed that the Greek and Turkish gov-
ernments were clearly cogniscent of the demands of the 
two Cypriot communities; an identity of goals was assumed. 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution of 
' March 1964 regarded Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, the . . ... ; . 4(,: I 
T~rkish-Cypriots and the Greek-Cypriots as parties to a I 
-
' 
' ' < 
' I 
dispute. But this is plainly misleading; the parties 
are not all equally involved, nor are they concerned with 
the S·ame .issues, and it is unlikely that "a solution" 
could be found to satisfy all those concerned. The three 
governments of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain are in I I 
I • cqnflict over the strategic role of Cyprus; Britain seeks r 1- : 
to maintain a strategic base in a stable environment ; l 
w~ilst Turkey desires a Cyprus in the hands of a neutral I ' 
or1 friendly government. Thus, Lewis has written: 
Turkey's attitude has been widely interpreted as a concern for the Turkish n1inorit:l in c~·~:r·,_1s. 
I \ 
Though real, it was not paramount. 1-Ie:-c r~::ie:f anxiety was for her own security ... To ]_ct Greece complete her encirclement by anr:c.:=·=~i_::s Cyp-rus would be to prejudice the secur-i t·_j'" c,i: t.i1c entire population of Turkey for the sat::.e: of the Greek "pocket majority" in the island .. l 
I 
I 
\ 
t ' I 
I 
The position of the Greek government is more problematical. 
However, in view of the traditional tenets of the "Megali 
Idea" and the major aspects of Greek policy in the 1950's, 
• 
I 
.. 
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Cyprus may be seen as part of a larger Greek diplomatic 
strategy aimed at bolstering Greek prestige. 
As Burton has put it, the Greek and Turkish govern-
m~nts ~might have been purporting to be acting on behalf 
of and in defense of the communities; but their own negot-, 
iations and activities indicated that their ir.tercs~s were 
not firstly .those of the local cornmunities." 2 
'm-~ · be possible to identify a tertiary level, • 
( I !1 c1 c c c1 , i t 
. . Com.r l- 1 c: 1 'f"' r., )._..l ..... ~ --- .._J -- ... "',..j 
... -
th·e. United States and the soviet Union, with Cyprus ass1..un-
ing a major role in terms of alliance stability.) The ex-
flicit reference to the local-level dispute as a key to the 
resolution of conflict at all levels was made in the United 
Nations Mediator's report of 1965, in an implicit fashion. 
Yet the distinction remains both implicit and conceptual 
there has been little indication of any progress in terms 
of\practically differentiating one dispute from another. 
I 
' l ~ • 
__ · 2.\ Linkage Theory; the interaction between and \•litl1in s~'stems. : j 
i 
Ha~ing explained the existence of two systems of behavio~1r i 
\ 
in 1\·terms of two disputes, it becomes necessary to explain 
the,influence of one upon the other. Rosenau has termed 
ihis area of study "linkage theory 113 
- the search for mean-i ; C I 
,in~ful links between national and international systems . • 
• 
Rosenau has cast the problem in terms of boundaries and 
brtdges, yet is is presumed here that this starting point 
151. 
:i,s ·.erroneous. A study of the costs and benefits accrouing 
to a. state if it enters a national dispute is not a cost-
benefit analysis of getting over a bridge or getting through 
' 
boundaries. Such a perspective presumes, in a way, the 
existence of billiard-ball type states with relatively in-
permeable and concrete boundaries. The cost-benefit anal-
ysis is related to redefining a situation to the extent i . 
I 
that a new system of behaviour, not bound by state boundar-
ies, is created. Thus, when the Greek government took up 
the Cyprus issue in 1954 it did not "link" one system \..rith 
: ~riother - it recast the Greek-Greek-Cypriot relationship I 
in new behavioural terms. There was a system organised 
round a prime goal - to change the status of Cyprus. 
What the changed status of Cyprus was to be was not a point 
I 
I I of complete identity between the two Greek grot1ps, but the 
community of goals was sufficient to realign them . 1.n a new 
system. Further evidence to support this concept is the 
flow of Greek arms to Greek-Cypriots (and Turkish ar1ns to 
Turkish-Cypriots); the boundary of Cyprus was significant 
only in the sense that it was a nuisance, since British 
. (and later U .N.) patrols tried to halt the flow of ar1ns. 
Thus, critical decisions do not merely link s~·stems, 
they redefined a situation according to new criteria (e.g., 
i 
p~rceived community of, and complementarity of, interests, 
the stakes and risks of redefinition) and create new relat-
I 
l 
l· 
I 
! 
; 
·.• 
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ionships. The national-international dichotomy is in a i 
way superficial since it presumes the existence of gaps 
that have to be bridged. System theory may help to get t 
around this problem by focusing on new systems, in texrns 
1qf which a link is less meaningful . . ' 
Having provisionally classified the disputes and ex-
, plored the relationships between the two, certain observ-
ations are presented that relate primarily to the communal ! ! 
c¢nflict in Cyprus. 
3l. From difference to separation. A major objective of I ; 
' ' ( 
the.preceding account was t6 plot the evolution of the 
-relationship between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot com-
~uni ties in Cyprus. The tentative (impressionistic} con-
clusion is presented in the graph below. 
The escalation from a level of mere difference to ! I 
violent separation may be explained in terms of Gurr 1 s 4 
model of "relative deprivation", a derivitive of Dollard's 
"frustration-aggression" hypothesis. 5 The Greek disappoint-
ment\ at the British decision to hold on to Cyprus after 1878, 
despite expectations by the fernier that enosis would be forth-
~ c¢>ming, acted as a stimulus to Greek demands. Successive ef-
\ 
forts to change the status of Cyprus failed and by 1882 the 
Gr~ek-Cypriots were voicing their demands for separate repre-
sentation in the Legislative Council. With the further frust-
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FIGURE m: 
The Evolution of Difference 
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· ration of Greek demands in 1920 a new stage was reached 
when the Greek members of the Council boycotted its pro-
ceedings. The feeling was compounded in 1931. Yet the 
critical point was reached in the period after World War 
II:, when rumours had circulated that Britain was to leave 
Cyprus. When these hopes were dashed, a systematic cam-
paign of violence was planned. Clearly, a violence thres-
hold had been reached; at a certain frustration level, 
violent procedures were invoked. Yet with the use of 
·violence by one group, the second (Turkish) group itself 
turned to violence. By the late 1950's both Cypriot 
groups were fighting each other, and by the end of 1963 
they were separated and violently opposed to each other. 
This evolutionary perspective tells us something 
about the,use of violence. In the first instance, the 
threshold of violence is fairly high, yet as the con::lict 
persists the nature of violence changes; from an init~al 
symptom of frustration the factor of violence is trans-
fornLed into an endemic feature. By 1963, both groups had 
' 
come to expect that any dispute would, of necessity, be 
violent and prepared themselves accordingly. 
The factor of expectations is critical. Expectations 
are judgements about the future behaviour of others and, as 
such they are subject to distortion, .. .. ., .. 1 e Pre}'',r•1c:-. ~ay •• , ' j U~L~ ,t.::; •.•• 
become a basis for action. The iaea of a self-fulfilling 
I 
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r 
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prdphecy is also important. Thus, if the Turks expect 
. ! 
Gteek-Cypriots to resort to violence, they too will re-• I 
so\rt to violence: the appearance of E.O.K.A. stimulated I 
th;e appearance of a Turkish underground movement. I I 
si;egel 6 has termed this "defensive cultural adaptation", 
meaning that in response to a perceived change . a minor-
ity group centralises its goals around central cul~ural 
syp,.bols. In essence, the Turkish-Cypriot goals have been 
simple and appealed to all members of the group; first, 
adherence to the status quo, then taxirn (partition) when 
' 
' I 
it appeared that Britain might leave Cyprus, and then the 
~.laim for adequate powers of representation. All three l 
I 
~eflect an underlying desire of the group to preserve it-! I ' 
se]f in a separate, identifiable form. ( 
: 
I ' 
I ' 
4 •. Group structures in conflict situations. It is generally 
argued that conflict with an out-group unifies . an l n - C" r r·, '.. ~ ....-. 
,f - . ._,,. l,., .. 4;, "'-' • 
..., ... 
Thus,. for example, Coser has restated Simmel' s maxim in the 
fdllowing fashion: "Conflict with another group leads to 
the mobilisation of the energies of group members and hence 
to increased cohesion of the group." 7 The answer to this is 
that it depends upon a time factor which is important. Thus, 
in .the period 1950-1957 the Greek-Cypriots (or at least its I [ 
leadership group) were united against the Britisl1 
ish-Cypriots. As time went on, however, divergences occurred 
with respect to short term policies and long term strategies. 
""!l!t-
-i.-
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rn 1964 the re-entry into Cyprus of Grivas, who had openly 
disatjreed with Makarios' tactics earlier, was clear 
. . 
of a splitting of ranks.· Similarly, the opposition 
Ma:karios in presidential elections are indicators of 
iqn. Nor does the Simmel/Coser proposition strictly appl:/ i ! tq the Turkish-Cypriots. Whilst Kuchuk has been officially 
unopposed, the role of Denktash as a leader is far from 
dlear. Thus, it is evident that conflict duration is imp-
. ortant and in need of further explanation. 
5.1 Conflict and group boundaries. Since one of the major 
Variables in the preceding account was the concept of group 
boundary, it may be of interest to review easer's treat~1ent i 
of
1 
this ·subject. Again reformulating a proposition from I 
' 
Sihunel, Coser states; "Conflict serves to establish and 
maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies and 
8 groups." The Cyprus case verifies this proposition. The i 
I 
• foundation of ~.O.K.A. in 1955 saw Greek-Cypriots leave the 
police force (where they might have had to take up pro-Turkish 
poisi tions) and join the Greek corrununi ty, whilst the (anti-
Greek) police force became almost wholly Turkish. Morco,.,.er, 
E.O.K.A.'s systematic execution of Greek's having dealings 
with Turks is an example, if extreme, of the same phenomenon. 
More generally, however, it appears from the available evi-
dence that the general belief, held by both groups, was that 
I. 
I 
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contact with the other group was in some way dysfunctional, 
but for this statement to be concretely upheld thei~e is a 
need for further, more detailed, analysis. 
6. The relevance of the state. · From the preceding account 
~tis fairly obvious that Cyprus is neither a so\rereicrn 
.., 
nor an independent republic. • 1S further argued that It 
Cyprus is not a state nor, with the precarious co-exist-
ence of two separate communities bound by dif f eren·t val-
ues and symbols, can it hope to be in the present circum-
~tances. There is no Cypriot consciousness; there are two 
separate group consciousnesses, and they are 
by -t;.he adjectives used to describe Cypriots as ei t::eI~ ,~:cce};. 
or Turkish. There is, more pointedly, adherence anc] le~/ a 1-
ty to an organised group below the level of the state itself 
- the ethnic group. The ethnic group, both in itself and 
!"in conjunction with the larger ethnic reservoirs of "Greek-
ness" and "Turkishness", supplies the wants of its members. 
I~ternal integration, the maximisation of a favourable input-
output ratio for the society and survival and protection a-
~ainst external enemies, all functions of the nation-state 
according to Katz 9 (and others) , are performed b;/ trie e t:1r.ic 
group. Such a situation, surely, must lead us to a ree:·:L~:-·.,i::-
ation of the concept of the state, particularly its relevance 
to modern conditions where "the State" subsumes a host of 
• 
., 
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group, cultural and ethnic loyal ties, not least in for1n-" J ! 
erly colonial areas. Such an analysis may lead us to be-
leive that, in certain circumstances, "the state" may have ' 
only limited usefulness as a conceptual device. I I ; 
, '7' •. A definition of communal conflict. Conflicts within 
_states are normally labelled either revolutions or civil~ J ; 
w~rs. By using the term revolution, one implies that a i • 
c~rtain sector of the population actively revolts agai~st ' I 
~:part, a sector, or a group within the system. Such a t 
. b~lief presumes an initial state of value compatibility. 
The same may be said for civil strife: it presumes a de-
gree of eystem wholeness (Civitas) and the appearance of 
a set of centrifugal forces that cause disruption. Com-
munal conflict, i.e., conflict between communities, may 
be characterised as conflict between disparate, separate 
'1 a1'-d identifiable groups. Now the community may be organ-
· ised I around symbols such as race, language, religion or I 
qolo~r, but there is- an implicit idea of the absence of a I 
sense of wholeness, community or society. Thus, communal I I 
confiict, it is argued, is wrongly approached from the per-I 
' I I 
s~ective of the nation state. The apparent utility of sys-
tem theory may help circumvent the semantic and conceptual 
difficulties inherent in a state perspective, but even if 
it is found to be unsuitable, it may have pointed out furth-
areas of analysis. 
i. 
I . 
'· 
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I 
. 8:~ The wider systemic effects of violent conflict. The ' 
apalysis of a conflict or a set of conflicts has more 
thanl mere ·-1 . 
\ ue at all 
solving. 
intellectual value. If it is to be of any val-
it must be relevant and directed toward problem-
Recent research has revealed previously ignored 
effects of conflict, i.e., upon socialisation. Only with 
the appearance of a bitter conflict on the doorstep of 
those able to deal with the problem of socialisz1tion (i.e., 
thelUlster conflict) by virtue of their being able to allo-
cate resources to research, have these wider effects been 
\ .cp.talog-µed. i 
. 
10 Thus, for example, Fraser has recentl:z' stud-i . ' \ibd the traumatic effects of violent conflict upon children 
in Belfast and found a significant link between the frequency 
of violence and mental disorder. Yet, compared to Ulster, 
the.conflict in Cyprus is much older. That it is so may 
tell us something about the wider systemic effects of viol-
ence in the Cypriot communities. Having said that, it may 
stimulate us in the knowledge that an understanding con-
'• I 
flict, of all kinds, may have more than passing value. 
As a prominent Cypriot has recently stated, "The younger 
generation is worse - at least we used to talk to one another 
in the old days. ,They have grown up apart, behind barricades, 
and have learned only to fight." 11 
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TABLE I 
The Population of Cyprus 
.. 
( ABSOLUTE PERCENTAGE 
GREEK 136,629 73.4 
TURK 46,389 24.9 
BRITISH 691 0.4 
OTHERS 2,400 1.3 
186,084 100.0 
GREEK 80.2 
TURK 17.9 
GREEK 442,138 77.1 
TURK 104,320 18.2 
MARONITE & 
ARMENIAN 6,324 1.1 
BRITISH 17,513 3.0 
OTHERS 3,271 0.6 
573,566 100.0 
TOTAL 614,000 
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TABLE II 
Population of Cyprus: Distribution by Village 
S~TTLEMENTS 
GREEK 
,. i 
TURKISH 
,. 
i MIXED 
; (Mainly 
I 
maJor 
towns) 
I 
_i 
' 
' 
OTHERS 
' 
" 
I 
{ 
l 
I 
I 
I 
·' 
TOTAL 
i \ 
' . 
. 1 
POPULATION 
OTHERS 
OTHERS 
GREEK 
TURK 
OTHERS 
MARONITE 
GREEK 
TURK 
274,436 
3,342 
3'6, 837 
128 
255,277 
166,907 
66,907 
21,463 
2,240 
2,175 
--
65 
573,556 
NUMBER % AS PROPORTION 
OF TOTAL POPULATION 
395 62.3% 
121 19.11 
114 18.01 
4 0.61 
634 100.0% 
Source: Statistical Data by E~nic Group, Nicosia 1964. 
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